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# Finabel
Finabel promotes the interoperability of European land forces, whilst complementing EU and NATO structures, through research and decision-making recommendations.
## Sitemaps
- [XML Sitemap](https://finabel.org/sitemap.xml): Contains all public & indexable URLs for this website.
## Posts
- [Our Studies](https://finabel.org/blog/) - German Forces intend to recruit Foreign Citizenship from EU countries. 22nd January, 2019 German military recruitment has been at the forefront of discussions for the past few weeks. This topic has been relaunched by General Eberhard Zorn – army’s general inspector – (Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, highest military rank in Germany) during his interview with the
- [From the Middle East to the Sahel: UAS knowledge transfer and implications for European Security](https://finabel.org/from-the-middle-east-to-the-sahel-uas-knowledge-transfer-and-implications-for-european-security/) - Written By: Paula Muresan Supervised By: Finn Seiffert, Élea Huguet Edited By: Edoardo Dall’Amico ABSTRACT The proliferation of drone technology among non-state actors in the Sahel represents an emerging security challenge for the European Union. This paper argues that the transfer of knowledge and operational expertise from Middle East (ME) armed groups to jihadist organisations in the Sahel is reshaping regional conflict
- [Strategic Vulnerabilities in the European Union’s Dual-Use Space Architecture](https://finabel.org/strategic-vulnerabilities-in-the-european-unions-dual-use-space-architecture/) - Written By: Aurora D’Auria Supervised By: Finn Seiffert, Élea Huguet Edited By: Alexandra Huggins ABSTRACT Space is changing, increasingly becoming a more contested, congested and militarized domain. Yet, the European Union’s space architecture has historically been dual-use, with defence functions layered on systems originally designed for commercial and civilian purposes. In this context, this research
- [The Legal Challenges of IEDs: An International Humanitarian Law Perspective](https://finabel.org/the-legal-challenges-of-ieds-an-international-humanitarian-law-perspective/) - Written By: Peter Trobec Supervised By: Giustiniano Cesare Vasey Edited By: Jackson Elder ABSTRACT This paper explores how improvised explosive devices are analysed under IHL, focusing on the law governing weapons. This paper will describe what IEDs are and how they are employed, using Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021 as a case study. Against this
- [The European Defence Industrial Base: Overcoming Critical Materials’ Supply Chain Obstacles and Vulnerabilities](https://finabel.org/the-european-defence-industrial-base-overcoming-critical-materials-supply-chain-obstacles-and-vulnerabilities/) - Written By: Elea Huguet Supervised By: Finn Seiffert Edited By: Jackson Elder ABSTRACT This paper argues that Europe’s defence industrial ambitions are constrained by structural vulnerabilities in the security of its critical raw material (CRM) supply chain, meaning that increased defence spending alone will not guarantee reindustrialisation or strategic autonomy. The study evaluates Europe’s diversification
- [Russian Lawfare in the High North: European Security Implications of the Svalbard Treaty](https://finabel.org/russian-lawfare-in-the-high-north-european-security-implications-of-the-svalbard-treaty/) - Written By: Amanda Hodne Supervised By: Finn Seiffert, Élea Huguet Edited By: Alexandra Huggins ABSTRACT Located in a remote yet strategically significant position in the Arctic, the Svalbard archipelago has emerged as a new target for hybrid threats and global power competition in the 21st century. This paper assesses how the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which
- [Old Laws, New Bullets. A Tale of an Evolving Battlefield and Its Influence on Weapons Law. Part II](https://finabel.org/old-laws-new-bullets-a-tale-of-an-evolving-battlefield-and-its-influence-on-weapons-law-part-1-copy/) - Written By: Peter Trobec Supervised By: Giustiniano Cesare Vasey Edited By: Alexandra Huggins ABSTRACT – Part II During armed conflicts, international humanitarian law (IHL) or the laws of armed conflict restrict the freedom of parties to use certain weapons. The first instruments of modern IHL related to weaponry concerned and regulated bullets. The Saint-Petersburg Declaration
- [Old Laws, New Bullets. A Tale of an Evolving Battlefield and Its Influence on Weapons Law. Part I](https://finabel.org/old-laws-new-bullets-a-tale-of-an-evolving-battlefield-and-its-influence-on-weapons-law-part-1/) - Written By: Peter Trobec Supervised By: Giustiniano Cesare Vasey Edited By: Alice O’Donnell ABSTRACT During armed conflicts, international humanitarian law (IHL) or the laws of armed conflict restrict the freedom of parties to use certain weapons. The first instruments of modern IHL related to weaponry concerned and regulated bullets. The Saint-Petersburg Declaration of 1868 and
- [Legal Constraints on EU Defence and Emerging Alternatives: Is the Union Destined to Be a “Military Worm”?](https://finabel.org/legal-constraints-on-eu-defence-and-emerging-alternatives-is-the-union-destined-to-be-a-military-worm/) - Written By: Giustiniano Cesare Vasey Supervised By: Finn Seiffert Edited By: Theodora Posta ABSTRACT The European Union finds itself in a structural paradox: while it increasingly aspires to become a credible defence actor, with goals such as strategic autonomy, strengthened interoperability, and long-term military readiness, its own Treaties prohibit the use of the EU budget
- [Increasing European Defence Budgets: Towards a Stronger Defence Community?](https://finabel.org/increasing-european-defence-budgets-towards-a-stronger-defence-community/) - Written By: Clémentine Nicolas Supervised By: Finn Seiffert, Élea Huguet Edited By: Edoardo Dall’Amico ABSTRACT This paper examines the implications of rapidly increasing defence expenditures on the European defence community following recent geopolitical shifts. It finds that while higher military spending has garnered political support and strengthened Europe’s preparedness, it also generates challenges related to
- [From Arms Control to Uncertainty: Europe in a Post-New START World](https://finabel.org/from-arms-control-to-uncertainty-europe-in-a-post-new-start-world/) - Written By: Leen Leclercq Supervised By: Finn Seiffert, Élea Huguet Edited By: Alexandra Huggins ABSTRACT The international architecture for nuclear arms control, grounded in bilateral treaties between the United States and Russia and multilateral instruments such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has contributed to strategic stability and predictability for decades. In recent years, however, this
- [The Divergent Reliance on PMSCs in the Russo-Ukrainian War: A Comparative Analysis](https://finabel.org/the-divergent-reliance-on-pmscs-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war-a-comparative-analysis/) - Written By: Alberto Aloni Supervised By: Finn Seiffert, Élea Huguet Edited By: Alexandra Huggins ABSTRACT This paper examines the growing reliance on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in the contemporary security landscape, focusing on their utilisation in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. It offers a comparative analysis of Russian and Ukrainian patterns of mobilisation, assessing
- [Romania’s Defence Industry at a Crossroads: Modernising Capabilities and Mitigating Dependencies through SAFE Funding](https://finabel.org/romanias-defence-industry-at-a-crossroads-modernising-capabilities-and-mitigating-dependencies-through-safe-funding/) - Romania will benefit from over €16 billion in funding through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mechanism, the second-largest allocation established by the European Commission. This fuels a newer and unique blend of growth opportunities for its defence capabilities. Romania's defence standing, strongly shaped by the country’s strategic position and its NATO and EU membership, has significant relevance for the traditional security landscape in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area; more so in light of evolving hybrid threats posed by Russia’s destabilising attempts to extend its sphere of influence in the region. The paper assesses current structural vulnerabilities in Romania’s defence sector, and discusses how industrial cooperation with a host of European partners, if properly pursued, will allow Bucharest to strengthen the competitiveness of the state-owned company ROMARM while also mitigating the risks of external dependency on its closest ally, the U.S., for procurement of military equipment.
- [NATO’s Codification Gap: Why Joint ISR Still Falls Short](https://finabel.org/natos-codification-gap-why-joint-isr-still-falls-short/) - Written by: Kevin Morgan Whitehead Supervised by: Elise Alsteens Edited by: Theodora Posta Abstract: This article examines NATO’s persistent “codification gap” in Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR). It shows how the Alliance often comes to improvise ISR solutions during crises, but struggles to translate them into binding standards and enforceable mechanisms. This is
- [Undersea Warfare in the 21st Century Part Two: Anti-submarine Warfare Technology and the Protection of Submarine Cables](https://finabel.org/undersea-warfare-in-the-21st-century-part-two-anti-submarine-warfare-doctrine-and-emerging-capabilities/) - Written By: Rodrigo Andrade Santos Supervised By: Elise Alsteens & Jennifer Kalushi Edited By: Jackson Elder ABSTRACT Building on this series’ first part on emerging capabilities in undersea warfare, this paper explores how submarine data cables, as critical infrastructure, are affected by developments such as unmanned vehicles, big-data analytics, and advanced computing. It highlights how
- [Undersea Warfare in the 21st Century Part One: Anti-submarine Warfare – Doctrine and Emerging Capabilities](https://finabel.org/emerging-technologies-and-the-laws-of-war-ai-warfare-under-ihl-and-the-eu-regulation-gap-2/) - Written By: Rodrigo Andrade Santos Supervised By: Elise Alsteens & Jennifer Kalushi Edited By: Jackson Elder ABSTRACT This paper discusses anti-submarine warfare (ASW), addressing conventional ASW platforms and doctrine against a backdrop of emerging capabilities. These include unmanned systems, non-acoustic detection methods, and advanced computing. Their potential to influence the future of ASW across its
- [The End of State Secrets with Quantum Cryptography](https://finabel.org/the-end-of-state-secrets-with-quantum-cryptography/) - Quantum computing can address problems faster than classical computing. Quantum properties like superposition, entanglement, and interference allow quantum computers to even break modern encryption, marking the end of state secrets and secure communications. To combat this, militaries must quickly implement Post-Quantum Computing and Quantum Key Distribution to protect classified information from adversary attempts to use quantum tools to harvest it. So far, Europe has done well to set bold policy targets for a quantum communication network and for institutions to implement PQC. However, it can do more by creating an enabling environment to achieve policy targets.
- [High Energy Lasers – Tactical Tool or Star Wars?](https://finabel.org/high-energy-lasers-tactical-tool-or-star-wars/) - In an environment where Europe’s adversaries – non-state actors and otherwise – are using drones extensively, High-Energy Lasers (HELs) are an easy, cheap, and efficient countermeasure. However, as a speed-of-light weapon, HELs’ ability to defeat hypersonic missiles also potentially thwarts attempted nuclear first-strikes and upsets Mutually Assured Destruction calculations. It can also frustrate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts by dazzling or blinding aerial and orbital optical sensors. However, there are technical challenges of thermal blooming, power management, and line-of-sight requirements. Europe has made some effort to centralise HEL production in the TALOS-TWO project. However, multiple ongoing HEL projects risk fragmented development. Europe should further centralise such efforts by improving communication and involving more stakeholders in the development process.
- [From Stabilisation to Securitisation: The EU in Libya](https://finabel.org/from-stabilisation-to-securitisation-the-eu-in-libya/) - Following the 2011 NATO intervention, Libya suffered increased instability with shifts in governance and a lack of central power. Following this, in 2013, the European Union (EU) launched missions in the country through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), aimed at supporting border management. However, questions were raised regarding the EU’s intentions as stabilising Libya became a vital security issue due to the country becoming a departure point for irregular migration. This Info Flash examines how securitisation shaped the EU’s crisis management in Libya to offer broader lessons about the Union’s limitations in responding to crises. Within the Libya case study and using securitisation as a conceptual framework, the research finds that a change in rhetoric within the CSDP’s missions, a gap between objectives and implementation, and persistent divisions within the Union carry broader lessons for the Union. Indeed, these weaknesses have ultimately shown that the EU tends to focus on short-term priorities rather than long-term stabilisation, becomes stuck in political entrapment that perpetuates missions, and experiences fragmentation within its member states that weakens its credibility.
- [NATO’s Renewed Arctic Commitment: Strategic Adaptation to Climate Change, Russian Ambitions and Chinese Expansion](https://finabel.org/natos-renewed-arctic-commitment-strategic-adaptation-to-climate-change-russian-ambitions-and-chinese-expansion/) - The Arctic is emerging as a region of critical geopolitical importance, mainly due to the wide effects of climate change, which are opening the Russian Arctic to economic and military expansion, and attracting Chinese investments. NATO has been engaged in the region since its creation; however, in recent times, it began to recalibrate its strategic posture to address the new growing challenges. This paper investigates the Alliance’s renewed commitment to the High North, putting it into context with the emergence of new, pressing security challenges in the region. First, after discussing NATO’s historical security stance in the Arctic, the focus is shifted to the threat-multiplying effect climate change has on regional security. Next, the paper emphasizes the expanding influence of Russia and the rising role of China as key actors in the Arctic. These security challenges lay the ground for the analysis of the Alliance’s expanding commitment and reinforced focus on its northern flank.
- [Emerging Technologies and the Laws of War: Ai Warfare under IHL and the EU Regulation Gap](https://finabel.org/emerging-technologies-and-the-laws-of-war-ai-warfare-under-ihl-and-the-eu-regulation-gap/) - Written By: Clara Torregrosa Basco Supervised By: Giustiniano Cesare Vasey Edited By: Chloé Schuyer ABSTRACT Artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping warfare as we know it. As the EU strives to improve its technological competitiveness and resilience in the military, security and defence sectors, the world struggles to find a consensus to regulate the use of
- [Soft Borders, Hard Lessons: Moldova, Hybrid Warfare and the New Eastern Threat](https://finabel.org/soft-borders-hard-lessons-moldova-hybrid-warfare-and-the-new-eastern-threat/) - Moldova is facing growing hybrid threats, аs the Russian Federation continues to deploy coordinated disinformation, cyber operations, political interference, energy coercion and the manipulation of unresolved territorial conflicts. All these actions are meant to destabilise the state, in addition to complicating its Euro-Atlantic integration (Wesslau, 2024; Maitland et al., 2025; Dhojnacki, 2025). NATO and the EU have responded with corresponding yet diverse strategies: with NATO concentrating on defence capacity-building and hybrid resilience, and the EU stressing on governance reforms and institutional strengthening (NATO, 2024a; European Council, 2025). This piece examines Russia’s hybrid toolkit, all the while evaluating the effectiveness of NATO and the EU’s responses and offering policy recommendations for strengthening Moldova’s security within the broader Black Sea strategy.
- [The Role of Strategic Culture in Germany’s Zeitenwende](https://finabel.org/the-role-of-strategic-culture-in-germanys-zeitenwende/) - The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 constituted a watershed moment for European security and triggered a fundamental transformation in Germany’s defence policy. Chancellor Scholz’s announcement of a “Zeitenwende” marked a sharp departure from decades of military restraint, initiating significant investments in the Bundeswehr and a commitment to NATO’s defence spending targets. This research examines how Germany’s strategic culture, traditionally characterised by moderation and ambivalence toward military power, both enabled and constrained this policy shift. Utilising the conceptual lens of strategic culture, the paper analyses the historical and ideational underpinnings that shaped Germany’s approach to crisis management and territorial defence, arguing that the swift pivot post-2022 reflects a return to deeply embedded national traditions rather than a revolutionary change. Ultimately, the study emphasises the enduring influence of strategic culture on Germany’s ability to adapt to shifting security demands in Europe.
- [The Forgotten Strategic Region: The Security Situation in the Western Sahel, Russian Influence, and European Security](https://finabel.org/the-forgotten-strategic-region-the-security-situation-in-the-western-sahel-russian-influence-and-european-security/) - Since the end of European missions in the Western Sahel and the military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the security situation in the region has deteriorated significantly. Jihadists and other insurgents have gained ground, while the regimes are being kept from total collapse by the newfound influence and military presence of Russia and its new strategic ambitions through the Russian Africa Corps. The disastrous security situation in the Western Sahel and instability in West Africa threatens European Security. This threat is worsened by the presence of Russia and other hostile powers. European countries must find new, improved, and pragmatic ways to engage with the region again.
- [The role of PMSCs in the EU’s Security and Defence Policy: a temporary complementary tool](https://finabel.org/the-role-of-pmscs-in-the-eus-security-and-defence-policy-a-temporary-complementary-tool/) - The following paper will examine the European Union’s reliance on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). By analysing regulatory frameworks, parliamentary initiatives, and case studies, namely Operation Atalanta and EULEX Kosovo, it highlights both the operational benefits and the political, legal, and ethical challenges of outsourcing security functions. The paper will show that PMSCs can provide rapid deployment, specialised expertise, and logistical support, but cannot replace core military tasks reserved to States. Gaps in regulation, accountability, and oversight risk undermining parliamentary and democratic control together with the EU’s credibility. The paper concludes that PMSCs should remain a complementary tool within EU security and defence policy, integrated through common standards, and binding and common legislation.
- [Future EU–South Korea Strategic Cooperation: From Value to a Pragmatic-Based Foreign Policy](https://finabel.org/future-eu-south-korea-strategic-cooperation-from-value-to-a-pragmatic-based-foreign-policy/) - Written by: Arvid William Olink Supervised by: Elise Alsteens Edited by: Theodora Posta Abstract: The EU–ROK strategic partnership deepened significantly under President Yoon Suk Yeo’s value-based diplomacy, particularly in the wake of the 2022 Russia–Ukraine War. However, following Yoon’s impeachment in 2025, it is uncertain whether the trend towards closer cooperation will continue under his successor Lee Jae-myung
- [From Isolation to Integration: The Rise of the Axis of Upheaval around Russia’s War in Ukraine ](https://finabel.org/from-isolation-to-integration-the-rise-of-the-axis-of-upheaval-around-russias-war-in-ukraine/) - Written by: Rodrigo Andrade Santos Supervised by: Elise Alsteens Edited by: Theodora Posta Abstract: The Russo-Ukrainian war has transformed Russia’s isolation into a network of pragmatic defence partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea. This paper argues that what ties these four states, often grouped as the ‘Axis of Upheaval’, is less ideological unity than
- [The Silent Global Threat: Climate Security and the Need for a Bold European Response](https://finabel.org/the-silent-global-threat-climate-security-and-the-need-for-a-bold-european-response/) - Written by: Clara Torregrosa Basco Supervised by: Giustiniano Cesare Vasey Edited by: Theodora Posta Abstract: For decades, scientists have been warning about the impending existential planetary emergency to no avail. Transnational challenges, such as climate change, pollution, environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity, further exacerbate existing security risks, thus requiring a swift and united European response. This
- [Hyper-Accurate Navigation and Sensing with Quantum Tools](https://finabel.org/hyper-accurate-navigation-and-sensing-with-quantum-tools/) - Written by: Arjun Jayaraman Supervised by: Elise Alsteens and Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Jackson Elder Abstract: Positioning, Navigation, Timing (PNT) and sensing are crucial for fighting wars. However, problems are on the horizon: (i) GPS-denied or degraded environments; (ii) drift in inertial navigation sensors; and (iii) radars that struggle to identify ever-stealthier platforms. PNT and sensing
- [Optimisation, Simulation, and Decision Making with Quantum Computing](https://finabel.org/optimisation-simulation-and-decision-making-with-quantum-computing/) - Written by: Arjun Jayaraman Supervised by: Elise Alsteens and Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Edoardo Dall’Amico Abstract: Quantum computing, or computing powered by qubits, can resolve many issues with classical computing. The latter lacks the processing power required to create optimal logistics solutions, accurately simulate molecular behaviour in materials science research, fuse information from multi-modal sensors
- [Heavy Armour: The Main Battle Tank in Evolving Warfare and European Development](https://finabel.org/heavy-armour-the-main-battle-tank-in-evolving-warfare-and-european-development/) - Written by: Finn Seiffert Supervised by: Elise Alsteens and Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Sarah Khossossi Abstract: This paper examines the performance of tanks in modern warfare in the context of new technological threats and devastating tank losses, addressing the question of the viability of the Main Battle Tank on modern and future battlefields.
- [Sudan’s civil war and the Enforcement Gap in International Humanitarian Law](https://finabel.org/sudans-civil-war-and-the-enforcement-gap-in-international-humanitarian-law/) - Written by: Federico Renda Supervised by: Elise Alsteens and Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Jonas Heins Abstract: For the past two years, Sudan has been afflicted by a brutal civil war between rival military groups controlling the country. War crimes are being committed en masse by both sides, with countless civilian casualties and massive internal displacement
- [Towards a European Intelligence Agency? The Untapped Potential and Legal Implications of Intelligence Integration In the EU](https://finabel.org/towards-a-european-intelligence-agency-the-untapped-potential-and-legal-implications-of-intelligence-integration-in-the-eu/) - Written by: Clara Torregrosa Basco Supervised by: Giustiniano Cesare Vasey Edited by: Theodora Posta Abstract: The current geopolitical climate and the rise of complex transnational, hybrid threats have rehashed decades-old debates on whether European countries should increase intelligence cooperation to improve readiness for war, crisis or conflict. This article examines existing intelligence sharing schemes in Europe,
- [Operational Energy, Operational Warfighters](https://finabel.org/operational-energy-operational-warfighters/) - Written by: Arjun Jayaraman Supervised by: Elise Alsteens and Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Sarah Khossoss Abstract: Operational Energy is crucial for warfighting. Military bases, platforms, and soldiers must be adequately powered in their operations. However, Europe is currently dependent unstable sources of fuel while reducing its refining capacity to facilitate the green transition. Sustainable Aviation Fuels and
- [The EU’s Dual-Use Dilemma: Balancing Openness, Security, and Competitiveness](https://finabel.org/the-eus-dual-use-dilemma-balancing-openness-security-and-competitiveness/) - Written by: Jennifer Kalushi Supervised by: Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Yonas Heins Abstract: This paper situates dual-use technologies at the core of the EU’s security–competitiveness agenda, among intensifying great power competition. It traces the shift from a defence-led to a civilian-led innovation model and argues that rapid civil–military convergence makes the binary dual-use terminology no longer
- [Meeting the Drone Challenge: The Future of UAVs in Hybrid Warfare](https://finabel.org/meeting-the-drone-challenge-the-future-of-uavs-in-hybrid-warfare/) - Written by: Federico Favia Supervised by: Elise Alsteens, Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Theodora Posta Abstract: The proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred to as drones, is driving the evolution of hybrid warfare, which blends conventional and unconventional military tactics. These versatile and often low-cost assets have introduced a powerful tool for state
- [From Drones to Doubt: Russia’s Cognitive Attack in Poland](https://finabel.org/from-drones-to-doubt-russias-cognitive-attack-in-poland/) - Written by: Aurora D’Auria Supervised by: Elise Alsteens & Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Jackson Elder Abstract: This paper analyses Russia’s cognitive attack in Poland following the drone incursion on the night between the 10th and 11th of September 2025. Using the concepts of cognitive warfare and cognitive security, it demonstrates how Moscow leveraged psychological manipulation,
- [Attrition : The Uncomfortable Reality of War and its Neglect in Contemporary Western Military Thought](https://finabel.org/attrition-the-uncomfortable-reality-of-war-and-its-neglect-in-contemporary-western-military-thought/) - Written by: Finn Seiffert Supervised by: Elise Alsteens & Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Theodora Posta Although many wars are started with the assumption of an achievable, quick victory, the vast majority of wars tend to develop into protracted conflicts that go on far longer than the aggressor had expected. Such wars involve a heavy
- [Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference: Lessons from the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency](https://finabel.org/countering-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-lessons-from-the-swedish-psychological-defence-agency/) - Written by: Sofia Linna Supervised by: Elise Alsteens & Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Sarah Khossossi This Research Report is part of a two-paper series focusing on Sweden’s psychological defence and how it can complement the EU’s efforts in countering foreign information influence campaigns. In broad terms, psychological defence refers to the resilience to foreign propaganda.
- [Special Operations Forces for the Evolving Battlefield](https://finabel.org/special-operations-forces-for-the-evolving-battlefield/) - Written by: Arjun Jayaraman Supervised by: Elise Alsteens & Kevin Whitehead Edited by: Jackson Elder This Research Report is part of a two-paper series focusing on Sweden’s psychological defence and how it can complement the EU’s efforts in countering foreign information influence campaigns. In broad terms, psychological defence refers to the resilience to foreign propaganda.
- [The Airbus Effect: Paths to Interoperability and Cohesion](https://finabel.org/the-airbus-effect-paths-to-interoperability-and-cohesion/) - Written by: Aurora D’Auria Supervised by: Jennifer Kalushi and Elise Alsteens Edited by: Edoardo Dell’Amico This research highlights that Member States’ interoperability in the air domain has evolved further than in the land sector because of a combination of a unifying regulatory framework and industrial consolidation. EU legal initiatives, such as the Single European
- [The EU’s Engagement In The Indo-Pacific: From Bilateral To Multilateral?](https://finabel.org/the-eus-engagement-in-the-indo-pacific-from-bilateral-to-multilateral/) - Writer: Jennifer Kalushi Supervisor: Elise Alsteens Editor: Sarah Khossossi Abstract The Indo-Pacific has become central to the European Union’s economic security and geopolitical future, as its trade routes and defence-industrial supply chains are increasingly shaped by Sino–US rivalry. Therefore, the EU has adopted an Indo-Pacific strategy and has expanded its presence. However, a gap persists
- [Europe’s Quest for Defence Readiness: Making Ukraine a ‘Steel Porcupine’](https://finabel.org/europes-quest-for-defence-readiness-making-ukraine-a-steel-porcupine/) - Writer: Federico Favia Supervisor: Jennifer Kalushi and Elise Alsteen Editor: Jackson Elder Abstract At the 2025 State of the Union Address to the European Parliament, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen placed a strong emphasis on developing a framework of long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. Accordingly, the Defence Readiness Roadmap released in October includes a specific initiative
- [Reforming Europe’s Defence: Amending the Treaties for a European Defence Union](https://finabel.org/reforming-europes-defence-amending-the-treaties-for-a-european-defence-union/) - Written By: Federico Renda Supervised By: Giustiniano Cesare Vasey Edited By: . Edoardo Dall’Amico ABSTRACT To date, Europe’s defence architecture has been growing into a patchwork of more than 160 bi- and plurilateral defence partnerships with limited proposals for military interoperability enhancement. After decades of European patchwork defence, this approach appears insufficient, now more than
- [Information Manipulation and Interference Countermeasures in the EU: Enhancing Resilience through a Whole-of-Society Approach](https://finabel.org/information-manipulation-and-interference-countermeasures-in-the-eu-enhancing-resilience-through-a-whole-of-society-approach/) - Writer: Sofia Linna Supervisor: Jennifer Kalushi and Elise Alsteen Editor: Jackson Elder Abstract This Research Report is the second part of a two-paper series on how Europe counters malign information influence and disinformation. The first paper looked at Sweden’s Cold War–era psychological defence model and its focus on resilience and fundamental rights.This follow-up shifts to the
- [European Sky Shield Initiative: Evolution and Challenges in Multi-Layer Air-Defence Against Drone Saturation and Hypersonic Missiles](https://finabel.org/european-sky-shield-initiative-evolution-and-challenges-in-multi-layer-air-defence-against-drone-saturation-and-hypersonic-missiles/) - This InfoFlash assesses how the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) can adapt while advancing EU strategic autonomy and retaining full interoperability with NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD). Europe must stay ready to face saturation drone attacks, massed cruise and ballistic missiles, and emergent hypersonic threats that compress decision cycles and invert defender cost calculus. It frames a triad of space-based missile early warning, a common BM/C2 layer, and missile interceptors as the decisive lever to cut decision time and raise deterrence. It maps current layers (Skyranger 30, IRIS-T, Patriot, Arrow 3) and gaps in stockpiles, costs, cross-border command and data-sharing. It argues for anchoring ESSI to NATINAMDS, accelerating ODIN’S EYE II, TWISTER, HYDIS and HYDEF projects, and adopting any-sensor/any-shooter standards. Recommendations include bundled procurement, EU-level financing, passive/multistatic feeds, and a common operating system to close C2 gaps.
- [A New European “Drone Wall”?](https://finabel.org/a-new-european-drone-wall/) - On September 18, 2025, EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius advocated the creation of a “drone wall” along the Union’s eastern border and convened a meeting of the EU defence ministers to address the mounting threat. The conference, held on September 26 and chaired by the Commission, gathered ministers from Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Finland, alongside Ukraine and NATO as an observer (Liboreiro, 2025). A couple of weeks earlier, in her State of the Union speech, European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen had already promoted an EU-backed drone wall to “heed the call of our Baltic friends”, defining it as “the bedrock of credible defence” (Von der Leyen, 2025, para. 11).
- [Simulation-Based Assessment of Passive Airbase Defences in Peer Warfare](https://finabel.org/simulation-based-assessment-of-passive-airbase-defences-in-peer-warfare/) - The proliferation of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) poses a critical threat to NATO airbases, where concentrated high-value assets are vulnerable to saturation missile strikes. While active defences such as the Patriot system can intercept a portion of incoming threats, their finite capacity and unfavourable cost-exchange ratios underscore the need for complementary passive measures. This study employs a probabilistic, Monte Carlo–based simulation to quantify the protective value of Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) under high-intensity attack conditions. Using Ämari Air Base, Estonia, as a representative NATO installation, the model integrates missile targeting logic, blast damage physics, active defence interception probabilities, and HAS degradation mechanics across 10,000 attack iterations. Two configurations are compared: the current shelter allocation versus an enhanced posture with additional HAS-protected aircraft. Results indicate that increased HAS utilisation reduces average aircraft losses by 4.6%, lowers exposed-to-sheltered loss ratios from 1.85:1 to 1.54:1, and decreases high-value asset kill probabilities by ~7%. While gains exhibit diminishing returns, HAS density also distributes targeting probability, indirectly enhancing survivability across the base. The findings affirm the continued relevance of Cold War-era hardening strategies in modern threat environments and support integrated, layered defence concepts combining active interception, sheltering, and deception to maximise operational resilience under saturation strike conditions.
- [Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Plan — Legal Framework and the Limits to a Way Forward for the Defence Union](https://finabel.org/readiness-2030-and-the-rearm-plan-legal-framework-and-the-limits-to-a-way-forward-for-the-defence-union/) - This research explores the European Commission’s White Paper Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Europe Plan within the broader legal and institutional framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It examines the Plan’s potential to foster integration in the defence sector through an €800 billion investment, while addressing legal, political and budgetary constraints. Particular attention is given to the legal framework of the EU’s external actions, the budgetary architecture of the ReArm plan and the financing restrictions imposed by Article 41(2) TEU, highlighting the shortcomings and the limits of the competences of the Union in the external actions field and how those impede the creation of a credible, common Defence Union.
- [Security over Humanity? Legal Implications of Withdrawals from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban](https://finabel.org/security-over-humanity-legal-implications-of-withdrawals-from-the-anti-personnel-mine-ban/) - This paper explores the legal and ethical implications of state withdrawals from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), particularly under claims of national security. As global security dynamics shift, some states are re-evaluating their adherence to disarmament treaties, raising concerns about the durability of humanitarian norms. Focusing on recent developments in Eastern Europe and NATO-aligned countries, the study argues that invoking national security to justify withdrawal lacks sufficient legal foundation and threatens to erode the integrity of international humanitarian law. Through analysis of Article 20 of the APMBC and related legal principles, it demonstrates that the treaty’s non-derogable humanitarian commitments cannot be overridden by strategic calculations. The paper warns that such withdrawals set dangerous precedents, weakening both normative and legal frameworks designed to protect civilians from indiscriminate weapons like landmines.
- [The geopolitical importance of Cyprus: Turkish and British military presence on EU territory](https://finabel.org/the-geopolitical-importance-of-cyprus-turkish-and-british-military-presence-on-eu-territory/) - The Republic of Cyprus holds a sensitive position within the European Union, facing compromised sovereignty due to ongoing military occupation and foreign control. Since accession to the EU in 2004, the entirety of the island is EU territory, though EU law remains suspended in those areas where the Republic of Cyprus has no effective control. The self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognised only by Türkiye, operates outside the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union, creating a legal and political anomaly. Brexit further complicates cohesion, as the British Sovereign Base Areas in Akrotiri and Dhekelia remain under UK sovereignty and serve both British and US military interests. Cyprus remains the only EU Member State hosting non-EU military operations. The situation in Cyprus challenges EU sovereignty, regional security, and implementation of EU law. The presence of non-EU military on EU territory without effective EU control can exacerbate the precarious situation of Cyprus, leaving the island vulnerable to the geopolitical developments in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- [The 2022 Russia-Ukraine War as a Test of Resolve: Challenges in Deterring Future Russian Aggression](https://finabel.org/the-2022-russia-ukraine-war-as-a-test-of-resolve-challenges-in-deterring-future-russian-aggression/) - The Russia-Ukraine War (2022) brought an unprecedented degree of unity and scale to the responses to Russia’s invasion among European Union member states and the United States, in a way that was incomparable to their responses to the Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-2022) crises. A weak resolve – the firmness of those responses and the underpinning willingness to incur costs – in the preceding crises may have fostered an expectation in the Kremlin that Washington and European capitals' responses to future aggression would follow a similar path. Hence, this paper examines the challenges for resolve in responding to the Russia-Ukraine War (2022), in order to discourage future aggression. It finds that, throughout the three crises, concerns over escalatory risks and disunity in responses between European capitals and Washington constitute two persistent challenges. Maintaining unity can become increasingly fraught as the economic and political costs increase, especially in countries that have historically held closer cultural and economic ties with Russia.
- [The Operational Challenge of Climate Change for European Land Forces](https://finabel.org/the-operational-challenge-of-climate-change-for-european-land-forces/) - Climate change has evolved into a standalone threat. This is changing the role and mission of European land forces, as they are increasingly required to perform humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as partake in conflicts that are exacerbated through climate change. This climate phenomenon is straining the personnel of European land forces, as they are forced to train and operate under more extreme weather conditions, such as above-average heat. Their equipment is also proving inadequate to respond to these new requirements. European land forces, and Europe’s militaries in general, must cooperate and communicate in order to find common solutions to the challenge of climate change.
- [Toward a European System-of-Systems: Achieving Seamless Data Interoperability Between Sixth-Generation Fighter Projects (GCAP & FCAS)](https://finabel.org/toward-a-european-system-of-systems-achieving-seamless-data-interoperability-between-sixth-generation-fighter-projects-gcap-fcas/) - Europe is fielding two sixth‑generation fighter families, the UK‑Italy‑Japan Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) and the Franco‑German‑Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS), to reclaim strategic autonomy following F‑35 kill‑switch and data-sharing concerns. This InfoFlash frames interoperability as the decisive variable, defines the pan‑European combat cloud, and maps overlaps between GCAP, FCAS, and enabling standards such as Link16, ESSOR, EICACS and EPIIC. Making the two projects interoperable would allow Europe to fuse compress decision cycles and deny hostile vetoes over its airpower. Risks of fragmentation emerge if divergent architectures, EU–UK/Japan divides, or legacy dependencies persist. Recommendations call for a NATO‑anchored Combat Cloud Waveform task force, a federated digital‑twin lab chain, and a GCAP‑FCAS board to translate study outputs into flight‑verified standards before 2030. Achieving interoperability by design would secure European sovereignty and coalition effectiveness.
- [On-Orbit Satellite Servicing Technologies – Towards European Space Defence Autonomy](https://finabel.org/on-orbit-satellite-servicing-technologies-towards-european-space-defence-autonomy/) - This research paper explores the role of on-orbit satellite servicing (OOS) technologies for the acceleration of European space autonomy. By assessing the global historical evolution of OOS, with a particular focus on the United States, China, and Russia, the paper establishes an overview of current OOS technologies and their growing strategic relevance. It finds that while in comparison to other global space actors, European OOS capacities have historically been underdeveloped, investments in OOS offer a cost-efficient opportunity to significantly bolster European autonomy. With recent changes in European defence policy and an increased focus on space as a strategic domain, new opportunities have emerged to close the resulting capability gap. Examining European projects such as ClearSpace-1, RISE, and EROSS+, the analysis concludes that expanding investments in private-public partnerships between governments and commercial providers are the most efficient path towards expanding European OOS capabilities.
- [EU Normative Power and its Limits: the case of Cyprus](https://finabel.org/eu-normative-power-and-its-limits-the-case-of-cyprus/) - This paper explores the perception of the European Union as a normative power in international relations. This concept refers to its ability to shape the behaviour of member states and third-party countries through the diffusion of its norms and values. Building on theoretical perspectives, the paper examines the EU's unique reliance on economic, legal, and diplomatic instruments rather than military force. It also discusses the main tools the EU employs to project normative influence, such as accession processes, development aid, and peacebuilding initiatives. To clarify the challenges and contradictions of this approach, the paper includes a case study on Cyprus. This example highlights the weaknesses of EU normative power in contexts of unsolved conflict and opposing national interests. Essentially, the analysis reflects on the tension between the EU’s aspirations and the realities of foreign policy shaped by internal diversity and external geopolitical pressures.
- [Distinguishing Civilians and Non-combatants: How Technological Warfare Challenges International Humanitarian Law](https://finabel.org/distinguishing-civilians-and-non-combatants-how-technological-warfare-challenges-international-humanitarian-law/) - Despite evolving forms of warfare, the obligation to distinguish between military and civilian objectives remains a fundamental principle of international humanitarian law since the 19th century. However, the roles of civilians, combatants, and non-combatants are difficult to distinguish under the current legal framework. Today’s public discourse, exacerbated by media exaggerations and political propaganda, equates the term ‘non-combatant’ with that of ‘civilian’, portraying civilians as innocent and vulnerable. However, not all civilians are non-combatants, and there is an increase in involvement by civil personnel which have military and strategic significance. As civilian and military functions overlap, especially through dual-use technologies and remote systems, the traditional civilian/combatant dichotomy appears outdated and incomplete. The lack of clarity on such fundamental distinctions promotes divergent interpretations and undermines the uniform applicability of international humanitarian law.
- [The European Commission’s 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework Proposal: Strengthening Defence Spending](https://finabel.org/the-european-commissions-2028-2034-multiannual-financial-framework-proposal-strengthening-defence-spending/) - On 16 July 2025, the European Commission presented its proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which establishes the rules and expenditure ceilings for broad categories of spending—referred to as "headings"—over a six year period from 2028 to 2034.
- [Outpaced at Sea? What AUKUS Reveals About Europe’s Strategic Drift](https://finabel.org/outpaced-at-sea-what-aukus-reveals-about-europes-strategic-drift/) - The AUKUS pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States has swiftly shifted the international dialogue on naval power (Hellyer & Stevens, 2022). For the first time, a non-nuclear weapon state is being armed with nuclear-powered submarines, thus changing not only the Indo-Pacific security environment but, additionally, opening a new chapter in strategic defence cooperation (Cheng, 2022). Whilst London and Washington were putting importance on the strategic need of countering China, Europe wаs left watching from afar: particularly France, whose billion-euro submarine deal with Australia had quickly collаpsed overnight (Tertrais, 2021). This аrticle explores how AUKUS redefines traditional defence norms and remodels the global nuclear submarine balance (Hellyer & Stevens, 2022). Likewise, it examines the implications for the European Union, which has long aimed for larger strategic autonomy, yet still struggles to coordinate effectively at sea (Fiott et al., 2021). Geographically speaking, AUKUS may be a distant pact, however, its message to Europe is as clear as day: naval power matters, and partnerships formed on trust, swiftness, as well as strategic clarity, are already setting the pace (Fiott, 2018).
- [Episode 9: Innovation Meets Operations: AI, Unmanned Systems, and European Defence Readiness ](https://finabel.org/episode-9-innovation-meets-operations-ai-unmanned-systems-and-european-defence-readiness/) - In this episode of StrategicALLY, hosts Livia Perrulli and Simon Perrin de Brichambaut are joined by Yves Augustus, former Belgian Army officer and Director of Business Development at STARK. With a background spanning engineering, defence, and business development, Mr. Augustus brings a unique perspective on how Europe can bridge capability gaps through innovation. We explore how the private sector can better respond to the operational needs of armed forces, the potential of AI-powered unmanned systems, and what capabilities are still lacking across European defence. Mr. Augustus also shares his views on transatlantic innovation gaps, lessons from U.S. initiatives like the Replicator program, and how EU defence investments could reshape industrial readiness. Tune in as we discuss how responsible innovation and military insight can drive strategic resilience and strengthen Europe’s position in a competitive global landscape. Podcast edited by Livia Perrulli. For more information about STARK and its work, visit their website and follow Yves Augustus on LinkedIn.
- [Lines of Sustainment: Evaluating Ukrainian Military Logistics in the Russo-Ukrainian War](https://finabel.org/lines-of-sustainment-evaluating-ukrainian-military-logistics-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war/) - This paper aims to examine the critical role of logistics in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, focusing on the evolving challenges and innovations in Ukraine's military logistics infrastructure. Logistical disruptions, especially from Russian missile strikes and precision bombing, threaten Ukraine's operational momentum and the sustainability of its military operations. This piece explores Ukraine's efforts to modernise its logistics systems, drawing from both doctrinal shifts and technological advancements, such as the integration of drones for last-mile delivery and the launch of the DOT Chain digital logistics platform. Despite these innovations, systemic challenges such as bureaucratic delays and limited air defence coverage persist, undermining the effectiveness of Ukraine's logistics network. The paper offers recommendations for enhancing resilience at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
- [Weaknesses in Civil Defence: How Prepared is the European Union?](https://finabel.org/weaknesses-in-civil-defence-how-prepared-is-the-european-union/) - This paper explores shortcomings of European civil defence by examining both infrastructure vulnerabilities and the widespread unpreparedness of civilians in the face of modern threats. While military spending across the European Union has increased in recent years, civil defence has lagged, with critical needs outdated or insufficient. The increasing complexity of global threats highlights the urgency of updating these systems. The civilian population remains largely unaware and unprepared to handle prolonged disruptions. This paper outlines these gaps, their risks, and the need for a culture of preparedness. It also presents Finland as a model of integrated civil and military defence, offering lessons for the broader European context. A transformation of mindset and investment in smarter civil defence are essential for the EU to confront future crises with confidence.
- [Defence - Climate Change Nexus: the long road for environmental considerations in the defence sector](https://finabel.org/defence-climate-change-nexus-the-long-road-for-environmental-considerations-in-the-defence-sector/) - With defence remaining an exclusive competence of Member States (MS) (Article 4§2 TEU), it is automatically excluded from the scope of European Union (EU)’s regulation. This exclusion equally applies to EU environmental regulation tackling climate change and targeting carbon neutrality by 2050. Despite not being covered by the EU's environmental regulations, the defence sector remains responsible for a large part of GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions and should not be exempt from the EU’s climate agenda due to treaty-based principles. Establishing this responsibility is possible through alignment with existing EU green legislation. The EU can offer relevant instruments to enable the defence sector to better incorporate environmental considerations in alignment with the EU green agenda, for example through procurement regulations. However, further effort should be undertaken to reach a consistent and coherent alignment of MS to that end.
- [Trump's Influence Marks NATO’s 34th Summit](https://finabel.org/trumps-influence-marks-natos-34th-summit/) - At the 34th NATO summit held in The Hague on the 24th and 25th of June, heads of state and government reaffirmed their commitment to collective defence and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO, 2025). Before the summit there was uncertainty surrounding the United States, due to President Trump’s previous threats of withdrawal from NATO and his refusal to give a clear pledge to back Article 5. Trump said he left the summit with more of an understanding about the importance of the alliance and was impressed by the passion from other world leaders for their countries (Ataman & Sebastian, 2025). Secretary General Mark Rutte made it clear that the United States is totally committed to NATO and Article 5 and criticised the press for continuously questioning the organisation's stability (Krupa et al., 2025).
- [Naval Drones in the Sky: How Ukraine’s Magura Fleet Is Redefining Air Superiority in Coastal Warfare ](https://finabel.org/naval-drones-in-the-sky-how-ukraines-magura-fleet-is-redefining-air-superiority-in-coastal-warfare/) - Ukraine’s MAGURA programme shows how distributed seaborne air denial might change coastal warfare assumptions. This InfoFlash defines this concept, tracks MAGURA V5 and V7 development and examines the twin shoot-downs of Russian SU-30SM fighters and Mi-8 helicopters. By pairing low-signature hulls to R-73 or AIM-9 seekers and feeding them target data from the Delta cloud, Kyiv fielded surface craft that can outmatch aircraft whose unit cost outweighs the boats by almost 100:1. Findings indicate inverted cost-exchange ratios, condensed kill chains, and new risks for patrol routes across narrow seas. The paper argues that littoral states should replicate this networked model with off-the-shelf sensors and surplus missiles, shifting budgeting priorities from frigates and fighter wings to expendable nodes and shared data links. Recommended actions include modular procurement, joint training that integrates missile-armed USVs, reinforced ship defences, and tighter controls on seeker heads and autonomy software before proliferation broadens the threat in coming years.
- [The potential consequences of cyberattacks under NATO’s Article 5: applying self-defence in cyberspace](https://finabel.org/the-potential-consequences-of-cyberattacks-under-natos-article-5-applying-self-defence-in-cyberspace/) - The increasing frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks have transformed international conflicts and challenged the international legal framework regarding self-defence. Today, NATO members face security threats capable of causing widespread disruption without the use of physical force. These threats test the aptness of NATO's Article 5, which would be the legal basis for the invocation of the mutual defence clause in cyberspace. The Wales Summit Declaration and Brussels Summit Declaration recognised that cyberattacks may reach the threshold of an armed attack, potentially triggering Article 5. However, invoking Article 5 for a cyberattack raises further legal questions, particularly in relation to the attribution of responsibility and the applicability of the right to self-defence. The involvement of non-state actors and the inability to clearly prove state involvement in a cyberattack challenges the conventional way of executing retaliatory actions. International law, in its current form, fails to instruct states on how to apply self-defence in cyberspace. Hence, as NATO governments appear increasingly reliant on cyberspace for both military capabilities and public services, they should actively consider the uncertainty that would derive from a unilateral invocation of Article 5 in the case of a cyberattack.
- [Operation Midnight Hammer: Tactical Triumph or Strategic Illusion?](https://finabel.org/operation-midnight-hammer-tactical-triumph-or-strategic-illusion/) - Operation Midnight Hammer unfolded during the night of June 21 and 22, 2025, as the United States launched a coordinated strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan. The operation involved more than 125 aircraft, including seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, and has been described as the largest and longest B-2 mission since the war in Afghanistan began in 2001 (D’Urso, 2025). According to General Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the operation required “months of positioning and preparation” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 3), moving “from strategic planning to global execution” within weeks (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025, para. 12). Deception played a critical role to preserve the element of surprise. Just hours before the strike, two additional B-2 bombers were dispatched westward toward Guam, serving as decoys (Holliday, 2025a). Their movements, including staged refuelling stops in Oklahoma, California, and Hawaii, were intended to draw attention away from the real strike package (Holliday, 2025b).
- [A Window of Opportunity for European Defence? Rare Earths and the China – US Trade War](https://finabel.org/a-window-of-opportunity-for-european-defence-rare-earths-and-the-china-us-trade-war/) - This paper explores the implications of China’s April 2025 Rare Earth Element (REE) export restrictions for European defence security. While targeting the US, the measures expose Europe’s reliance on both Chinese REEs and US defence technologies. The paper argues that this disruption presents a strategic opportunity for Europe to reduce critical material dependencies, strengthen its defence industrial base, and advance strategic autonomy. It assesses the role of REEs in military systems, Europe’s current vulnerabilities, and potential responses, including diversification, domestic processing, and innovation. Despite challenges such as environmental constraints and institutional fragmentation, the crisis offers a rare chance for Europe to reinforce defence resilience and redefine its role in an evolving global security landscape.
- [Should the European States Reintroduce Conscription and Military Reserve Programs?](https://finabel.org/should-the-european-states-reintroduce-conscription-and-military-reserve-programs/) - Modern-day threats, challenges and increased geopolitical tensions aimed at the European security landscape have made several European states reconsider whether to reintroduce conscription and military reserve programs to enhance their national defence capabilities. Although conscription offers a wide-range of benefits, such as ensuring a broader pool of trained individuals, enabling faster mobilisation and reducing dependence on limited professional forces it also implies many ethical, societal and economic issues. Due to this ambivalence, this paper seeks to outline all the positive and negative aspects in order to evaluate their necessity in national defence strategies.
- [Rwanda’s Campaign in Mozambique as a Counterinsurgency Case Study: A Radical Approach?](https://finabel.org/rwandas-campaign-in-mozambique-as-a-counterinsurgency-case-study-a-radical-approach/) - Rwanda’s campaign against the Islamic State in Mozambique since 2021 has attracted widespread praise from the international community. Characterised by civilian protection, its approach saw widespread success in pushing back jihadists in Mozambique. This was argued by some to act as a blueprint for future counterinsurgency campaigns, in stark contrast to recent Western efforts (ADF, 2023) and raises the question of whether Rwanda has adopted a radically different approach to counterinsurgency. This paper will examine the operations of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) in northern Mozambique as a case study of an effective counterinsurgency campaign. It will begin by overviewing Rwandan operations in Mozambique, before examining how their approach aligns with counterinsurgency theory and recent Western examples. Finally, it explores the RDF’s the longer-term chances of success as a further test of theory and as another point of comparison with Western operations.
- [Rethinking European Defence: The European Defence Mechanism Proposal](https://finabel.org/rethinking-european-defence-the-european-defence-mechanism-proposal/) - On 12 April 2025, the European Union (EU) finance ministers, joined by their counterparts from the UK, Norway, and Switzerland, expressed their support for a joint defence fund aimed at collectively purchasing and owning military equipment. The initiative would bring together EU and selected non-EU countries to streamline defence spending and enhance coordination (Strupczewski & Badohal, 2025). This proposal originates from a report by the Bruegel think tank, commissioned by the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU. Its premise is the urgent need for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy, reversing decades of economic dependencies and fragmented strategic planning. This is deemed essential to effectively respond to contemporary threats, chief among them, a potential attack from Russia (Bortoletto, 2025; Wolff et al., 2025), following the diminishing reliability of the United States as Europe's primary security guarantor.
- [Illusory or substantive? Analysing the European Union’s Support to the International Criminal Court](https://finabel.org/illusory-or-substantive-analysing-the-european-unions-support-to-the-international-criminal-court/) - This paper explores whether the European Union’s support for the International Criminal Court (ICC) is substantive or illusory. By examining legal and policy commitments alongside the case studies of Ukraine and Libya, the research shows that EU support is context-dependent. In Ukraine, where judicial and political interests align, the EU provides tangible, substantive support. In Libya, stability and migration control take precedence, resulting in symbolic engagement and undermined cooperation. The paper argues that this difference stems from differing institutional logics: generally, the ICC pursues principles of justice and fairness, while the EU often prioritises political consequences.
- [Toward Hybrid Deterrence: Conceptual Foundations and the Evolution of NATO Response](https://finabel.org/toward-hybrid-deterrence-conceptual-foundations-and-the-evolution-of-nato-response/) - Hybrid threats, leveraging ambiguity and asymmetry, increasingly challenge NATO’s deterrence and credibility. This paper critically examines NATO’s doctrinal evolution and responses to hybrid threats since first acknowledging cyber challenges in 2002. Despite doctrinal progress and tools like Counter-Hybrid Support Teams (CHSTs) and initiatives such as Baltic Sentry, NATO’s response remains largely reactive and fragmented, activated only post-crisis rather than proactively deterring threats. Ambiguous attribution and contested thresholds further hinder collective action. The analysis highlights persistent strategic gaps and concludes by asserting that credible hybrid deterrence cannot be improvised post hoc but must be embedded systematically into NATO’s doctrine and operational architecture, a concept that will be further developed in a forthcoming companion article.
- [Europe’s southern border in Lampedusa: migration, crisis and the responsibility of the European Union](https://finabel.org/europes-southern-border-in-lampedusa-migration-crisis-and-the-responsibility-of-the-european-union/) - This paper explores the European Union’s response to irregular migration across the Central Mediterranean, with a specific focus on the Italian island of Lampedusa as a key entry point. It examines how the EU balances border security, migration control, and humanitarian obligations within the broader framework of international humanitarian law, refugee law, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Through an analysis of EU actions including border operations, partnerships with third countries, and emergency response mechanisms, the paper investigates whether current policies genuinely protect the rights and dignity of migrants or whether they reflect a securitised and externalised approach to crisis management. Lampedusa serves as an example for understanding the broader tensions and contradictions in EU migration governance.
- [Renegotiating Alliances: Trump’s America’s first foreign policy and the European Union’s quest for strategic autonomy](https://finabel.org/renegotiating-alliances-trumps-americas-first-foreign-policy-and-the-european-unions-quest-for-strategic-autonomy/) - In light of Donald Trump’s second administration and its transactional America-first foreign policy, this paper considers the implications for European strategic autonomy amid the heightened importance of US security commitments and defence capabilities. Trump’s foreign policy is driven by the belief that Europeans have taken advantage of the US within the NATO alliance and international trade, and seeks to renegotiate trade agreements, returning manufacturing to the US and shifting its strategic orientation towards Asia. In the short term, this can constrain Europe’s strategic autonomy, as European capitals are pressured to accommodate the America-first agenda to ensure the US retains vital military capabilities in Europe and continues to provide military support to Ukraine. However, in the long term, the Trump administration’s pressure on allies to spend more on defence and a degree of ambiguity over security commitments reinforces the need for European strategic autonomy and accelerates the development of capacities that enable Europe to pursue its interests more independently.
- [Operation Spiderweb: under Russia’s nose](https://finabel.org/operation-spiderweb-under-russias-nose/) - On 1 June 2025, Ukraine launched Operation Spiderweb, the most effective drone attack against Russian airfields since the start of the war. A total of 117 drones were used to strike airbases across five regions – Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur regions –, with the aim of inflicting maximum damage on Russian aircraft far away from the frontier (Al Jazeera, 2025; Horowitz, 2025). Reports suggest that 41 aircrafts – including A-50, Tu-95, Tu-22 M3 and Tu-160 – have been hit in the operation along with a third of Russian bombers that are currently used as cruise-missile carriers (Horowitz, 2025; Security Service of Ukraine, 2025; Zoria, 2025).
- [The Acceleration of Command and Control Through Artificial Intelligence and its Implications for European Land Forces](https://finabel.org/the-acceleration-of-command-and-control-through-artificial-intelligence-and-its-implications-for-european-land-forces/) - Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming an ever more important part of command and control (C2) and the decision-making connected to it. AI systems are crucial in supporting commanders in their decision-making, allowing them to act on data and the information it carries faster and more efficiently than ever before. These systems are complex, their results are often difficult to understand or verify, and they struggle with ethical considerations. To offset these disadvantages, humans need not concur with every decision AI makes, but they should retain control and be able to intervene and stop certain decisions as they see fit. Given the faster speed that AI gives C2 activities, continuing to exercise this control will prove challenging for commanders and their staff.
- [Calls for a Stronger EU Defence Clause](https://finabel.org/calls-for-a-stronger-eu-defence-clause/) - The article has been updated to correct a previously identified error. The incorrect reference to "NATO's Article 50" has been replaced with the correct term, "NATO's Article 5". Following rising security concerns in Europe, increased focus has been placed on the EU’s defence clause, contained in Article 42(7) of the Lisbon Treaty. The Article emphasises
- [NORDEFCO – A Blueprint for Regional Defence Cooperation?](https://finabel.org/nordefco-a-blueprint-for-regional-defence-cooperation/) - This paper examines the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) as a case study in pragmatic, regional defence collaboration. Despite being founded by states with divergent political alignments and defence doctrines, NORDEFCO has evolved into a flexible and low-threshold framework that promotes operational efficiency, logistical coordination, and strategic interoperability among its members. By tracing NORDEFCO’s institutional structure and historical development, the study assesses the model’s successes and limitations. While NORDEFCO’s achievements, such as multinational exercises, intelligence sharing, and education programmes, demonstrate the value of voluntary, sovereignty-conscious cooperation, its replicability is constrained by the unique geopolitical and cultural cohesion of the Nordic region. The paper further aims to provide an outlook into NORDEFCO’s possible avenues of expansion and prospective transformation following the NATO membership accession of all its members. The study concludes that NORDEFCO-NATO coalescence is crucial to overcome the agreement’s limitations to achieve real Nordic defence integration, arguing that NORDEFCO is likely to retain its relevance under NATO command thanks to its region-specific capability enhancement projects.
- [A New Chapter in EU-UK Relations? Insights from the 2025 EU-UK Summit](https://finabel.org/a-new-chapter-in-eu-uk-relations-insights-from-the-2025-eu-uk-summit/) - The EU-UK summit, held on May 19th at Lancaster House in London, marked a decisive moment in post-Brexit European politics. As the first formal summit since the UK’s departure from the European Union, the meeting brought together key EU officials, namely European Council President António Costa, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and High Representative Kaja Kallas, alongside UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer (Tocci, 2025). Amidst a backdrop of global geopolitical turmoil, the summit symbolised a renewed commitment to security and defence cooperation.
- [Climate threats as justifying derogations under Article 15 ECHR?](https://finabel.org/climate-threats-as-justifying-derogations-under-article-15-echr/) - This paper examines whether Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) can serve as a legal foundation for addressing security threats arising from climate change. Through doctrinal analysis and case-based comparisons, it explores how climate-driven crises may justify rights derogations under Article 15. The findings show that while such an approach aligns with the EU’s Joint Communication on the climate-security nexus, it risks reinforcing coercive, state-centric responses. The paper concludes that a shift towards a human security framework offers a more ethical and effective path, emphasising individual protection and structural climate justice over militarised solutions.
- [From Cape to Kazan? Russia’s Contemporary Use of Colonial Warfare in Africa](https://finabel.org/from-cape-to-kazan-russias-contemporary-use-of-colonial-warfare-in-africa/) - The scale of the war in Ukraine has overshadowed Russia’s other overseas military ventures. This includes the multiple operations across Africa which began with Libya in 2016, and has since expanded to Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, among others. Such operations were a key source of notoriety for the Wagner group before its deployment to Ukraine, which has since dominated coverage and analysis of the group’s conduct. Hence, in comparison to their conduct in Eastern Europe, the modus operandi of Russian state and private forces in Africa has received comparatively less attention. This paper aims to fill this lacuna and provide a taxonomical framework for this conduct, arguing that the military methods utilised by Russia in Africa are classifiable as colonial warfare, akin to the warfare waged by Europeans in the region two centuries earlier. It will elaborate on colonial warfare as a distinct practice of violence and how Russia’s conduct fits in with this framework. Furthermore, this paper will elaborate on the risks that the use of these methods directly and indirectly poses to European security.
- [European Union military engagement in the Western Balkans: peacekeeping or strategic containment? EU’s mission EUFOR Althea case study](https://finabel.org/european-union-military-engagement-in-the-western-balkans-peacekeeping-or-strategic-containment-eus-mission-eufor-althea-case-study/) - The European Union’s military involvement in the Western Balkans, particularly through European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is grounded in a multilayered legal framework that draws on EU treaties, international law, and regional peace agreements. Established under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1575 (2004), Althea represents a rare example of EU-led military deployment with a UN mandate. It is the largest mission launched by the European Union to this day. While the mission plays an important role in supporting public security and implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement, it also reveals the EU’s limited legal and institutional capacity to address structural issues like constitutional dysfunction, ethno-nationalism, and secessionist threats. The reliance on soft power and minimal military presence reflects the EU’s constrained ability to enforce durable peace, while the continued necessity of EUFOR underscores both the fragility of the region’s stability and the limitations of existing legal instruments in securing long-term constitutional cohesion.
- [Episode 8: Wargames and Beyond: How NATO Prepares for Modern Conflict](https://finabel.org/episode-8-wargames-and-beyond-how-nato-prepares-for-modern-conflict/) - In this episode of StrategicALLY, hosts Livia Perrulli and Nicola Bonsegna are joined by Major Stephen Nelson, Simulation Officer at the U.S. Army Futures Command and former Program Director for NATO’s Next Generation Modelling and Simulation. Together, we explore the strategic use of modelling, simulation, and wargaming in NATO and U.S. Army planning. We discuss how these tools support defence foresight, operational readiness, and multinational cooperation. Major Nelson shares insights on NATO’s efforts to build a common synthetic environment, enhance interoperability among Allies, and embrace new technologies such as AI, digital twins, and cloud-based platforms. Podcast edited by Livia Perrulli.
- [Defence Spending as Economic Policy? Military Keynesianism in Today’s European Context](https://finabel.org/defence-spending-as-economic-policy-military-keynesianism-in-todays-european-context/) - This paper explores how recent European defence spending reflects a strategic application of military Keynesianism rather than a purely threat-driven response. While the term remains largely absent from official rhetoric, EU institutions and Member States have embraced its logic to confront a dual challenge: growing geopolitical insecurity and economic stagnation. By linking defence investment to industrial revival, regional cohesion, and political consensus-building, the EU uses military expenditure as a policy tool to stimulate growth and support rearmament. The paper identifies a secondary form of military Keynesianism, in which defence policy is deliberately bundled with broader economic objectives, showing a shift in the EU’s approach to both security and fiscal policy.
- [Bridging the Gap: The Role of EU Cybersecurity Regulations in Supporting Cyber Defence Strategy](https://finabel.org/bridging-the-gap-the-role-of-eu-cybersecurity-regulations-in-supporting-cyber-defence-strategy/) - Hybrid threats exploit the increasingly blurred line between civilian and military domains. By targeting critical civilian infrastructures (CCIs), whose cybersecurity remains the sole responsibility of civilian actors, adversaries weaken the defence sector, which heavily relies on these infrastructures. This strategy creates a blind spot in the defence community that only the EU Cyber Security Policy can address. The paper investigates the contribution of the EU Cyber Security Policy regulations to the EU Cyber Defence Policy, highlighting their synergistic relation. It bases its analysis on the NIS2 Directive as an illustrative case. By adopting a more defensive posture that integrates hybrid threats, NIS2 contributes to enhanced cyber defence that aligns with the objectives of the EU Cyber Defence Policy.
- [Opportunistic or Humanitarian Military Interventions? The Case of French Involvement in Africa](https://finabel.org/opportunistic-or-humanitarian-military-interventions-the-case-of-french-involvement-in-africa/) - In light of frequent discussion surrounding the motives of military interventions in conflict-affected areas, this paper examines the interaction between national interests and humanitarian and conflict-resolution. An analysis of French-led military operations in Mali, Chad and Côte d'Ivoire illustrates how national interests are major drivers of military operations, amongst other reasons. This paper also seeks to find if such findings could be justified by historical colonial ties, recommending a potential research question for further engagement with the topic.
- [Above the Battlefield, Below Expectations? The Diminishing Role of Attack Helicopters in Conventional Warfare](https://finabel.org/above-the-battlefield-below-expectations-the-diminishing-role-of-attack-helicopters-in-conventional-warfare/) - This paper argues that attack helicopters are losing relevance in conventional continental warfare. While not yet obsolete, their traditional roles—close combat attack, deep strikes, and anti-tank operations—are increasingly threatened by advanced air defence systems, evolving doctrines, and cheaper or more versatile alternatives like loitering munitions and artillery. Most NATO and like-minded nations are adopting partial measures toward their attack helicopter fleets to reduce risks. The analysis traces the historical evolution of attack helicopters and assesses their competitivity in contemporary near-peer continental conflicts. The study concludes that their future viability hinges on integration within broader multi-domain operational frameworks rather than on stand-alone capabilities exposing them to competition from other weapon systems.
- [A Cor Cinniúnach? Ireland’s Defence Policy since 2022](https://finabel.org/a-cor-cinniunach-irelands-defence-policy-since-2022/) - Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the strategic position of many European governments has undergone a dramatic reorganisation, encapsulated by then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende address to the Bundestag three days after the invasion. Although far less prominent in this sea of change, similar debates on the country’s defensive future in this new European security environment also occured in Ireland. This study will examine if the changes proposed or implemented in Ireland’s defence and security policies since Russia’s invasion represent a real shift in the Republic’s defence policy -an Irish Zeitenwende or Cor Cinniúnach- or if this is a case of rhetoric overshadowing action. The paper will analyse the shift in the Irish security landscape both domestically and in the country’s international relations, from the invasion to the present, taking into account the release of the new Programme for Government following the general election in 2024, as well as the potential impact of future changes in the country’s internal politics and relations with Northern Ireland.
- [Resilience and Rearmament: A Comparative Analysis of Russia’s Defence Industrial Base in 2025](https://finabel.org/resilience-and-rearmament-a-comparative-analysis-of-russias-defence-industrial-base-in-2025/) - This paper provides a comparative analysis of Russian and European defence industrial capacities in the aftermath of the 2022 Ukraine invasion amid the ongoing retreat of U.S. global security commitments. While Russia has demonstrated short-term resilience through mass production of tanks, artillery, and drones, it remains vulnerable due to technological dependencies and supply chain constraints. In contrast, the European Union, despite structural fragmentation, is mobilising towards strategic autonomy through initiatives like ASAP and EDIS. The study argues that Russia’s high-volume model may face sustainability limits, whereas Europe’s innovation-oriented, collaborative framework could offer long-term strategic depth. The research evaluates production trends, budgetary shifts, and geopolitical implications to assess the trajectory of both blocs in the emerging post-American security order.
- [Strategic Autonomy in Action: Europe’s Reassurance Force](https://finabel.org/strategic-autonomy-in-action-europes-reassurance-force/) - On 10 April 2025, NATO hosted the last of a series of meetings of the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ (Gray & Van Overstraeten, 2025). The initiative, spearheaded by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and supported by French President Emmanuel Macron, was first introduced at the London Summit on Ukraine in March (Davies, 2025). Bringing together defence ministers from 30 nations, including Canada and Australia but excluding the United States (US), the coalition aims to establish a ‘reassurance force’ for Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire with Russia (Melkozerova, 2025). The group seeks a credible and lasting European-made peace, reducing the chances of a future invasion from Russia even without US security guarantees promised to the war-torn country. In the words of the British Defence Secretary, the aim is to “put Ukraine in the strongest possible position, to protect its sovereignty and deter further Russian aggression” (Gray & Van Overstraeten, 2025). The urgency of the project has grown amid declining U.S. support under the Trump administration, which has pushed Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security as Washington pivots its strategic focus toward the Pacific.
- [Can France’s Nuclear Deterrent Be Extended to Europe?](https://finabel.org/can-frances-nuclear-deterrent-be-extended-to-europe/) - The Trump administration’s hostile rhetoric towards Europe, its seeming reluctance to uphold the United States’ (US) security guarantees, and Russia’s assertive behaviour on the international stage have led to a profound strategic debate on nuclear deterrence amongst Europeans. Some European leaders have questioned whether France could fill the nuclear deterrence gap left by the US, and Emmanuel Macron has initiated a strategic debate to this end. Extending the French nuclear deterrent to protect Europe will require it to be complemented by the United Kingdom’s (UK) own deterrent. It is a process that necessitates careful consulting between European allies, as well as an appropriate framework and doctrine in order to be effective. The question will also be whether France’s nuclear deterrent must complement or replace the US’. For European land forces, this shift signals a closer strategic alignment between European NATO allies and will influence the likeliness of high-intensity conflict in the future.
- [Greece’s Military Modernisation Process: Is the EU Ready to Follow?](https://finabel.org/greeces-military-modernisation-process-is-the-eu-ready-to-follow/) - On 2 April 2025, during a session in Parliament, the Greek government announced the largest military spending plan in its history: €25 billion over the next twelve years (Stamouli, 2025). This decision comes after years of budget cuts following the 2009-2018 financial crisis. The investment, which amounts to around three-and-a-half percent of Greece’s GDP, largely exceeds NATO’s two percent defence spending requirement and reflects the broader European shift in increased spending. Following Donald Trump’s re-election, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has repeatedly stressed the importance of meeting the two percent spending threshold to maintain effective deterrence (Cook, 2024).
- [Episode 7: The Role of Space in European Security and Defence](https://finabel.org/episode-7-the-role-of-space-in-european-security-and-defence/) - In this episode of StrategicALLY, hosts Doğa Sultan Önaçan and Manuel Dias are joined by Colonel Marcin Mazur from the Polish Space Agency (POLSA) to explore the evolving role of space in European security. We discuss space warfare, dual-use technologies, and the EU's path to strategic autonomy in space. Colonel Mazur shares valuable insights on the challenges Europe faces in protecting space assets and advancing space capabilities. Topics covered include the weaponization of orbital debris, the development of military space vehicle technology, and the EU's efforts in achieving autonomous space access. Tune in as we discuss how Europe is positioning itself to secure the future of its space domain. Podcast edited by Livia Perrulli.
- [Strategic Narratives: Russia’s Influence in Africa and the Challenge for Europe](https://finabel.org/strategic-narratives-russias-influence-in-africa-and-the-challenge-for-europe/) - Russia’s information operations in non-Western environments, particularly in African countries, have significant implications for European security and defence. Historical ties and prevailing sentiment in certain African states make them more susceptible to specific narratives that can be exploited to serve Russian strategic interests. This paper examines the mechanisms and objectives of Russia’s influence campaigns in these regions and assesses their impact on European interests. By analysing Russia’s methods and the vulnerabilities they target, the study aims to provide insight into potential countermeasures for both the EU and NATO. Strategic responses including strengthening digital resilience, enhancing diplomatic engagement, and fostering media literacy are explored as potential means to mitigate Russian influence and protect European security.
- [The Involvement of the Private Sector in the Militarisation of Outer Space and the Liability Problem](https://finabel.org/the-involvement-of-the-private-sector-in-the-militarisation-of-outer-space-and-the-liability-problem/) - The military use of space is not new, yet it has developed and become more advanced today. Space is relatively unregulated, as multilateral organizations such as the UN find themselves powerless to strengthen existing legal agreements. The private industry has evolved rapidly and challenges governments’ monopolization of the use of space. Outer space is now a shared realm with both public priorities and private initiatives, which impacts state security and the military use of space. The aim of this paper is to analyse how the involvement of private companies change the militarisation of outer space, which, while not new, has developed and become more advanced today. Some limits are placed by the existing legislation, but only upon States, while private companies are becoming more important in the outer space militarisation field.
- [Setting the Limit for AI Weaponry in the Changing Nature of Modern Warfare](https://finabel.org/setting-the-limit-for-ai-weaponry-in-the-changing-nature-of-modern-warfare/) - In an age when algorithms dictate almost every aspect of our lives, from social media feeds in daily life to missile trajectories in national and international decisions, Artificial Intelligence should be studied beyond purely technological curiosity in its application to warfare in reshaping the boundaries of security, ethics, and human rights. This paper explores the transformative role of AI in modern warfare, focusing on Israel’s deployment of AI-driven weaponry and its influential power in reshaping the future of armed conflict. The research delves into how the diminished role of human oversight has contributed to targeting inaccuracies and civilian casualties in the current war in Palestine.
- [Generative AI and Foreign Electoral Interference: How Information Warfare Threatens Democracies](https://finabel.org/generative-ai-and-foreign-electoral-interference-how-information-warfare-threatens-democracies/) - This article explores how foreign actors use generative AI and disinformation to manipulate democratic processes and public trust. Drawing on concepts such as digital geopolitics, information warfare, and disinformation, this paper analyses recent examples of electoral interference in the United States and the European Union. The study reveals how digital technologies and social media algorithms amplify polarisation and facilitate the exercise of malign foreign influence. Finally, it highlights forward-looking recommendations for EU resilience, highlighting the urgent need for action to preserve the integrity of its democratic institutions.
- [An Analysis of Space Debris II: The Space Weaponisation and the Kessler Syndrome](https://finabel.org/an-analysis-of-space-debris-ii-the-space-weaponisation-and-the-kessler-syndrome/) - The dual-use capacity of many space assets and technologies is bolstering the weaponisation of space and becoming a great threat to satellites and space-based services. Therefore, the militarisation of space presents security risks and technical, diplomatic and legal challenges. This paper delves into the challenges that weaponisation of space pose to the proliferation of space debris in orbit and the risk of triggering the Kessler Syndrome from a legal perspective. Consequently, this article proposes updating the international legal framework to regulate the behaviour of space actors, restrict the location in space of space weapons and assets as well as to ban certain weapons.
- [The White Paper on Defence: How a Single Market Can Boost Efficiency and Interoperability](https://finabel.org/the-white-paper-on-defence-how-a-single-market-can-boost-efficiency-and-interoperability/) - The 2025 White Paper on Defence outlines a strategic framework for enhancing European security through greater financial incentives, integration, and strategic autonomy. Aiming to address significant gaps such as underinvestment, industrial fragmentation, and capability deficiencies, the White Paper proposes a Single Market for Defence to streamline procurement, boost innovation, and strengthen partnerships. This article conducts a policy-driven critical analysis to assess the feasibility of the ambitious initiative, outlining the implications for reaching full-spectrum interoperability in the European defence sector. The paper emphasises that despite financial and political challenges, implementing a Single Market for Defence would establish a more resilient and autonomous European security architecture, ensuring preparedness against evolving security threats.
- [Mercenaries Made in Europe? Exploring the Need for a European Regulatory Framework of Private Military Companies](https://finabel.org/mercenaries-made-in-europe-exploring-the-need-for-a-european-regulatory-framework-of-private-military-companies/) - This research paper examines the operations of European Private Military Companies (PMCs) and their implications for European security, both abroad and domestically. It discusses two case studies on European-based PMCs which were involved in an incident in the eastern Congolese city of Goma after Rwandan-backed rebels captured the town in January 2025. The study finds significant potential risks to European foreign policy and security interests arising from European military contractors’ collaboration with strategic contestants of Europe and their operational conduct in conflict areas. Additionally, it reveals how European PMCs operating in third countries can be linked to ventures that undermine security within Europe, as demonstrated in the case of Romania, highlighting the dangers posed by inadequate control mechanisms of European-based military contractors. The analysis concludes with policy recommendations for a unified European regulatory mechanism to oversee PMCs.
- [Hope For a New Perspective on Ballistic Missile Non-Proliferation? An Analysis of International Humanitarian & Environmental Law and Political Science](https://finabel.org/hope-for-a-new-perspective-on-ballistic-missile-non-proliferation-an-analysis-of-international-humanitarian-environmental-law-and-political-science/) - This paper explores the persistent dangers of ballistic missiles (BMs) despite international legal efforts to curb their proliferation and use. It analyses violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Environmental Law (IEL), using the 44-Day War between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a case study to illustrate the devastating impact of BMs on civilians and the environment. While acknowledging the challenges posed by realist perspectives in international relations, the paper adopts a constructivist approach, suggesting that a shift in state identities and interests could encourage greater commitment to disarmament efforts. In this regard, the EU Space Strategy is highlighted as a potential avenue for promoting norms that prioritise humanitarian and environmental concerns in the context of space security.
- [Hungary and European Defence: Political Rhetoric vs Military Reality](https://finabel.org/hungary-and-european-defence-political-rhetoric-vs-military-reality/) - Hungary is often perceived as a political outlier within the European Union and NATO due to its government’s controversial stance on Russia and Ukraine. However, despite diplomatic tensions, Hungary has actively modernised its military and strengthened its defence industry in line with European security objectives. This paper examines Hungary’s post-Cold War military decline and subsequent revitalisation through the Zrínyi 2026 programme. It highlights Hungary’s threat perception, its role in NATO and EU missions, joint exercises, and interoperability efforts, demonstrating that while political disagreements persist, Hungary remains an integral part of European defence structures. The research sheds light on the contrast between Hungary’s political positioning and its military commitments.
- [Strategic Planning and Tactics in The Ukrainian-Russian War: What Should European Armies Implement and Avoid?](https://finabel.org/strategic-planning-and-tactics-in-the-ukrainian-russian-war-what-should-european-armies-implement-and-avoid/) - This paper’s purpose is to examine strategic and tactical lessons to be learned from the Ukrainian-Russian war and offer European armies recommendations for future preventive and defensive measures. Through analysing both warring parties’ engagement in war, this paper shows that Russian entrenching strategy is successful in containing Ukrainian forces, and using surveillance drones is an effective method of preventing surprise attacks from the adversaries’ army. Further benefits and deficiencies of Russian offense and Ukrainian defence strategies are discussed. This comparative analysis provides European armies with recommendations for implementations and avoidances.
- [Romania’s Defence Industrial Sector: The long road towards Modernisation and Readiness](https://finabel.org/romanias-defence-industrial-sector-the-long-road-towards-modernisation-and-readiness/) - Romania’s strategic geopolitical location between the Balkans and the Black Sea, coupled with recent international tensions, has placed it at the heart of NATO and EU defence strategies. Historically burdened by post-communist industrial decline, Romania is revitalising its defence sector through international partnerships and EU-led initiatives like the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP). However, persistent challenges within national defence company ROMARM, such as management inefficiencies, outdated technology, workforce aging, and restrictive state ownership policies, continue to impede the pace and scope of modernisation. Addressing these limitations is essential for sustaining Romania’s defence sector revitalisation. Ultimately, the effectiveness of Romania’s modernisation efforts will determine its contribution to regional stability and broader European defence resilience.
- [From Resilience to Deterrence: Is the EU Shifting Toward Proactive Cyber Defence?](https://finabel.org/from-resilience-to-deterrence-is-the-eu-shifting-toward-proactive-cyber-defence/) - This paper examines the European Union’s evolving cyber defence strategy in response to the growing integration of cyber operations into hybrid warfare. It traces the EU’s doctrinal shift from a reactive, resilience-based posture to one that increasingly embraces proactive deterrence, including the potential use of offensive capabilities. By analysing key strategic documents and highlighting the case of France, the study illustrates both progress and limitations. While conceptual advances are evident, practical implementation remains a national competence. The paper concludes that translating strategic ambition into credible cyber deterrence will require legal clarity, interoperability, and coordinated capability development.
- [ReArm Europe: European Response to European Problems](https://finabel.org/rearm-europe-european-response-to-european-problems/) - Following Trump’s re-election and his statement on NATO – “if you are not going to pay your bills, we are not going to defend you” (NBC News, 2023) – along with JD Vance’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference and their tense Oval Office meeting with Zelensky, a strong response from EU countries became inevitable. The US has made it clear that NATO allies failing to meet the 2% defence spending threshold cannot expect American protection, casting doubt on the applicability of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to certain members. This policy shift not only shakes NATO and the EU but also signals a shift in US military engagement in Europe. Washington will now decide where to plan and exercise based on defence budgets, potentially reducing or repositioning its presence on the continent (Kube, Lee, & Tskirkin, 2025).
- [The joint action of the EU and NATO in Ukraine: are we doing enough?](https://finabel.org/the-joint-action-of-the-eu-and-nato-in-ukraine-are-we-doing-enough/) - In February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This decision forced the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to take more decisive action in supporting Ukraine’s defence of its territory. For example, many EU member states increased their defence spending and sent weaponry to Ukraine. However, the interoperability issue remains pertinent as the European Defence and Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) is structurally fragmented. Moreover, given Ukraine’s inheritance of Soviet-era weaponry, further training and logistical difficulties have arisen, posing setbacks and challenges to Ukraine’s effective defence strategies. This paper will discuss the joint action of the EU and NATO and its impact on Ukraine’s defence of its territory. The analysis will focus on the evolution of financial mechanisms and the creation of a military mission on the ground that complements nonmilitary efforts. Following this, it explores NATO’s complementary action, reinforcing cooperation with Ukraine and boosting armament in the East. Finally, the paper analyses hybrid threats in the examined case and problematises about a way forward through EU-NATO joint action.
- [Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Weapons - Strategic Ethical Considerations for European Defence](https://finabel.org/artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-weapons-strategic-ethical-considerations-for-european-defence/) - The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into autonomous weapons systems represents a shift into modern warfare, offering unprecedented capabilities while posing profound stra- tegic and ethical challenges. This paper explores the strategic benefits and ethical challenges associated with deploying AI-driven technologies in European defence strategies. It highlights the potential military advantages, including enhanced operational efficiency, while addressing critical ethical concerns such as accountability, decision-making in life-or-death scenarios and the risk of conflict escalation. By analysing European defence policies and international frameworks, this study offers a nuanced perspective on balancing technological innovation with ethical imperatives, ensuring stability and adherence to international humanitarian law. Through case studies of European and global approaches, this paper’s aim is to inform strategies that harmonise security objectives with moral and legal principles.
- [The Importance of Electronic Warfare for European Land Forces: Lessons from the War in Ukraine](https://finabel.org/the-importance-of-electronic-warfare-for-european-land-forces-lessons-from-the-war-in-ukraine/) - Armed forces in all domains are becoming increasingly reliant on electronic equipment that uses the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and its associated frequencies. Electronic warfare (EW) serves both to secure and to deny access to the EMS. The war in Ukraine had demonstrated that EW capabilities are now crucial for land forces, with their scope and applications continuously expanding. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become the focus of a contest in EW between Ukraine and Russia, with each side attempting to deny the other the use of these systems and the EMS necessary for their operation. European land forces should observe and assimilate the lessons from Ukraine’s experience in EW, as their own EW capabilities have become largely obsolete or insufficient.
- [A Legal Analysis of Space Debris I: The Kessler Syndrome and the Regulation of Space in International Law](https://finabel.org/a-legal-analysis-of-space-debris-i-the-kessler-syndrome-and-the-regulation-of-space-in-international-law/) - The evolution of industrial models applied to space technologies has opened the door to space exploration and activities for smaller states and private actors. This proliferation of actors and the access to launching objects into Earth’s orbit has multiplied the amount of functional and non-functional objects in space, increasing the amount of space debris and the risk of triggering the Kessler Syndrome. This paper is the first of a series of articles analysing this challenge from a legal perspective. In this first part, the purpose is to frame the space debris threat and analyse the regulation of space in International Law.
- [The Crescent and The Star: A Turkish Option for the European Defence](https://finabel.org/the-crescent-and-the-star-a-turkish-option-for-the-european-defence/) - This paper examines the evolving role of Türkiye’s military-industrial complex within the European security framework in light of shifting global power dynamics and the growing strategic autonomy debates within the European Union. As the United States retreats into isolationist policies, echoed by the Trump administration's stance on Ukraine, Europe increasingly seeks alternative and critical partnerships to bolster its defense capabilities. Türkiye, with its rapidly expanding indigenous defense industry and proven operational successes in previous conflicts such as Karabakh and Syria, emerges as a pivotal albeit complex partner for Europe. The study analyses Türkiye’s key defense platforms, including UAVs, naval assets like TCG Anadolu and PİRİREİS, and its collaboration with European companies such as Leonardo. It also evaluates the strategic opportunities and political risks involved in deepening military cooperation between Türkiye and the EU. The paper concludes by offering policy recommendations to balance pragmatic defense collaboration with broader geopolitical considerations.
- [TCG Anadolu: The Dawn of Drone-Centric Naval Power Projection](https://finabel.org/tcg-anadolu-the-dawn-of-drone-centric-naval-power-projection/) - This paper examines the strategic transformation embodied by Türkiye’s drone-centric naval platform TCG Anadolu, reconfigured from an amphibious assault ship—in response to geopolitical shifts and drone warfare lessons from the war against Ukraine. Following the transitioning from manned aviation to advanced unmanned systems Bayraktar TB3 and Kizilelma, the paper compares global responses to these platforms and evaluates vulnerabilities in conventional aircraft carriers that may encourage navies to adopt drone-centric platforms. The analysis shows that while drone carriers enhance operational flexibility and cost-efficiency for low-intensity missions, their effectiveness depends on future technological advancements. These findings underscore the evolving impact of unmanned systems on naval power projection and modern maritime warfare.
- [Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Under International Law and the Role of Peacekeeping Missions](https://finabel.org/conflict-related-sexual-violence-under-international-law-and-the-role-of-peacekeeping-missions/) - Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) is a grave violation of International Law and International Humanitarian Law, as well as a serious challenge in armed conflicts and global security, however is a crime that is frequently ignored and under-reported. The paper traces the development of the legal framework under which CRSV is recognised and explores the role of peacekeeping missions in preventing and responding to this phenomenon, underlining that CRSV is not an inevitable consequence of war, but a weapon used to control the population.
- [Ukraine Aid and European Defence Procurement: Insights from the Prague 2024 GLOBSEC Conference](https://finabel.org/ukraine-aid-and-european-defence-procurement-insights-from-the-prague-2024-globsec-conference/) - The Russian invasion of Ukraine is nearing its third year, yet how to support the war-torn country remains one of the most discussed issues in security and defence circles. At the 2024 GLOBSEC Conference in Prague, discussions centred on what Ukraine’s current battlefield needs are, what the role of the EU in meeting them is, and what lessons the Union can learn from Ukraine’s experience. This paper will dedicate a section to all 3 of these aspects, providing detailed information about European actions in support of Ukraine and the future of European procurement.
- [European Space Strategic Autonomy](https://finabel.org/european-space-strategic-autonomy/) - This paper examines the European Union's pursuit of strategic autonomy in the increasingly contested space domain, a critical aspect of contemporary geopolitics. Through an analysis of EU space policies and strategies, this study aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the current quest of the EU towards the achievement of European space strategic autonomy. The findings reveal that the intense astropoliticisation of space has reignited the hard power dimensions of space, pushing the EU to make substantial progress in developing autonomous space capabilities, especially in the field of defence and security. Despite the high ambition and commitment demonstrated by the EU, several institutional and material challenges continue to impede its path to full strategic autonomy.
- [The AI War Machine: Chinese State-Conscious Cybernetics and the Evolution of Military Intelligence](https://finabel.org/the-ai-war-machine-chinese-state-conscious-cybernetics-and-the-evolution-of-military-intelligence/) - This paper explores the evolving landscape of intelligentised warfare, focusing on the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), cybernetics, and cognitive warfare into modern military strategy. It examines how China and the European Union (EU) approach AI-driven military development, highlighting the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) intelligentised warfare doctrine, its emphasis on autonomous systems, AI-enhanced command structures and information dominance, as well as its strategic implications for Taiwan and future conflicts. Meanwhile, Europe’s perspective is shaped by ethical AI governance, NATO’s military AI strategy, and cognitive warfare countermeasures, reflecting tensions between technological sovereignty and regulatory constraints. The study also investigates the role of cybernetic control loops in AI warfare, the PLA’s cyber transformation, and the impact of AI-enabled disinformation, deepfake propaganda, and automated battlefield logistics on military engagement. Ultimately, the paper argues that intelligentised warfare represents not just an evolution in military technology but a fundamental shift in the nature of conflict, where the lines between physical war, cyber operations, and psychological warfare are increasingly blurred. The findings underscore the need for robust international AI governance to mitigate risks associated with autonomous military escalation and cognitive warfare strategies.
- [A regulatory roadmap to EU’s Security of Supply in Defence: Assessing the current legal framework effort and the next steps toward an effective Security of Supply Strategy](https://finabel.org/a-regulatory-roadmap-to-eus-security-of-supply-in-defence-assessing-the-current-legal-framework-effort-and-the-next-steps-toward-an-effective-security-of-supply-strategy/) - Security of Supply in Defence has progressively shifted from being the sole interest of Member States to an area where the EU plays an increasingly important role. From the Directive on Defence Procurement and Intra-EU transfers to ASAP and EDIRPA, this paper examines the potential and limitations of the EU legal framework in supporting the Union’s Security of Supply. This analysis will lead us to consider the EU’s ability to ensure robust Security of Supply further through its EDIP proposal, marking a new step toward strategic autonomy.
- [Rapid Response in a Changing World: The New Force Model (NFM) as a Game Changer for NATO's Readiness?](https://finabel.org/rapid-response-in-a-changing-world-the-new-force-model-nfm-as-a-game-changer-for-natos-readiness/) - The New Force Model (NFM) represents a fundamental shift in NATO’s defence posture. This strategy is designed to enhance rapid deployment, deterrence, and interoperability in response to the current volatile geopolitical context characterised by evolving security threats. This study examines the NFM’s origins, structural evolution, and operational implications, particularly considering Russia’s aggression and the new dimensions of hybrid warfare. A key element of this transformation is the Allied Reaction Force (ARF), whose multi-domain capabilities are currently being assessed through Steadfast Dart 2025 (STDT25), NATO’s largest military exercise of the year. The findings highlight progress in force readiness while underscoring persistent challenges, including logistical coordination and multinational integration. As NATO adapts to modern warfare, refining the NFM will be essential to maintaining credible deterrence and collective defence.
- [Long-Range Capabilities Development in Ukraine: Current Projects and Implications for Europe](https://finabel.org/long-range-capabilities-development-in-ukraine-current-projects-and-implications-for-europe/) - The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrated how crucial long-range capabilities are in modern warfare. After a brief overview of Ukraine and Russia’s situation in this area at the beginning of the hostilities as well as the Western policy over missile supplies to Ukraine, this paper analyses how Ukraine has focused on the development of domestic long-range munitions to pursue a more autonomous strategic interdiction campaign against Russia, increasing its future deterrence potential. The study also discusses what implications these projects could have on future European missile capabilities in the context of an uncertain security environment and increased disengagement from the United States vis a vis European security.
- [The Role of AI Decision-Making for Land-Based Operations](https://finabel.org/the-role-of-ai-in-decision-making-for-land-based-operations/) - In an era of technological ‘Oppenheimer momentum,’ Artificial Intelligence (AI) has emerged as the new frontier in military decision-making, presenting enormous promises and challenges. This paper investigates the transformational impact of AI in the context of European land-based military operations, focussing on how AI may speed up decision-making, improve interoperability, and reshape traditional command and control (C2) structures. In the current context of global military competition, AI’s dual-purpose nature—its applicability in both civilian and military contexts—presents European ground forces with a competitive advantage, notably in sensor-to-shooter systems, predictive analysis, and autonomous decision-making.
- [Framework for the Future: Lessons Learned from the UK’s Approach to Integrated Battle Networks](https://finabel.org/framework-forthe-future-lessons-learned-from-the-uks-approach-to-integrated-battle-networks/) - This paper examines the evolution of the United Kingdom’s (UK) approach to integrated military network systems, analysing its strategies, technological advancements, and partnerships, particularly within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and with European Union (EU) allies. The study underscores the UK’s commitment to Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) and multi-domain operations, outlining the development of foundational communication systems like Bowman and Network Enabled Capability (NEC), as well as newer projects, including Morpheus, TRINITY, and the Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems (LETacCIS) program. The UK’s integration strategy prioritises secure, real-time data exchange across land, air, maritime, cyber, and space domains, aiming to enhance interoperability and strengthen resilience against hybrid threats. A key focus of this paper is on the UK’s collaboration with NATO and the EU in advancing secure communication frameworks, cyber resilience, and satellite capabilities through projects like Federated Mission Networking (FMN) and the SKYNET satellite system. As cyber and space domains become more critical, the UK’s evolving strategies demonstrate an adaptable, modular approach to maintaining technological superiority and coalition interoperability. To conclude, the paper highlights future directions for integrated networks, emphasising the importance of flexible, cyber-resilient, and quantum-encrypted systems to address emerging security challenges in a complex, multi-domain operational environment.
- [Beyond Sophia: EU launches Operation Irini to counter arms trafficking in Libya](https://finabel.org/beyond-sophia-eu-launches-operation-irini-to-counter-arms-trafficking-in-libya/) - Correction Notice In the original Food for Thought paper, it was reported that the EU Operation SOPHIA and the EU NAVFOR MED IRINI had a budget of "€ 12 billion" and "€9.8 billion" respectively. The correct figures are "€ 12 million" and "€ 9.8 million". 8 April 2020 While most of Europe is engaged in
- [The Light Advantage: Exploring Li-Fi as the Next Frontier in Military Data Transmission](https://finabel.org/the-light-advantage-exploring-li-fi-as-the-next-frontier-in-military-data-transmission/) - Light Fidelity (Li-Fi) is an emerging technology that revolutionises wireless communication by leveraging the visible light spectrum for data transmission. Addressing the limitations of tradi- tional radio frequency (RF)-based systems, Li-Fi offers unparalleled advantages in bandwidth, security, and energy efficiency. This paper examines Li-Fi’s transformative potential, partic- ularly in military contexts where secure and resilient communication is paramount. From enhancing command and control operations to facilitating naval coordination and disaster re- sponse, Li-Fi’s unique attributes, such as immunity to electromagnetic interference and high- speed transmission, make it a compelling alternative to RF technologies. However, issues like line-of-sight reliance and environmental sensitivity must be addressed be- fore widespread use occurs. The integration of Li-Fi with existing RF systems via hybrid tech- niques, as well as the new IEEE 802.11bb standardisation, point to a route towards practical feasibility. The paper also explores prospects, including Li-Fi’s role in multi-domain operations and its potential synergy with quantum encryption technologies. The study’s extensive research highlights Li-Fi’s importance in tackling current communica- tion difficulties, as well as its ability to reinvent connection in military and civilian applica- tions. The adoption of Li-Fi might signal a watershed moment in the transition to more secure, efficient, and adaptive wireless communication networks for an increasingly linked world by encouraging collaboration among governments, academics, and businesses.
- [The Impact of Intergovernmentalism on Interoperability in Developing a Common European Defence](https://finabel.org/the-impact-of-intergovernmentalism-on-interoperability-in-developing-a-common-european-defence/) - As Europe faces evolving security challenges, the need for a unified and common approach to defence within the EU has never been more pressing. Yet the intergovernmental model of governance, with its emphasis on national sovereignty, significantly hampers the EU's ability to develop a cohesive defence ecosystem. This article investigates this issue from the perspective of interoperability, defined as the ability of different systems or actors to work together in an efficient and coordinated manner. Given the plasticity of this concept, it can be articulated in various ways, and in this case is tripartite in its institutional, material and strategic dimensions. Therefore, this paper dissects the impact of intergovernmental logic on these interoperability dimensions while highlighting the European Commission's emerging role in transcending these limitations through entrepreneurial political activities. In conclusion, this analysis highlights the critical interplay between national sovereignty and collective defence efforts within the EU.
- [Beyond Exquisite: Europe’s Defence Strategy in the Era of Precise Mass](https://finabel.org/beyond-exquisite-europes-defence-strategy-in-the-era-of-precise-mass/) - As precision strike capabilities proliferate globally, European states face the strategic dilemma of finding the right balance between mass and precision in their defence posture. Historically reliant on high-quality, exquisite systems, a legacy of the Cold War, their militaries must adapt to an era where lower-cost, mass-produced precision weapons are reshaping modern warfare. While the United States is recalibrating its strategy toward a mix of stealth and scale, Europe must craft its own approach, factoring in its industrial capacity, geopolitical imperatives, and alliance commitments. Successfully developing and integrating attritable systems without undermining technological superiority will be necessary to strengthen European armed forces and ensure long-term operational readiness. This article argues that European defence planners must rethink force structures and procurement strategies, striking the right balance between quality and quantity to enhance flexibility and credible deterrence in a volatile regional environment.
- [Checks and Balances in the High North: The British Vision of the Arctic](https://finabel.org/checks-and-balances-in-the-high-north-the-british-vision-of-the-arctic/) - The UK’s Arctic strategy is shaped by evolving geopolitical, military, and environmental challenges. Although not a part of the Arctic, the British Army plays a crucial role for the greater securitisation of the region. This paper examines the UK's defence contributions in the High North, focusing on military cooperation with Arctic states, strategic deterrence measures, and environmental considerations. Key initiatives such as Project Heimdall, the F-35 Lightning II program, and the Littoral Response Group (North) illustrate the UK’s commitment to NATO’s Arctic security framework. Additionally, UK partnerships with Arctic nations highlight collaborative approaches to Arctic governance. With increasing Russian and Chinese activity in the region, the UK’s role is crucial in maintaining stability through joint exercises and surveillance initiatives. The paper also explores future policy directions, including UK-Scandinavian security alignment and transatlantic defence shifts. Balancing military preparedness with environmental stewardship remains a core challenge for UK policymakers. As Arctic geopolitics continue to evolve, the UK's strategic role will be integral to shaping a secure and sustainable Arctic future.
- [From Paper to Precision: Streamlining Weapon Issuance and Maintenance Through Automation](https://finabel.org/from-paper-to-precision-streamlining-weapon-issuance-and-maintenance-through-automation/) - This paper treats the topic of Weapon Management Systems and the benefits their automation would have on Innovation and Interoperability in the defence sector. It argues, specifically, that automation provides a way of improving the military landscape in its entirety with a bottom-up approach. Methodically, the research draws from the contemporary relevance of the concepts of Innovation and Interoperability to highlight how digitalising and streamlining military administration can have positive and lasting effects on the defence sector. In that, this paper finds that automation can benefit Innovation by furthering broad sections of the world of defence and the entanglement between these sections. Particularly here, the bottom-up perspective becomes an important aspect of how automation can improve the military land- scape. In the discussion about Interoperability, the bottom-up perspective offers insights into the flaws of current European frameworks in enhancing the military by making it more in- teroperable. The automation of Weapon Management Systems therefore serves as an overview of how seemingly smaller initiatives can positively impact relevant features of current defence needs. This research thus makes a bold attempt in trying to present new ways of implementing important steps in European defence.
- [Where are the Women? Hegemonic Masculinity and the Struggle for the Integration of Women into the Military](https://finabel.org/where-are-the-women-hegemonic-masculinity-and-the-struggle-for-the-integration-of-women-into-the-military/) - This research argues that the underlying problems behind the integration of women into the military lie in the hegemonic masculinity that embodies the institution as a whole. The research begins by theoretically outlining how this hegemonic masculinity takes form in institutional structures and how it constructs masculinised gender configurations. This is used as a foundation for an exploration of the practical dimensions of how hegemonic masculinity hampers the integration of women. The research finds that symbolism, language, and actions within the institution of the military are construed around hegemonic masculinity and that this is fundamentally obstructing the integration of women into the military, which has major Civil-Military and political implications on the current security context of Europe.
- [The Application of Artificial Intelligence to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Challenge of Targeting](https://finabel.org/the-application-of-artificial-intelligence-to-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-and-the-challenge-of-targeting/) - As Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) proliferate on battlefields from Ukraine to the Middle East, states and private actors are increasingly moving towards equipping them with Artificial Intelligence (AI). AI-enabled UAVs excel in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and can effectively counter enemy electronic warfare measures. However, they also raise ethical and legal concerns, particularly when AI is applied in targeting processes. As a result, many in the international community have called for their regulation or an outright ban. Failure to properly regulate the development and use of AI-enabled drones could lead to their proliferation and also to human rights abuses, especially among non-state actors.
- [NATO Unveils Baltic Sentry: A New Security Mission for Undersea Pipelines and Cables](https://finabel.org/nato-unveils-baltic-sentry-a-new-security-mission-for-undersea-pipelines-and-cables/) - In response to escalating threats, NATO launched Operation Baltic Sentry, a coordinated effort to secure undersea communication and energy networks from sabotage and cyber-attacks. This paper examines the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea, the evolving nature of hybrid warfare, and the core components of the Baltic Sentry initiative. It explores the role of naval assets, surveillance technologies, and multinational cooperation in countering emerging threats. Additionally, the study evaluates the mission’s implications for regional security and NATO’s long-term strategic posture. While Baltic Sentry marks a crucial step in securing vital infrastructure, challenges such as resource limitations and the complexity of hybrid threats necessitate ongoing adaptation. The operation underscores the need for enhanced intelligence-sharing, advanced surveillance systems, and sustained multinational collaboration to safeguard stability in the region.
- [European Health Data Space (EHDS) and Cybersecurity: The Gaps in Europe’s Digital Health Future](https://finabel.org/european-health-data-space-ehdsand-cybersecurity-the-gaps-in-europes-digital-health-future/) - The European Health Data Space (EDHS) aims to revolutionize medical accessibility across EU Member States. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the need for a collective health data system to improve patient care and track health trends across the EU. While EDHS relies on the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to safeguard private data, certain cybersecurity issues remain unresolved. Despite multiple EU cybersecurity initiatives, cyber-attacks persist, raising concerns about EDHS’s vulnerability and its potential impact on private and state security. This article explores EDHS’s purpose, the gaps it aims to fill, and GDPR’s role in ensuring data safety. It also examines cybersecurity threats and their broader implications for state sovereignty, defence, and collective health data management within the EU.
- [The Evolving Theatre of Urban Warfare: A Post-Modern Battlefield in Ukraine and Gaza](https://finabel.org/the-evolving-theatre-of-urban-warfare-a-post-modern-battlefield-in-ukraine-and-gaza/) - This paper examines the evolving dynamics of urban warfare, emphasising the integration of advanced technologies and their profound impact on modern military operations. Through detailed analyses of the battles of Bakhmut and Gaza, the study explores how innovations such as kamikaze drones, precision-guided munitions, and enhanced surveillance systems have transformed the urban battlefield, rendering it both deadlier and less predictable. The research highlights how these technologies have led to the ‘civilianisation’ of high-tech warfare, where cyber operations and sophisticated information campaigns play roles as critical as physical firepower. Additionally, the paper investigates the psychological dimensions of urban combat, focusing on the use of cyber warfare to influence morale and public perception. By synthesising insights from recent conflicts, this study reflects on the operational, ethical, and strategic challenges faced by modern militaries, particularly in densely populated environments. The findings aim to inform future defence strategies, offering valuable perspectives for policymakers and military planners confronting the complexities of post-modern urban warfare.
- [The Strategic Vulnerability of NATO Logistics in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine](https://finabel.org/the-strategic-vulnerability-of-nato-logistics-in-wartime-lessons-from-ukraine/) - In light of NATO’s recent focus on logistics in high-intensity, large-scale warfare, this paper examines the vulnerabilities of the Alliance’s ability to sustain and resupply forces, based on lessons learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It analyses how threats to logistics evolved in modern combat, revealing the critical role of military sustainment within contemporary military strategy and the challenges that NATO must face in supporting and enabling operations on the battlefield.
- [Trump’s Greenland Proposal: Balancing Territorial Integrity, Self-Determination, and Strategic Interests](https://finabel.org/trumps-greenland-proposal-balancing-territorial-integrity-self-determination-and-strategic-interests/) - Trump’s ambition to gain control over Greenland has unsettled Denmark, the people of Greenland, and much of Europe. As the world’s largest island, Greenland is an autonomous region within the Kingdom of Denmark with aspirations for independence. This article will analyse Greenland’s legal status and potential path to independence. Additionally, it will explore the various strategies the United States might pursue to assert influence over the island and will examine the potential implications of Greenlandic independence for these efforts.
- [Space-to-Space Military Systems — An Operational Paradigm Shift](https://finabel.org/space-to-space-military-systems-an-operational-paradigm-shift/) - Current developments in space-to-space kinetic and non-kinetic weapons are changing the nature of military conduct in outer space. Additionally added flexibility, manoeuvrability and sustainability in space operations is made possible by in-orbit refuelling, servicing, assembly and manufacturing capabilities. When coupled with new technologies like military space vehicles, hunter-killer and nesting doll satellites and converged directed energy weapons, the space domain is realigned with more traditional operational domains of warfare. Although the nature of many military systems are by nature classified, one can infer from the current gamut of Western and adversarial projects already implemented but also in development that an operational paradigm shift is taking place in space. As such, European interoperability has never been so crucial - but similarly so is the ability to militarise space while guided by a stern moral compass, where legal accountability is ambiguous. In this vein, the article contends that space is experiencing an operational paradigm shift. Space is now, for all effects and purposes, a battlefield.
- [Universal Jurisdiction: A Bridge Between International Criminal Law and EU Defence and Security](https://finabel.org/universal-jurisdiction-a-bridge-between-international-criminal-law-and-eu-defence-and-security/) - This paper aims to demonstrate how EU Defence and Security reflects International Criminal Law (hereafter ICL). Said link is analysed through the notion of transitional justice, lending itself to the concept of universal jurisdiction. Analysing the latter contributes to highlighting the concrete workings of ICL on a global scale, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of the security and defence considerations in question. In fact, this paper assesses that it is beneficial for EU Member States to consider undertaking universal jurisdiction within the ambit of their security and defence policies, as such action positively contributes to EU diplomatic relations, contrary to what is commonly believed. Such a finding thus justifies the final observation that EU States should consider exercising universal jurisdiction as part of their defence and security strategies, thereby bolstering the importance of accountability as a global value.
- [Reassessing the Euro-Atlantic Nuclear Umbrella in the 21st Century](https://finabel.org/reassessing-the-euro-atlantic-nuclear-umbrella-in-the-21st-century/) - This article assesses the credibility of the current Euro-Atlantic nuclear deterrence in the context of 21st century geopolitical and technological challenges. Russia’s ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy and modernisation of its nuclear triad pose significant challenges to NATO’s deterrent credibility. Simultaneously, China’s rapid military advancements and growing strategic alliance with Russia complicate the Euro-Atlantic security picture. The advent of disruptive technologies, such as hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence (AI), creates new vulnerabilities in nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems, increasing worries about decision-making processes and the possibility of catastrophic mistakes. To meet these developing threats, this paper contends that NATO must modernise its nuclear arsenal, strengthen transatlantic coordination, and pursue strong arms control and diplomatic measures. NATO can adapt to the difficulties of great power rivalry by combining conventional, nuclear, and hybrid response techniques, ensuring its sustained position in global security and stability.
- [The High Representative of the Union (HR/VP) and the new Commissioner for Defence and Space: Necessary Cooperation for the Future of the European Defence Union](https://finabel.org/the-high-representative-of-the-union-hr-vp-and-the-new-commissioner-for-defence-and-space-necessary-cooperation-for-the-future-of-the-european-defence-union/) - The recent appointment of Andrius Kubilius as the first-ever Commissioner for Defence remarks the importance of the industrial defence strategy for the Commission Von der Leyen II. However, the complementarity between this new portfolio and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) is still uncertain. Overlaps and conflicts of competence could undermine the role of the HR/VP and cause unnecessary delays and upset among the Member States. This leads to two fundamental questions: Where are conflicts likely to emerge between these roles, and what mechanism can push forward better coordination to strengthen European defence?
- [Indian Ocean Strategic Relevance to Europe: Collaboration, Challenges and Competition](https://finabel.org/indian-ocean-strategic-relevance-to-europe-collaboration-challenges-and-competition/) - The Indian Ocean plays a crucial role in global geopolitics, trade, and security. Serving as a vital link between Europe, Asia and Africa, it facilitates the flow of commerce and energy supplies, making a key strategic corridor. The region’s importance is underscored by critical chokepoints that are both essential for global trade and vulnerable to disruption. For European nations, ensuring the stability of these maritime routes is vital for economic and energy security. The strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean is increasingly shaped by geopolitical competition, particularly with the growing influence of China through infrastructure investments and military expansion. In response, European countries have sought closer security and economic ties with India, a dominant regional player, through military cooperation and strategic engagement. However, the challenge remains in balancing partnerships while addressing the broader implications of China’s presence. This paper explores the Indian Ocean’s strategic significance to Europe, analysing the key drivers of collaboration, competition, and security challenges. As geopolitical rivalries intensify, European nations must adopt a proactive approach to safeguard their interests and maintain influence in this critical maritime domain.
- [The Future of Military Sustainment: Humans, Machines, and Autonomous Systems](https://finabel.org/the-future-of-military-sustainment-humans-machines-and-autonomous-systems/) - This article explores the transformative potential of Human-Machine Teaming (HMT) and Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) in enhancing sustainment operations for European land forces. It examines how these paradigms can revolutionise logistics, battlefield repair, and medical support by combining human adaptability with autonomous precision and efficiency. By exploring the increasing demands of dynamic and contested environments, the paper highlights the strategic importance of adopting these technologies for European militaries to achieve greater resilience and operational effectiveness in future large-scale combat scenarios.
- [Ceasefire in Gaza: The Fragile Agreement Between Israel and Hamas](https://finabel.org/ceasefire-in-gaza-the-fragile-agreement-between-israel-and-hamas/) - On December 19th, 2024, a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas entered into force in Gaza, halting the onslaught that has razed most of the Strip to the ground in the past fifteen months (Ewing, 2025; Shotter et al., 2025). The agreement followed months of draining negotiations brokered by Egyptian and Qatari mediators, with the backing of the United States (Mills & Mackenzie, 2025). It involves three stages, the first of which started with a few hours delay, displaying the truce’s fragility (Boxerman, 2025). The deal should last 42 days and provide for the release of 33 Israeli hostages in exchange for about 1,900 Palestinian prisoners detained in Israeli prisons (Livni & Boxerman, 2025). Moreover, Israel will have to withdraw its forces from Gaza’s population centres to areas no more than 700 metres inside Gaza’s border with Israel, allowing civilians to return to what remains of their homes and a surge of aid into the enclave (Al Jazeera Staff, 2025).
- [EU-Japan Strategic Partnership: Asian Influence on European Defence](https://finabel.org/eu-japan-strategic-partnership-asian-influence-on-european-defence/) - The EU-Japan Security and Defence Partnership marks a transformative chapter in transregional cooperation, reflecting shared values of democracy, multilateralism, and the rule of law. This paper explores the brief evolution, core components, and strategic implications of the partnership that highlight its significance in addressing contemporary security challenges. Japan’s departure from its pacifist stance and increased integration into global defence frameworks, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and NATO interoperability, complement the EU’s aspirations for strategic autonomy and expanded influence in the Indo-Pacific. Key areas of the proposed cooperation include military collaboration, cybersecurity, and space defence. Both actors agree on the alignment of strategic interests to counter threats from authoritarian regimes, regional instabilities, and hybrid warfare. The partnership also emphasises capacity-building initiatives to promote peace and stability globally. The paper argues that this partnership serves as a model for navigating geopolitical tensions in the Pacific theatre, including the challenges posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Amidst uncertainties, such as the impact of the invasion of Ukraine and foreign policy shifts in the American presidency, the EU-Japan alliance represents a pivotal step toward resilient strategic autonomy in the region.
- [The Economies of Scale of Joint Defence Procurement](https://finabel.org/the-economies-of-scale-of-joint-defence-procurement/) - This paper examines the role of economies of scale in addressing inefficiencies within the fragmented European defence sector. Despite ongoing geopolitical challenges, Europe’s defence industry struggles with duplicated efforts, inflated costs, and a lack of standardisation due to its decentralised structure. The analysis explores the historical roots of fragmentation, evaluates current debates on defence spending efficiency, and outlines strategies such as aggregating demand, increasing joint procurement, promoting consolidation, fostering cross-border collaboration, and reinforcing European preference in procurement. Theoretical insights into economies of scale highlight the potential for reducing costs and enhancing production capabilities, particularly through unified procurement and joint industrial efforts. The study further investigates the constraints faced by both major defence contractors and SMEs, as well as recent European Commission initiatives, including coordinated R&D at the pan-European level. Concluding with actionable policy recommendations, the paper provides a roadmap for consolidating Europe’s defence industry, emphasising the necessity of strategic integration and collective investment to enhance the continent’s strategic autonomy and industrial resilience.
- [Episode 6: European Military Support for Ukraine](https://finabel.org/episode-6-european-military-support-for-ukraine/) - In this episode of StrategicALLY, hosts Zsigmond Tar and Katharina Brzuska discuss with Gustav Gressel, an expert in Eastern Europe, Russia and in military affairs, the European military support for Ukraine. Drawing from valuable experience at the Austrian Ministry of Defence and the European Council on Foreign Relations, he offers details on the current situation in Ukraine and explains how the war has evolved through nearly three years. As we address areas such as the coordination of arms deliveries, the role of advanced weapons and drone warfare, this episode aims to provide insight into the challenges Ukraine faces in maintaining its defence and sovereignty. The sounds for this podcast were edited by Irina Antonescu.
- [Episode 5: AI and Geoeconomics: Understanding Europe’s Security Landscape](https://finabel.org/episode-5-ai-and-geoeconomics-understanding-europes-security-landscape/) - In this episode of StrategicALLY, hosts Belén Padrón Salinas and Zsigmond Tar sit down with Heiko Borchert, owner and manager of Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affairs consulting company that focuses a broad range of security issues. We will discuss the dynamics of geoeconomics and artificial intelligence for the defence industries in Europe, touching aspects such as the security of supply chains, interoperability and the modernisation of European militaries. Mr Borchert shares his expertise on the application of artificial intelligence and the geoeconomic aspects for armed forces and defence industries in Europe. As co-author of the book ‘The Very Long Game’ where 25 different countries are analysed as case studies for implementing AI in the militaries, Mr Borchert provides us valuable information on the modernisation of militaries across Europe. The podcast recording and sounds have been edited by Irina Antonescu.
- [Assessing Reprisals as an Alternative to Judicial Proceedings for Enforcing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law](https://finabel.org/assessing-reprisals-as-an-alternative-to-judicial-proceedings-for-enforcing-compliance-with-international-humanitarian-law/) - Countermeasures are an established mechanism in International Law that allows a State to respond to the unlawful actions of another. This tool enables the injured State to act in a way that would otherwise be illegal, with the objective of compelling the breaching State to cease its violations. Similarly, the concept of belligerent reprisals refers to a similar mechanism in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which allows a State to violate IHL rules in response to the previous violations of another State in order to enforce compliance. It has been a part of armed conflicts throughout history, and its codification can be traced back to the earliest iterations of IHL. Over time, the scope and permissibility of reprisals have become significantly more constrained. Today, their regulation is primarily governed by customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL), which draws upon the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Customary Rules and established case law. This article will examine the exact legal boundaries of belligerent reprisals and evaluate the practice.
- [European Troops for Ukraine? Evolving Perspectives and Strategic Debates on the Deployment of European Ground Troops to Ukraine](https://finabel.org/european-troops-for-ukraine-evolving-perspectives-and-strategic-debates-on-the-deployment-of-european-ground-troops-to-ukraine/) - In February 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron sparked an intense debate by suggesting the deployment of European ground troops to Ukraine. However, other NATO and EU leaders quickly dismissed such an idea. French authorities rushed to frame it as part of a strategic ambiguity policy, emphasising non-combat roles to avoid a public outburst. Although the idea faded, reports in December 2024 revealed renewed Franco-British discussions on deploying Western troops to prevent another Russian aggression in the context of a potential US shift in European priorities under the new Trump administration and announced peace talks. Analysing European leaders’ reactions and future scenarios for possible deployment, this article finds that the suggestion mainly served to signal to other actors that European states are preparing to assume responsibility for guaranteeing Ukraine’s security when a peace agreement is reached. Although such a project is likely to remain in the discussion stage, the existence of the debate itself may help shape European geopolitical actorness at a time of increasing instability throughout the continent.
- [The Interconnectedness of AI Systems - The Future of Contemporary Warfare](https://finabel.org/the-interconnectedness-of-ai-systems-the-future-of-contemporary-warfare/) - The incorporation of AI in military applications has transformed contemporary warfare, providing unparalleled efficiency, accuracy, and independence abilities. Yet, with the progress of AI systems, the possibility of autonomous weapons collaborating and communicating with each other brings up substantial strategic, ethical, and security issues. This paper seeks to investigate the technological groundwork that allows for AI communication, analysing the latest progress in machine learning and autonomous systems. It will examine how the connectedness could impact battlefield dynamics, decision-making processes, and the potential for emergent behaviours that can improve operational effectiveness or result in unintended consequences.
- [Towards Super Soldiers? The Implications of Tech-Infusion of Soldiers and the Concept of Connected Soldiers on the Military Landscape](https://finabel.org/towards-super-soldiers-the-implications-of-tech-infusion-of-soldiers-and-the-concept-of-connected-soldiers-on-the-military-landscape/) - This Info Flash discusses the implications of Tech-Infusion of Soldiers on the Military Landscape and inferentially on the political world. In doing so, the IF first covers how tech-infusion has taken hold of the soldier and what the developments have specifically entailed before applying these findings in a wider, political scope in the second section. It finds that a lot of the developments in the area of tech-infusion are based on surpassing the boundaries of the human body and, therefore, attempting to make reality easier, and even rearrange the boundaries of reality itself. Yet one must conclude that the growing investment into tech-infusion must equally be understood in the context of the changing military and political landscape of increasing uncertainty and conflict.
- [Convergence and Divergences: Unravelling the Challenges and Opportunities of the Future Combat Aircraft of Europe, a key element for European Interoperability](https://finabel.org/convergence-and-divergences-unravelling-the-challenges-and-opportunities-of-the-future-combat-aircraft-of-europe-a-key-element-for-european-interoperability/) - The Russian war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of air superiority in achieving war objectives, demonstrating that fighting without it involves massed armies relying on ground-based artillery firepower, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths in the first year. Preventing prolonged and deadly campaigns for Land Forces is critical for Europe, a goal achievable through strong air capabilities. The Western world and Russia have long led in air combat technology. Since the Cold War, other nations, notably China, have advanced their aircraft capabilities to counter Western technologies. Building advanced aircraft requires significant investment in technological warfare and serves as a marker of geopolitical strength. Possessing self-made aircraft demonstrates industrial and financial capacity, as well as determination to achieve defence autonomy. Thus, it is worth analyzing whether Europe has the capability and determination to develop a standard combat air system.
- [Finabel's Space Handbook](https://finabel.org/finabels-space-handbook/) - Against the backdrop of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War and Europe’s changing security environment, space has become ever more significant in the field of defence and security. Today, the spatial context has moved beyond the binary Soviet-American dynamic of one-upmanship experienced during the Cold War. Greater acknowledgement of the domain’s importance to modern society has led to a renewed look at space within military affairs in recent years, spurring the formal recognition of space as an operational domain by NATO allies in 2019 (Eagleson, 2023). This paper explores various strands of the strategic domain of space in the European context, involving analyses ranging from explorations of the sector’s legal dimensions to a further dive into the lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War in the realm of space.
- [Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare](https://finabel.org/convergence-and-divergences-unravelling-the-challenges-and-opportunities-of-the-future-combat-aircraft-of-europe-a-key-element-for-european-interoperability-2/) - New artificially intelligent technologies are being developed and becoming crucial for commercial, economic, and scientific progress. The defence sector is adopting AI to enhance security, using it “for repetitive tasks to free up security staff for projects that require human ingenuity” (Murugesan, 2022, p. 4), and “NATO Member States have already started to invest in this technology” (Carlo, 2021, p. 269). While AI offers benefits, it brings “dramatic changes in the strategy, operational art, tactics and doctrines of the warring sides” (Ploumis, 2022, p. 1) and may increase cyber-attack threats (Kline et al., 2019). AI is expected to impact “the conduct of warfare, bring new capabilities into being, and alter power equations” (Singh Gill, 2019, p. 169). This paper explores how AI affects conflicts, focusing on its benefits, risks, and implications for military cooperation, technological compatibility, and ethical considerations.
- [Privatisation of Security: The legal Status and Responsibilities of Private Military Companies in European Missions](https://finabel.org/privatisation-of-security-the-legal-status-and-responsibilities-of-private-military-companies-in-european-missions/) - The rise of Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) in military or civilian missions stands as an important change in the dynamics of the security and defence world, as they change how operations can be conducted, especially for armed forces. Dating back to the Middle Ages with mercenaries, they have taken different forms throughout history. Nowadays, they deliver a large span of services (from indirect support in logistics or military counselling to taking part directly in combat). This paper will present their blurred status in law and their duties in missions led by European Member States, taking a look at the existing legislation and tools to hold them responsible for their actions.
- [Chad Ends Defence Pact with France, Signalling a Shift in Regional Alliances](https://finabel.org/chad-ends-defence-pact-with-france-signalling-a-shift-in-regional-alliances/) - Chad announced that it was terminating its defence cooperation agreement with France, signalling a potential withdrawal of French troops from the Central African nation (Deutsche Welle, 2024). The decision was officially communicated by Chad’s Foreign Minister Abderaman Koulamallah on the ministry’s Facebook page, emphasising the country’s desire to assert its sovereignty after 64 years of independence from French colonial rule (Deutsche Welle, 2024). While this marks a significant shift, Koulamallah clarified that it did not constitute a complete break with France, as seen in other regional cases (Deutsche Welle, 2024).
- [IRIS²: A New Frontier in The European Space Programme](https://finabel.org/iris²-a-new-frontier-in-the-european-space-programme/) - On December 16th, the European Commission signed the concession contract for constructing the Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS²). This space initiative involves the creation of a multi-orbital constellation of 290 satellites, leveraging the comparative advantages of satellites in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) (European Commission, 2024a). This 12-year project embodies Europe’s strategic attempt to develop a viable alternative to Elon Musk’s Starlink (Volpicelli & Palasciano, 2024).
- [The Art of Illusion: The Role of Decoys in Military Deception and Modern Warfare](https://finabel.org/the-art-of-illusion-the-role-of-decoys-in-military-deception-and-modern-warfare/) - This paper explores the evolving role of decoys in military deception (MILDEC), examining their historical significance, current applications across the kinetic and non-kinetic spectrum, and their technological evolution in response to modern detection, recognition, and identification threats. The objective is to evaluate the challenges posed by advanced detection systems, which significantly improve battlefield situational awareness, and to identify how modern Western decoy strategies are adapting rapidly to maintain their relevance within military deception.
- [Europe Adrift: The Incoming Trump Presidency and the EU’s Strategic Void in Ukraine](https://finabel.org/europe-adrift-the-incoming-trump-presidency-and-the-eus-strategic-void-in-ukraine/) - The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has exposed the critical state of the European Union’s defence and security strategies. At the same time, the EU’s Strategic Compass outlined a vision for greater defence integration, long-standing divides among member states persist, hindering coherent action. The initial unified response to Russia’s aggression has faded into a strategic divergence, with contrasting national priorities. The prospect of a Trump administration in 2025 exacerbates Europe’s security vulnerabilities, as Ukraine remains heavily dependent on US military aid. The failure to prepare for a US withdrawal leaves the EU strategically paralysed, risking both Kyiv’s sovereignty and Europe’s future security. This study explores the consequences of this strategic void and underlines the importance for the EU to develop a unified defence strategy.
- [Analysing the Strategic Implications of Russia’s “Oreshnik” Missile: The Next Stage of Russia’s Missile Strategy](https://finabel.org/analysing-the-strategic-implications-of-russias-oreshnik-missile-the-next-stage-of-russias-missile-strategy/) - From conventional missiles to more experimental hypersonic platforms, Russia is redefining missile warfare. On November 21st, Russia launched the Oreshnik missile in Ukraine, marking the first-ever use of a hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile that can also carry a nuclear warhead. These advanced systems—capable of evading air defences and delivering precision strikes—are being tested extensively in Ukraine. They are not just battlefield tools; they are strategic signals to NATO and Europe about Russia’s evolving military might and a form of geopolitical blackmailing. The lack of adequate air defences to deter hypersonic missiles creates a new security dilemma for Europe. This Info Flash analyses the greater implications of Oreshnik in Russian missile strategy and, more importantly, what it means for Ukraine and its allies in the long-term.
- [The Role of International Humanitarian Law in Human Rights Bodies: A Focus on the European Court of Human Rights](https://finabel.org/the-role-of-international-humanitarian-law-in-human-rights-bodies-a-focus-on-the-european-court-of-human-rights/) - In the absence of a judicial body that would specifically deal with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the role of its interpretation and enforcement often falls on human rights bodies, like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This article will begin by recalling the theories developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). An analysis will then be conducted on the interplay between human rights and international humanitarian law within the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence. The Court’s judgments in the Al-Jedda and Hassan cases will be examined to understand how ECtHR interprets the relationship between human rights and IHL and, subsequently how this affects the protection granted to individuals by the European Convention on Human Rights.
- [The Quest for a Common Strategic Culture in the EU: Challenges for the Development of a Coherent Political Autonomy](https://finabel.org/the-quest-for-a-common-strategic-culture-in-the-eu-challenges-for-the-development-of-a-coherent-political-autonomy/) - This paper explores the challenges of the European Union (EU) in developing a common strategic culture and, consequently, a coherent political autonomy on the international stage. By examining the evolution of the Union’s security narratives and the challenges these pose to its political autonomy, particularly in light of the war in Ukraine, the paper highlights that certain institutional mechanisms of intergovernmental nature and the discordance between the strategic interests of member states hinder the development of a collective European position. These challenges widen the capability-expectation gap of the EU and affect military coordination. In this regard, the lack of a common strategic culture also has an impact on the interoperability of military capabilities, as the varied priorities and defence strategies of member states complicate efforts to harmonise doctrines across the EU.
- [The Evolution of EU Defence Policy: Strategic Compass and Industrial Implications](https://finabel.org/the-evolution-of-eu-defence-policy-strategic-compass-and-industrial-implications/) - The article examines recent EU defence initiatives aimed at establishing a unified European Military Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Key measures like the European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through the Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), spurred by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, reflect a shift towards greater EU defence unity and interoperability. Anchored by the 2022 Versailles Summit and the Strategic Compass, these efforts culminated in the 2024 European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS). The article highlights the Compass as a framework for achieving autonomy and interoperability while addressing structural challenges such as fragmented procurement and industry limitations. It also explores the debate over collective borrowing for defence, balancing national interests with EU security needs.
- [The Role of the OSCE in European Conflict Prevention and Security](https://finabel.org/the-role-of-the-osce-in-european-conflict-prevention-and-security/) - The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the world’s largest regional security organisation, uniting 57 member states to promote peace, stability, and democracy. Through tools like the Vienna Document, election monitoring, and field missions, the OSCE fosters transparency, dialogue, and cooperation to prevent conflicts. Its comprehensive approach integrates military, economic, environmental, and human rights dimensions. While consensus-driven decisions ensure inclusivity, they can hinder swift action. Despite challenges, the OSCE remains vital in addressing evolving regional security risks.
- [The Downfall of Wagner and the Rise of Redut: The Growing Challenge of Russian PMCs for European Security](https://finabel.org/the-downfall-of-wagner-and-the-rise-of-redut-the-growing-challenge-of-russian-pmcs-for-european-security/) - The collapse of the Wagner Group has paved the way for Redut, a GRU-backed private military company (PMC), to emerge as a key Kremlin tool for hybrid warfare. Operating in Ukraine, Africa, and Eastern Europe, the shadowy operational capabilities of Redut pose significant challenges to European Union (EU) missions and international stability. This report examines Redut’s structure, strategic objectives, and the broader implications of Russian PMC activities on global security and geopolitics. This paper discovers how Redut symbolises Russia’s evolving strategy in leveraging private military influence in conflict zones. Read the full analysis:
- [Enhancing European Crisis Response: From EU Battlegroups to the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity](https://finabel.org/enhancing-european-crisis-response-from-eu-battlegroups-to-the-eu-rapid-deployment-capacity/) - The European Union's Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022, envisioned the creation of a Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) intended to reach full operability by 2025. Despite its innovative capacity, this project is not the first attempt made by the European Union to develop a common rapid response force. Comparing the RDC initiative to the Battlegroups’ almost twenty-year experience, this article examines the obstacles that prevented the deployment of Battlegroups and explores what similar and new hurdles the RDC will have to overcome to enable Member States to react collectively to future security challenges. It finds that only by building upon lessons learned from the past could the EU Member States establish an effective operational tool to engage rapidly in autonomous military operations.
- [From Assistance to Armed Surveillance: Frontex and the EU’s Securitised Migration Agenda](https://finabel.org/from-assistance-to-armed-surveillance-frontex-and-the-eus-securitised-migration-agenda/) - This paper examines the European Union’s (EU) gradual development of external border management, focussing on the militarisation and externalisation of migration control. Through an analysis of the role of Frontex and the increasing integration of military technology, it argues that the EU has shifted from cooperative regulation to a security-centric paradigm, frequently at the expense of human rights. Key findings show how migration is increasingly being presented as a security threat, impacting EU partnerships with non-EU countries and transforming the Mediterranean into a militarised zone. The paper advocates for rethinking the EU border strategy to balance security goals with humanitarian responsibilities, arguing that the future of European border management must prioritise human dignity alongside effective security measures.
- [From PESCO to EU Battlegroups: Poland’s Role in Advancing EU Land Force Interoperability](https://finabel.org/from-pesco-to-eu-battlegroups-polands-role-in-advancing-eu-land-force-interoperability/) - This study investigates Poland’s role in enhancing EU land force interoperability through its participation in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the EU Battlegroups initiative. Drawing on Poland’s strategic geopolitical position and its leadership in PESCO projects, this paper highlights contributions to mobility, cybersecurity, and rapid response capabilities. Poland’s leadership in EU Battlegroups, including the Visegrád and Weimar groups, underscores its commitment to EU defence frameworks despite operational challenges, such as political discord among allies. Findings reveal Poland’s dual role in bridging EU and NATO defence efforts, emphasising military modernisation and shared standards. This study concludes that Poland’s proactive engagement is vital for advancing European defence capabilities and fostering strategic autonomy in an evolving security landscape.
- [Navigating European Naval Power: The Role of the European Patrol Corvette in EU Maritime Security](https://finabel.org/navigating-european-naval-power-the-role-of-the-european-patrol-corvette-in-eu-maritime-security/) - Amid rising geostrategic tensions, the maritime domain has emerged as a critical arena where Great Powers navigate their competing interests, emphasising the importance of a coordinated European naval defence policy. This article delves into the European Union’s (EU) dynamic approach to maritime security, beginning with an overview of the EU’s strategic goals for maritime defence and security. It also provides an overview of previous cooperation initiatives in the European naval defence sector, laying the groundwork for more recent advances, particularly the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) initiative. By providing a coordinated and flexible response to maritime threats, the EPC is anticipated to strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy and improve interoperability. The article’s conclusion offers an evaluation of the EPC’s implications for EU defence policy and its potential to transform Europe’s naval capabilities, granting the EU an opportunity to redefine its role in maritime security.
- [Seabed and hybrid warfare in Europe: the strategic importance of undersea cables in the Baltic region](https://finabel.org/seabed-and-hybrid-warfare-in-europe-the-strategic-importance-of-undersea-cables-in-the-baltic-region/) - The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has greatly transformed the political and military landscape in Europe. Amidst a tense strategic environment, the Nordic-Baltic region has emerged as a potential point of friction between Russian and NATO allies. The undersea cables beneath the Baltic Sea, which hold a vital importance for military communications, internet, and financial traffic, are a focal point in the battlefield preparation according to the Russian hybrid war planning. This study looks at the importance of sub-sea telecommunications infrastructure in the wider Baltic region within the context of hybrid warfare.
- [Episode 4: European Deterrence and the Changing U.S. Strategy](https://finabel.org/episode-4-european-deterrence-and-the-changing-u-s-strategy/) - In this episode of StrategicALLY, hosts Bori Benedek and Zsigmond Tar sit down with Paul van Hooft, a defence and deterrence expert at RAND Europe, to explore the evolving dynamics of European security. The discussion covers critical topics such as NATO enlargement, European deterrence, and the shifting focus of American foreign policy from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. Mr. van Hooft provides context on the potential implications of a Trump administration on transatlantic relations, the war in Ukraine, and the strategic cohesion of European militaries. Drawing on his extensive research and publications, he discusses Europe’s reliance on the U.S. in key military sectors, the necessity for European fallback options, and the prospects for enhanced EU-NATO collaboration. Packed with expert insights, this episode offers a comprehensive analysis of the future of European defence in an increasingly multipolar world.
- [A Crumbling Anchor? The Collapse of the German Government and European Security](https://finabel.org/a-crumbling-anchor-the-collapse-of-the-german-government-and-european-security/) - The collapse of Germany’s ‘Traffic Light’ coalition marks the end of a government marred by in-fighting and continuous crises. This News Flash addresses the implications it has on the future of both German and European Security.
- [From Duty to Dissent: the Legal Boundaries and Ethical Considerations of Conscientious Objection](https://finabel.org/from-duty-to-dissent-the-legal-boundaries-and-ethical-considerations-of-conscientious-objection/) - This article examines the right of conscientious objection, showcasing the legal limits of certain rights and obligations, existing in a complex intersection between human rights and the demands of state security, particularly in a precarious European landscape. Through the legal analysis of European case-law, the article showcases the evolving interpretation and changes in human right doctrines, that can nonetheless be suspended in times of conflict. Commonly known as a right ‘to be enjoyed in peace time’, the evolution of legal and societal considerations of this right reflects the fragile nature of individual rights in the face of collective security needs, inviting to a reflection of what this means for the future of a society that strives for the protection of human rights and peace.
- [Episode 3: Is Conscription Returning to Europe?](https://finabel.org/episode-3-is-conscription-returning-to-europe/) - Since the end of the Cold War, most European countries have suspended compulsory military service, reducing their militaries to a relatively small force of volunteers. The consequences of the cuts to military budgets have become more apparent following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While only 9 out of the 27 Member States of
- [Episode 2: Does Diplomacy Still Have a Chance in Ukraine?](https://finabel.org/episode-2-does-diplomacy-still-have-a-chance-in-ukraine/) - Between the 15th and the 16th of June 2024, delegations from nearly 100 countries gathered in Bürgenstock Resort in Switzerland to discuss a path to peace in Ukraine. While Russia and its key ally China were not there, most participants reaffirmed their support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the core principles of international law in
- [Episode 1: Will these European elections build the momentum for a European common defence?](https://finabel.org/14894-2/) - As we enter the 2024 European elections voting weekend, defence and security are among the main campaign issues for voters. In the first episode of StrategicALLY, Gaia Durante Mangoni and Patricia Bernardo are joined by Thomas Tindemans, chairman of the strategic communications consultancy Hill & Knowlton, to discuss why European common defence and security should
- [The Case for Ukraine’s Weapons Export](https://finabel.org/the-case-for-ukraines-weapons-export/) - As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its third year, Kyiv is exploring ways to enhance its domestic weapons production and decrease reliance on unpredictable Western military aid. However, the government lacks funds for its realisation, and the country’s defence companies are producing much less than they could. For this reason, they are proposing to allow exports and earn money to invest in higher production, research and development. However, this proposal faces political resistance from inside Ukraine and the international community. While describing these latest political and industrial developments, this article explores an alternative solution that envisages Western partners investing in the country’s industrial-military complex. This strategy could address Ukraine’s political concerns while helping the country’s industry to be better prepared for current and future challenges.
- [Securing the Sky: Challenges to Building a European Integrated Air and Missile Defence System](https://finabel.org/securing-the-sky-challenges-to-building-a-european-integrated-air-and-missile-defence-system/) - This paper examines the prospects for a European Air Defence Shield, focusing on the technological, political and industrial challenges in creating an Integrated Air Defence (IADS). The urgency for a unified system is underscored by Russia’s war of aggression and the growing threats from hypersonic missiles, drones and electronic warfare. The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) marks an important step towards addressing these vulnerabilities but faces significant obstacles, including fragmented procurement and national priorities. The paper explores the potential of ESSI, its limitations and the broader need for an integrated European approach to air defence.
- [Franco-German Relationship in the European Defence and Security ](https://finabel.org/franco-german-relationship-in-the-european-defence-and-security-2/) - This paper explores the complex Franco-German relationship in European defence and security, focusing on how their strategic divergences have shaped Europe's defence landscape. It traces the historical evolution of their cooperation from the post-World War II period, marked by key agreements such as the Élysée Treaty and the creation of the Western European Union, which laid the foundations for joint defence initiatives. However, despite these efforts, France and Germany have developed contrasting strategic visions: France champions strategic autonomy, favouring military interventionism and European independence, while Germany prioritises multilateralism, with a stronger reliance on NATO and a cautious approach to military engagements. These differing defence cultures have led to operational challenges, particularly evident in recent crises such as the conflict in Ukraine, where their varied responses have impeded Europe's ability to act cohesively and swiftly. The paper argues that these ongoing strategic differences undermine Europe’s potential to develop a unified defence strategy and highlights the need for deeper Franco-German alignment to ensure a stronger, more coherent European defence posture in the face of evolving security challenges.
- [The legal approach of the nuclear deterrence policy: A resurgence of the concept with the European Security Defence](https://finabel.org/franco-german-relationship-in-the-european-defence-and-security/) - In an era characterised by resurgent geopolitical tensions, the role of nuclear deterrence is once again at the forefront of European defence strategy. Traditionally seen as a military safeguard, nuclear deterrence evolves into a complex legal construct, raising concerns about its legitimacy, constraints, and adaptability. As the Russian invasion has reignited debates over nuclear strategy, it becomes clear that the legal dimensions of deterrence reflect both a continuity of Cold War-era principles and a significant shift toward flexible, adaptive policies. Given the potentially disastrous effects on civilian populations, the current legal framework raises severe humanitarian questions, even though nuclear deterrence serves as a critical safeguard. Therefore, by exploring the legal basis of nuclear deterrence and its role within Europe’s defence architecture, this article highlights the need for scrutinised legal adaptability in a rapidly evolving security landscape. Maintaining credible deterrence while ensuring compliance with legal obligations and humanitarian principles remains essential to reduce civilian casualties.
- [The Return of President Trump: Potential Repercussions on European Security ](https://finabel.org/the-return-of-president-trump-potential-repercussions-on-european-security/) - On November 5th, 2024, former President Donald J. Trump was elected as the 47th President of the United States of America for a second mandate after the four-year interval of President Joe Biden’s Democratic Administration (Miller et al., 2024). Alongside Trump’s return to the White House, the Republican Party secured control over the Senate and is currently leading the race for the House of Representatives. Such an outcome will likely impact the current geopolitical landscape across the European continent and may drive EU Member States to reconsider the European security environment entirely.
- [Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan ](https://finabel.org/volodymyr-zelenskyys-victory-plan/) - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has unveiled a bold five-part victory plan to end the war with Russia in 2024, focusing on fast-tracking NATO membership, increasing military aid, and leveraging Ukraine's economic resources. He views NATO membership as vital for Ukraine’s security and a symbolic defeat of Putin’s ambitions. While the plan has garnered some support, it faces sharp opposition from Russia, which warns of escalating conflict, and Hungary's Prime Minister Orbán, who calls for peace talks over more aid. Zelenskyy’s refusal to give away territory underscores his commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, but his success depends on continued international support amid shifting global priorities.
- [The Impact of Climate Change on Ground Defence Strategies](https://finabel.org/the-impact-of-climate-change-on-ground-defence-strategies-2/) - As climate change reshapes the global landscape, its impact is vast not just in its effect on the environment but also politics, economics and security. For European militaries, climate change is a “threat multiplier”, intensifying resource competition, migration as well as instability. From extreme weather disrupting operations to the growing demand for disaster relief, armed forces need to adapt to new challenges. This paper investigates how European military strategies are evolving in order to combat climate related threats, assessing the implications for national security and NATO’s collective defence. The future of defence is climate conscious- are we ready?
- [The Modernisation of the Italian Armed Forces after the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine](https://finabel.org/the-modernisation-of-the-italian-armed-forces-after-the-2022-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/) - The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a wake-up call for many countries in Europe, which decided to start a comprehensive modernization of their armed forces after decades of neglect. Although traditionally sceptical about prioritising the strengthening of its military, Italy is raising its defence expenditures to address the structural problems of its armed forces, which include a lack of personnel and adequate equipment. While these steps are surely essential, there is more that Italy can do to further improve the condition of its land, naval and air forces, including a better allocation of resources, the integration of innovative weapons systems in its arsenals and an increased proactivity in some European collaborative defence projects.
- [The New Portfolio of Defence and Space Commissioner: Key Priorities and Challenges Ahead](https://finabel.org/the-new-portfolio-of-defence-and-space-commissioner-key-priorities-and-challenges-ahead/) - In this paper, Marek Gallo analyses the implications of the newly created post of Defence and Space Commissioner (DaSC) for the European security architecture. The appointment of Andrius Kubilius reflects a strategic shift aimed at bolstering the EU’s defence industry and achieving greater strategic autonomy in response to Russian aggression and global instability. However, this paper argues that while the DaSC role emphasises joint procurement and enhanced interoperability, the portfolio lacks the authority to drive substantial defence reforms. At the same time, Kubilius' success depends on securing resources, overcoming institutional hesitancy, and fostering collaboration with NATO. Additionally, the EU’s cost-effective space policy focuses on regulatory leadership and space programmes continuity, rather than militarisation. This paper constructively highlights the challenges Kubilius will face in aligning immediate security concerns with long-term strategic objectives, positioning the DaSC as a symbolic yet limited step in strengthening Europe’s defence posture.
- [France Claims World’s First Ground to Space High-Speed Optical-Laser Link](https://finabel.org/france-claims-worlds-first-ground-to-space-high-speed-optical-laser-link/) - In late 2023, the French Defence Innovation Agency (AID), through the French Armament Directorate, launched a new satellite named Keraunos with the aid of two novel French Space companies, Cailabs and Unseenlabs (AID, 2O24). The project, along with others like Toutatis and Yoda (Bosquillon, 2024), contribute to the French 2024-2030 Military Programming Law (AID, 2024). The mission is meant to test the potential of space Optical-Laser Infrared (OLI) communications between space and ground segments of communications networks. During the summer of 2024, these three entities performed a successful test (Ruitenberg, 2024). The test was followed by a joint announcement on September 10th, 2024, claiming the world’s first stable OLI high-speed communications “end-to-end” downlink between a low orbit nanosatellite and an optical ground station, which lasted for several minutes (AID, 2024). Despite the possibility of classified initiatives and recent breakthroughs by NASA (Powers, 2024), China (Xinhua, 2024), and others (Depond, 2024), this was the first commercial test of its sort (Bosquillon, 2024), marking a new age for space to ground optical-laser infrared (OLI) communications.
- [Command and Control Insights from Ukraine](https://finabel.org/command-and-control-insights-from-ukraine/) - Examining the role of Command and Control (C2) dynamics in the war in Ukraine, this article highlights the advantages of decentralised over traditional command systems in multi-front combat lines. The research showcases the benefits of utilising decentralised C2 frameworks for European armed forces in specialised scenarios, such as the one at hand, implying that better operational efficacy and strategic posture in upcoming wars hinge on greater flexibility and real-time information.
- [Greek Efforts in renewed Air Superiority Doctrine– A Scramble for Security or Conflict?](https://finabel.org/greek-efforts-in-renewed-air-superiority-doctrine-a-scramble-for-security-or-conflict/) - Greece is taking significant steps in securing its air superiority in the Aegean Sea with modernised fighter jets and drone technologies. As part of a broader defense modernisation strategy "Agenda 2030", the country is planning to integrate Switchblade drones into its military framework to bolster surveillance and precision strike capabilities. At the same time, the acquisition of F-35 jets and Rafale fighters strengthens Greece's air defense in response to regional tensions with Turkey. The question remains: is this buildup a proactive defense strategy or a sign of escalating conflict in the Mediterranean region?
- [FACT – The importance of European cyber resilience in hybrid warfare](https://finabel.org/fact-the-importance-of-european-cyber-resilience-in-hybrid-warfare/) - This article studies the Federated Advanced Cyber Physical Test range (FACT), a new initiative launched by the European Defence Fund (EDF) in December 2023 to develop a next-generation European cyber test-bed capability. The dependence of military and civil-urban infrastructures on digital and IoT systems underscores the need for and importance of a European cyber range to test military equipment on its cyber resilience. The article addresses the cyber vulnerability of these infrastructures under the current context of hybrid warfare and foreign cyber potential. The FACT case study underlines how this initiative embodies a capability that has yet to be achieved in the current EU framework by creating a shared cyber range test-bed. The analysis of pertinent EU-based NATO-owned cyber infrastructure also emphasises the existing future potential for appropriation and integration into a new European cyber architecture. Finally, the article stresses how FACT shows the potential and political willingness to change European cyber-resilience and interoperability in the long-term.
- [The EU's Approach towards Countering Hybrid Threats: Conceptualization and Capacity Building](https://finabel.org/the-eus-approach-towards-countering-hybrid-threats-conceptualization-and-capacity-building/) - In this paper, Marek Gallo examines the European Union’s approach to hybrid warfare, particularly following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It begins by defining hybrid warfare, exploring its historical context and contemporary implications for security. The analysis highlights the EU’s strategies, including the creation of institutions like the Hybrid Fusion Cell, and assesses their effectiveness. While recognising the dual role of the EU in utilising soft power alongside NATO's hard power, the paper also addresses the challenges posed by geopolitical ambiguities and the necessity of building trust among member states. Furthermore, it emphasises the importance of enhancing the EU's capabilities, as articulated in the Strategic Compass of 2022, and proposes recommendations for strengthening resilience against hybrid threats. The conclusion calls for a proactive stance in upholding international law and engaging civil society, reinforcing the EU's position as a key player in addressing hybrid warfare in a complex security environment.
- [The Legal Concept of Neutrality: The Case of the Ukrainian - Russian War](https://finabel.org/the-legal-concept-of-neutrality-the-case-of-the-ukrainian-russian-war-2/) - As countries like Finland and Sweden shift away from neutrality to join NATO, the war has prompted a reevaluation of neutrality's relevance within European security. Mostly known as a political concept, this article explores the legal principle of neutrality in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian war, where military aid from numerous states has sparked debate on the boundaries of neutrality in modern conflicts. The narrow legal framework of neutrality highlights the ambivalence of the legal obligations of neutral states where abstention from supporting belligerents and help to a state defending against aggression coexist. Therefore, the rigidity of traditional neutrality law appears to be challenged by the ongoing war shifting towards more flexible interpretations in the face of collective security threats. Consequently, the need to adpat the legal doctrine in the rapidly changing landscape of international law and warfare underlines the obsolescence of the concept.
- [Explosive Devices in Lebanon: an analysis of lawfulness in modern warfare ](https://finabel.org/the-legal-concept-of-neutrality-the-case-of-the-ukrainian-russian-war/) - This article studies the events surrounding the explosive attacks in Lebanon on September 17th and 18th through the lens of IHL, uncovering significant concerns about Israel’s adherence to IHL regarding the lawful use of weapons. The lack of distinction between military objectives and civilian objects, coupled with the high number of civilian casualties, underscores the failure to comply with fundamental principles of IHL. This article explains how the implicit use of devices such as pagers, mobile phones, and laptops as explosive weapons hinders the ability to target combatants while minimising harm to civilians, making the use of this new method of warfare unlawful. This case exemplifies a broader and worrying trend of rising civilian harm in conflicts globally, as seen in Ukraine, the Middle East, and beyond. The analysis underscores the need for respect for the most basic principles of IHL, particularly distinction and caution, when developing and using new methods of warfare, and serves as a call for respect and accountability for the principles that aim to make conflicts more humane by safeguarding the lives of civilians.
- [Rethinking the Concept of Air Superiority: From Sine Qua Non Towards Interoperability ](https://finabel.org/rethinking-the-concept-of-air-superiority-concept-from-sine-qua-non-towards-interoperability/) - For decades, gaining and maintaining air superiority has been a linchpin for the Western perception of military power. In contrast, due to geopolitical and technological factors, Russia has historically relied on air power as a supplementary tool for achieving victory on the ground (Grimshaw, 2017). Developments of the 21st century, especially within the technological realm, have, however, proven both of these doctrines to be incapable of reflecting modern battlefield challenges. The evolution of air defences, massive deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and modernized electronic warfare (EW) tools are making the third domain more complex and restricted than ever. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has proven that uncontested dominance of the skies is neither guaranteed nor a sustainable task. Lethal air defence, a subdomain of air littoral consisting of thousands of drones and limited air sorties, have forced both sides to rethink the concept of air dominance and its role within the conflict. While the definition of air superiority remains clear, the necessity of achieving this objective as the sine qua non is diminishing as a new subdomain of the air littoral dominated by UAVs is emerging. Thus, rather than fully controlling and freely manoeuvring within the air domain, both sides pursue so-called ‘windows of opportunity’ (Gunzinger, 2024). This paper argues that the traditional view of air supremacy, central to Western military thinking, is no longer an adequate strategy against the peer or predominant opponent. The failure of the Russian Air Force (VVS) to establish air superiority on the first day of aggression was surprising and gave valuable lessons for military strategists. This conflict underlines the challenges in achieving total air dominance in the face of advanced air defence, UAV proliferation and EW capabilities. Thus, there is an essential need to rethink the air power concept, arguing for focusing on limited air superiority in times and places of choosing. In this context, Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences operations appear to be a crucial strategy. Finally, this paper underlines the implications for Western military thinking regarding air power theory, which is needed to operate within growingly contested airspace. In the face of the modern operational environment, emphasis on joint operations and interoperability in executing successful air campaigns is crucial.
- [NATO Multi- Domain Operations: challenges for the European Land Forces](https://finabel.org/nato-multi-domain-operations-challenges-for-the-european-land-forces/) - The paper analyses NATO’s move towards Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), where cyber and space domains are incorporated into conventional warfare, moving beyond joint operations. The paper highlights the primary challenges NATO faces in implementing MDO: operational adaptability, institutional coordination, technological disparities, and command-and-control structures. Consistent military doctrines within NATO Member States, recognising their historical events and cultural differences, are necessary to avoid doctrinal impediments, stressing the importance of a shared structure and vocabulary to improve coordination and efficiency in operations. The paper outlines the institutional obstacles, like NATO’s absent role in coordinating the implementation of MDO, and how this translates into diverging pathways to operationalise the concept. Furthermore, challenges in technological disparities and budgetary contributions are outlined, followed by an analysis of the command-and-control structures indicating the need for Europe to seek models to develop an MDO- capable fighting force. The paper ends with a key findings section outlining the primary challenges and providing specific solutions to tackle them.
- [ Kursk Operation: Legal Perspectives of a Counter Offensive](https://finabel.org/kursk-operation-legal-perspectives-of-a-counter-offensive/) - The ‘Kursk Operation’ marks a pivotal moment in the War in Ukraine, shifting the dynamics of this conflict and raising some legal questions regarding the Ukrainian incursion into Russian Territory. This paper will examine the context that prompts what might be the third phase of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, examining the legal arguments that make this act lawful and compliant with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants States the right to self-defence. By analysing the right to self-defence, alongside the principles of proportionality and necessity, this paper argues that the Kursk Operation can be lawfully considered an act of self-defence. Lastly, it examines the definition of "occupation" to clarify the legal distinctions relevant to this operation.
- [The Evolution of Ukraine’s Defence Industry and Lessons for the European Union ](https://finabel.org/the-evolution-of-ukraines-defence-industry-and-lessons-for-the-european-union/) - The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is entering its third year, and the debate around aiding the war-torn country is increasingly shifting towards empowering Ukraine’s domestic defence industry, to make it more autonomous against a larger and more resourceful opponent. At the same time, in 2023 the former Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin suggested that the EU could also benefit from this process by learning from the evolution of Ukraine’s defence industry (EDA, 2023). This paper will thus give a brief overview of the condition of the country’s industry before and after the war with Russia and summarise the main lessons that the EU can incorporate from the Ukrainian experience.
- [The Modernisation of the Estonian Armed Forces – A New Approach to Baltic Security](https://finabel.org/https-finabel-org-wp-content-uploads-2024-09-if-pdfs-3-2-pdf/) - The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sparked a renewed concern for Baltic security. Given the hard-earned independence process of Baltic countries, Russia’s aggression and hostile rhetoric push Baltic countries to boost their defensive capabilities. Until 2022 (or the Annexation of Crimea in 2014), Baltic states have relied heavily upon ally stationing and hosting NATO troops in joint operations. However, with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the defence strategy of these countries quickly shifted towards increasing their offensive measures and modernising the current inventory. While Baltic countries have always cooperated in many fields since their independence (Vaiksnoras, 2002), military spending requires national-level importance and adaptation. Between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the case of Estonia carries specific attention, as it is the smallest nation (population approx. 1.3 million) and has the highest GDP per capita. The economic advantage also pushes the Estonian Government to test different approaches to the concept of military strategy and be able to deliver better technological advancement to its units. Estonia’s approach to security presents an interesting case for the Baltic security framework. Unlike traditional firepower or manpower superiority, Estonia relies on a civil-military orientation strategy in which the concept of security expands in different domains (Karabeshkin, 2007). Like the Finnish model, Estonia applies mandatory military service to every male citizen after the age of 18, which enables the mobilisation of the nation as a reserve in case of war, even after military service is finished (Besch & Westgaard, 2024). The Estonian conscription system is also made-up of a part-time volunteer body, which is composed of citizens wishing to stay in the military after their service, and receiving military training for war or crisis management cases. Women can also be a part of the volunteer service under Naiskodukaitse (Women`s voluntary defence organization), taking different roles (Kaitseliit, n.d.) However, the country’s successful branding as an internet-intelligent nation also allows for the local development of technological domains in the defence sector, such as cybersecurity, AI or robotics (Jermalavičius & Hurt, 2021). The recent success of first-person view (herein FPV) drones, integration of cyber defence command chain and volunteer units with technological know-how are all part of this new “modernisation” process that this paper will discuss.
- [Disinformation and EU: The Role of Narrative in Hybrid Warfare within the European Union](https://finabel.org/https-finabel-org-wp-content-uploads-2024-09-if-pdfs-3-pdf/) - The days of winning battles and wars solely on the battlefield are long gone. Warring parties are gaining a significant advantage in the realm of information warfare. The information domain can bring significant advantages or cause a significant harm to one side, with no regard to the actual happening on the battlefield. As the conflicts become more complex, there is a bigger need to win the war not only on the field but also in the people’s ‘heads and minds’. The main aim of this article is to analyse Russian and Chinese influence operations and provide a comprehensive overview of the EU’s institutional response to disinformation and narrative campaigns. The first part of this paper introduces the conceptual framework for understanding narratives and disinformation in the light of hybrid warfare. Secondly, it discusses the various ways in which state actors, notably Russia and China, are influencing the EU with their own narratives and disinformation campaigns. Finally, the paper analyses the EU’s policies and responses to these information attacks, while critically examining the structures and mechanisms EU is implementing to tackle this issue.
- [Prisoner Swap Between Russia and Ukraine ](https://finabel.org/prisoner-swap-between-russia-and-ukraine/) - On August 24th, 2024, Ukraine and Russia exchanged 115 prisoners of war (POW) on each side. This deal was the first exchange since Ukraine launched a surprise invasion of the Kursk region on August 6th (Al Jazeera 2024). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) facilitated the deal between the two countries (Al Jazeera 2024). This exchange is a crucial reminder of the human cost of war and the ongoing need for diplomatic intervention. It underscores the ongoing humanitarian efforts amidst the brutal conflict and highlights the importance of diplomatic channels, such as the UAE’s mediation, in easing tensions.
- [Poland’s Military Surge: Strategic Investments and Recent Developments in Polish Armed Forces](https://finabel.org/https-finabel-org-wp-content-uploads-2024-09-if-pdfs-1-pdf/) - Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland has been among the most active countries in supporting its eastern neighbour to halt the advance of Russian forces and to conduct its counteroffensive. This decision was consistent with Polish strategic objectives, allowing Poland to launch its modernisation project and expand its military capabilities. Although Poland’s strategic rationales vary depending on the political stance of its elites (Pawłuszko, 2022), there are three common denominators: the intent to deter Russia, the need to secure US support, and the ambition to become the Central-Eastern European region’s leading power. Poland considers strengthening its armed forces as essential for achieving these goals. In fact, Warsaw aspires to build the most potent European land force by the beginning of 2026 (Tilles, 2023). While this objective is ambitious, the Russian invasion has catalysed the modernisation of the Polish military and its arms industry (Cucino & Scarazzato, 2023).This paper will address Poland’s recent strategic investments, aimed at developing multiple components of its armed forces, including land, air, sea, drone, and anti-missile forces, and analyse the potential challenges that such a rapid upgrade and amplification of its military capabilities entail.
- [The Role of Women in European Armed Forces: Progress and Challenges](https://finabel.org/https-finabel-org-wp-content-uploads-2024-09-correct-pdf-infoflash-pdf/) - Historically, women have been systematically excluded from roles within the military, and while progress has been made regarding integration, significant challenges persist in achieving full equality and addressing persistent gender biases. Throughout most of history, specifically up until the late 20th century, the military was perceived as a male-dominated field due to societal norms that placed importance on traditional gender roles (Segal, 1995, p. 758). Consequently, women were mostly confined to non-combat positions such as nursing, telephone operators and clerks (National Army Museum, 2018). However, as society has progressed, the roles of women in the military have expanded and evolved accordingly. With the 20th century enduring two world wars, there was a significant change in expectations and perspectives as women played more active and key roles during these conflicts, laying the groundwork to expand women’s participation in the military. As time progressed, policy and legal changes across Europe have created new opportunities for women to serve not only in a supporting role but also in combat and leadership roles as well. The participation of women in the military is an important step towards the larger mission of achieving gender equality and social progress. Although there has been significant progress made in the integration of women into the European armed forces, pervasive challenges such as discrimination, gender bias and physical barriers remain (Parliamentary Assembly, 2016). These obstacles impede the equal and complete participation of women within the military. This paper will provide a historical overview of the role of women in the military armed forces. It will do so by giving insights into the advancement of the role of women in European armed forces, focusing on countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Greece, Norway, Germany and Sweden, while addressing the chronic obstacles that must be overcome to achieve equality. It will ultimately demonstrate notable progress within these European countries, challenges such as gender biases, unequal access to leadership roles and how insufficient support for women in combat continues to hinder full integration and equal participation within European armed forces.
- [Slovak Air Defence: Critical Point and Modernisation Efforts](https://finabel.org/https-finabel-org-wp-content-uploads-2024-09-if-september-2024-pdf-1-pdf/) - The past decade’s conflicts, including those in Europe and the Middle East, have fundamentally underscored the necessity of capable air and ground-based air defence. The outbreak of Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 shook the European security architecture. As a result, several European countries have decided to strengthen their capabilities and overall deterrence significantly. One of the main areas of effective deterrence is a functioning air defence force, which serves as a vital pillar for the defence of states. Additionally, beyond security reasons, air defence plays a crucial role in each country’s expression of sovereignty and independence, providing a form of ontological security for its citizens. However, like most post-Soviet countries, the legacy of flawed and ineffective defence planning remains at the heart of some Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (Young, 2023). A prime example is Slovakia’s current air defence capabilities, which are nearing a critical low point. Temporarily bolstered by the assistance of the Allies, Slovakia is slowly progressing towards a new era of modern air defence capabilities. However, without concrete and immediate action, Slovakia’s airspace will remain dependent on NATO’s support (Dangwal, 2024) and the collective defence clause under Article 5. Considering the “crisis” in Slovakian air defence, this article provides options for modernisation efforts, reflecting on the industry's current situation and the Slovakian Army's needs. It also outlines why air defence is necessary even for small countries like the Slovak Republic as part of a broader effort to maintain effective conventional capabilities.
- [Thermite-Equipped ‘Dragon’ Drones: Ukrainian Special Forces’ New Battlefield Arsenal](https://finabel.org/thermite-equipped-dragon-drones-ukrainian-special-forces-new-battlefield-arsenal/) - Ukrainian Special Forces have recently made use of a new generation of sophisticated drones, increasing their capacity to launch accurate strikes against Russian soldiers. These drones, referred to as ‘dragon drones,’ employ thermite, a highly incendiary chemical that burns at around 2,448 degrees Celsius (4,440 degrees Fahrenheit) (Lendon, 2024). This new strategy represents Ukraine’s shifting tactics in reaction to the ongoing conflict. It demonstrates Ukraine’s adjustement to the changing reality of the war, using cutting-edge drone technology and accurate attacks to outmanoeuvre its enemies.
- [Croatia to Acquire $390M HIMARS from The US Amid Growing Tensions in the Balkans](https://finabel.org/croatia-to-acquire-390m-himars-from-the-us-amid-growing-tensions-in-the-balkans/) - The US State Department has approved the sale of eight High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and 24 M30A2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) to Croatia following the Croatian government’s request, totalling a sale of around $390M (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2024). The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) stated that the HIMARS acquisition will help Croatia to increase its deterrence capacity against future threats (Saballa, 2024). Considering its long-range capacity and proven success on the battlefield in Ukraine, HIMARS carry a strategic importance for both Croatia and NATO to securitise the Southern European region, especially after the rising geopolitical tensions between Serbia and the local Kosovar government (International Crisis Group, 2024).
- [Black Sea Security: A New Partnership Between Bulgaria and Romania Constitutes Regional Special Operations Command of NATO](https://finabel.org/black-sea-security-a-new-partnership-between-bulgaria-and-romania-constitutes-regional-special-operations-command-of-nato/) - The security of the Black Sea region remains unstable as the war in Ukraine lingers into its third year. In recognition of the increasing need to bolster defence security in the area, NATO and its member states have intensified their cooperative efforts to strengthen deterrence and protect their interests. As a gateway between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the region serves as a critical security and defence frontier. On the sidelines of the recent NATO summit in Washington, D.C., Bulgaria and Romania signed a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a Regional Special Operations Command for the Black Sea (HQ R-SOCC). The new command will integrateRomanian and Bulgarian special forces through a new Command and Control (C2) structure, which will conduct the Alliance’s special missions in the region. This newly created body’s main task is to protect merchant ships and conduct inspections, ultimately supporting the safeguarding of NATO's strategic interests in the area (Ministry of National Defense, 2024).
- [Negotiating Freedom: The Legal Complexities of International Prisoner Exchanges](https://finabel.org/negotiating-freedom-the-legal-complexities-of-international-prisoner-exchanges/) - The prisoner exchange between Russia and the West that occurred at the start of this month on August 1st surprised the international community (The Washington Post, 2024). On top of that, it garnered significant attention for being the largest prisoner exchange between Russia and the West since the Cold War due to its multinational nature and the high profile of the prisoners involved (The Washington Post, 2024). As Russia released twice as many prisoners as the West did, including notable activists and journalists, media outlets have framed the exchange as a diplomatic victory for the West (BBC, 2024). Academia, however, must examine this exchange more critically and address the legal complexities that arise from ‘hostage diplomacy’ and prisoner exchanges, as well as the diplomatic and political implications of such agreements. The lack of international treaties explicitly regulating the exchange of prisoners has led to the topic largely regarded as a political exercise rather than a legal one. Nonetheless, this article proposes several international frameworks that can be applied in such situations. This article briefly analyses the different categories of prisoners involved and which international framework applies accordingly . Finally, the article examines the political implications of these exchanges, particularly their potential to set precedents for future scenarios.
- [France, Germany and Poland Propose the Weimar Triangle as a New Centrepiece for EU Defence](https://finabel.org/france-germany-and-poland-propose-the-weimar-triangle-as-a-new-centrepiece-for-eu-defence/) - On 12 February 2024, Berlin, Paris and Warsaw pitched for the Weimar Triangle as the new centrepiece for the EU’s defence (Alipour & Bourgery-Gonse, 2024), aiming to enhance defence capability. Following these discussions, in April, the German defence minister, Boris Pistorius recommended Poland join the ‘Main Ground Combat System’ (MGCS). By June, Poland indicated its willingness to join the Franco-German projects: the ‘Future Combat Air System’ (FCAS) and MGCS projects (Alipour, 2024a). Despite this momentum, defence ministers of Poland and Germany remain silent when journalists ask for more details.In June, France also deepened its military ties with Germany and Poland (Kayali, 2024), indicating growing momentum for defence collaboration within the Weimar Triangle. By aligning national defence priorities, France, Germany, and Poland could play a more substantial role in defence and transform, at some point, the Weimar Triangle into a defence alliance. Historically, the Weimar Triangle has made outstanding achievements. However, cooperation has not been inconsistent during the last decades, with partners experiencing challenges of trust and misalignment. The evolving international landscape, characterised by the intensification of conflict in Ukraine since 2022 and the upcoming United States (US) election, has prompted new developments and investments in European defence cooperation.
- [Democracy in Question: Georgia's Foreign Agents Law](https://finabel.org/democracy-in-question-georgias-foreign-agents-law/) - The adoption of the “foreign agents” law in Georgia has become a critical issue, reflecting broader struggles over democratic governance, the autonomy of civil society and geopolitical direction in the post-Soviet region. Georgia is a parliamentary unitary republic in which the President, the Government, the Parliament, and the judiciary share powers reserved to the national government. In March 2023, two parallel bills have been submitted to the Parliament, namely “Transparency of Foreign Influence’’ and “Registration of Foreign Agents”. These two bills were withdrawn from the Georgian Parliament following protests in response to the legislative process. On 3 April 2024, the leader of the ruling Georgian Dream party, Mamuka Mdinaradze, announced the reintroduction of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence to the Parliament. The law requires non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and media companies that receive more than 20% of their funding from foreign sources to register as “organisations serving the interests of a foreign power”. Founded in 2012 by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the Georgian Dream Party, was formed as an alternative to the Georgian National Movement. Georgian Dream quickly gained widespread support and won the parliamentary elections that year, representing a major shift in the country’s political landscape.
- [Cloud Computing in Defence](https://finabel.org/cloud-computing-in-defence/) - Information superiority is critical to modern combat, and in a changing digital landscape, investment in cloud technology is paramount to maintaining these defence capabilities. During warfare, military forces must gather and analyse extensive data to stay ahead of adversaries. However, warfare has evolved from traditional battles on land, sea and air to encompass various interrelated types of war, including cyberwarfare, information warfare, and space warfare. The evolution of warfare is compounded by the effects of technology, which increase the speed at which war is fought and managed. However, the success of decision-making that modern warfare requires relies on the ability of information technology systems to rapidly process large amounts of data (Defence One, n.d.). New technology is outperforming these older IT systems, and European militaries must adopt new technology, specifically Cloud computing to maintain information superiority which underpins successful warfare. Cloud will likely serve as the backbone of all future digital defence capabilities; thus, investment in this technology is fundamental to maintaining information superiority. Cloud is more than just a storage platform as it can host various computing tools that assist in information superiority through situational awareness, contributing to efficient decision-making during conflict. In 2019, the European Defence Agency financed a study about cloud computing for the defence sector (European Defence Agency, 2024). The EDA’s study, Cloud Intelligence for Decision-Making Support and Analysis (CLAUDIA), ended this January (European Defence Agency, 2024). The study was run in collaboration with GMV, a private capital technology business group (GVM, n.d.), and The Information Processing and Telecommunications Center (IP&T Center) (European Defence Agency, n.d.). This paper explores the notion of cloud computing, and using the case studies of CLAUDIA, NATO and the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), it delves into three uses of cloud in the defence sector, including source analysis, edge computing and multi-domain operations. Finally, the analysis discusses challenges associated with cloud technology, including digital sovereignty and the need for cultural shifts within the defence sector.
- [Navigating Uncharted Waters: Russia's Potential Exit from the Convention on the Law of the Sea](https://finabel.org/navigating-uncharted-waters-russias-potential-exit-from-the-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea/) - In the light of Russia’s recent comments regarding their possible withdrawal from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the international community must re-think the integrity of the current maritime order, assess the present challenges and examine different perspectives for the governance of the seas. Following decades of negotiations, in 1982, the United Nations adopted UNCLOS, the Convention that sets the modern standards and encapsulates the principles of international maritime law. As one of the most widely ratified international treaties, UNCLOS has enjoyed decades of being unchallenged, yet the current unsteady political landscape — with big countries such as China and Russia claiming to be unsatisfied with the Convention — puts UNCLOS in a precarious position regarding compliance and observance of international maritime norms. After a brief overview of the Convention and the evolution of Russia as a member of UNCLOS, the paper will analyse the relevant legal framework of the Law of Sea, focusing on Russia’s bid for the Arctic and its process with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Finally, the paper will examine Russia’s latest threat to withdraw from the Convention, addressing legal and geopolitical implications, including how rather than following a different ‘maritime strategy’, these threats might reflect a strategic narrative aimed at promoting a multipolar world order.
- [Financial Intelligence Unit Structures Under Scrutiny: Potential for Misuse and Ethical and Legal Considerations](https://finabel.org/financial-intelligence-unit-structures-under-scrutiny-potential-for-misuse-and-ethical-and-legal-considerations/) - This paper discusses financial intelligence’s ethical and legal considerations and explores the potential for misuse within Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). More in detail, it examines the handling of information by FIUs from a legal perspective while also analysing how the structure of FIUs could allow for undue political influence under certain conditions. As a consequence, the structures designated to prevent or detect financial crimes could become part of the adverse circle instead of fighting it. Understanding the extent to which this process could lead to detrimental effects is the primary focus of the present paper. The study begins by outlining the characteristics of FIUs. It then analyses the ethical and legal implications associated with their operations, emphasising the risks of misuse. The paper then shifts its focus to corrupt environments with a detailed examination of Argentina’s case. The final section draws conclusions based on the preceding analysis and discussions.
- [The Development of AI-Enabled Military Equipment in Ukraine and the Implications for Military Interoperability](https://finabel.org/the-development-of-ai-enabled-military-equipment-in-ukraine-and-the-implications-for-military-interoperability/) - In the past two and a half years, the Russo-Ukrainian War has uncovered how war on the modern battlefield is no longer exclusively waged on the physical domain, and new capabilities can be leveraged instead of conventional approaches to defence. Armed conflict has expanded to encompass new battlefronts that increasingly depend on the virtual domain (Furlong et al, 2022). Cutting-edge technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) are reshaping armed conflict, impacting every aspect of warfare from automated frontline systems to logistics, and enhancing multi-domain situational awareness. According to the Land4Developers platform, a marketplace and network of industrial engineering experts from Ukraine, over a dozen Ukrainian companies offer products and services in predictive analytics (Land 4 Developers, 2022). The partnership between tech firms and the Ukrainian military, which allegedly includes having a software engineer within each battalion, is sparking a new wave of development and testing with military AI (Bergengruen, 2024). In resisting Russia’s invasion, the Ukrainian defence proved to be better equipped than anticipated (Furlong et al., 2022). Ukraine’s military performance has offered valuable lessons for both emerging and already established military powers on the benefits of partnering with tech companies to gain quicker access to the latest innovative technologies. Although the Russo-Ukrainian conflict’s outcome is still uncertain, it has highlighted the critical role of public-private partnerships in rapidly advancing military technology. The integration of AI-enabled tools in Ukraine’s defence demonstrates that collaboration between governmental bodies and private tech firms is essential for the swift development and deployment of cutting-edge military technologies. This paper explores how the partnership between the public and private sectors has shaped Ukraine’s defence strategies and examines the implications for enhancing military interoperability across Europe.
- [The Evolution of Neutrality in Europe](https://finabel.org/the-evolution-of-neutrality-in-europe/) - Neutrality is not a static concept but has evolved significantly, reflecting changes in political, military, and economic contexts over time. This paper argues how neutrality has changed in Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland, particularly in response to the invasion of Ukraine. These European case studies highlight neutrality as a complex, dynamic and multifaceted concept, which has transitioned from a rigid principle to a dynamic and adaptable practice across military and political realms that evolves in response to shifting geopolitical contexts, public opinion and growing alliances. This paper reveals how increased spending, expanding alliances and shifting public opinion have redefined the concept and practice of neutrality in Europe By redefining the territorial boundaries of NATO’s Article 5, which commits members to collective defence measures, new borders with potential adversaries are introduced, creating new vulnerabilities and opportunities for defence. The paper will begin by giving a brief account of the historical development of neutrality in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries to contextualised the following discussions. For each case study, the dynamic nature of neutrality will be revealed, with a particular focus on developments following the invasion of Ukraine.
- [Humanitarian Aid and European Defence: Legal Status and Budget Allocations](https://finabel.org/humanitarian-aid-and-european-defence-legal-status-and-budget-allocations/) - Humanitarian relief is a significant issue and a prominent concern for actors in our societies, particularly non-governmental organisations, governments, and individuals, as the ongoing crisis in Ukraine has demonstrated. Many people do not have access to basic supplies and could have to move due to natural or man-made disasters. The European Union (EU) has responded by devoting significant resources in line with its responsibility to aid those in need (European Commission, n.d.-c). Nevertheless, how does the EU distribute aid, and under what criteria does it operate? This article analyses the internal humanitarian aid system of the EU by looking at the key organisations responsible for managing these programmes and the funding structure that supports them. Moreover, it will address the fundamental principles that guide the EU's assistance distribution strategy to guarantee that aid reaches the most disadvantaged. Although, the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine emphasises the need for adequate assistance, it is simply one aspect of a global issue. This article will also evaluate the EU's role in the global humanitarian arena, highlighting its continuous efforts to maximise the effectiveness of its assistance in an international context where crises are happening increasingly often.
- [UN-Backed Kenyan Intervention Begins amidst Haiti’s Escalating Instability](https://finabel.org/un-backed-kenyan-intervention-begins-amidst-haitis-escalating-instability/) - On June 25, 2024, the first wave of 200 Kenyan police officers arrived in Port-au-Prince as a part of a United Nations-backed Multidimensional Security Support (MSS) mission to help combat gang violence and restore stability within a year (Coto & Sanon, 2024). These officers, that were joined by another 200 Kenyan police officers on July 16, (AFP - Agence France Presse, 2024), work in close cooperation with Haitian police to fight gangs and regain control over crucial infrastructure such as airports, hospitals and ports (Cotrino, 2024). Other teams of officers from Chile, Jamaica, Grenada, Paraguay, Burundi, Chad, Nigeria and Mauritius will join the Kenyan and Haitian police effort (Ombati, 2024). This intervention marks the fourth extensive foreign military intervention in the country and provoked mixed reactions since the previous UN mission, MINUSTAH, was tainted by sexual assault allegations and the cholera outbreak that resulted in the death of 10.000 people (Coto & Sanon, 2024).
- [The Role of the EU in Arctic Security](https://finabel.org/the-role-of-the-eu-in-arctic-security/) - Arguably, the Arctic region has always been an area of interest to the world’s countries. Despite its location and harsh arctic climate, the region opens opportunities for exploring new territories, trading routes, rich natural resources, and raw materials. According to the research on Arctic warming, by 2040, the melted ice in some parts of the Arctic will provide a new prospect for commercial shipping, shortening the transit time between Europe, the United States and Asia (Rantanen et al., 2022). Nevertheless, these changes open not only new opportunities for economic development but also threaten the global environment. As a result, the Arctic becomes a playground of conflict of interests of many international actors, creating new challenges to the region’s stability and security. In addition, due to its strategic importance, the region has begun to attract the attention of various actors. Since 2008, the EU has actively shown interest in Arctic issues, trying to strengthen its influence on Arctic affairs and emphasising the importance of its participation in solving the problems of the region to ensure its stability and development. Today’s interests of the EU in the Arctic region include the region’s sustainable development, security concerns, and climate change issues (The EU in the Arctic, 2024).
- [Natural and Artificial Intelligence in Armed Conflict: Exploring Settled and Open Legal Questions with Dustin A. Lewis](https://finabel.org/natural-and-artificial-intelligence-in-armed-conflict-exploring-settled-and-open-legal-questions-with-dustin-a-lewis/) - Based in The Hague, the T.M.C. Asser Instituut is a distinguished organization funded in 1965 that conducts independent, policy-oriented research in International and European law. The centre promotes expertise through different initiatives, including two noteworthy lecture series, “Designing International Law and Ethics into Military and Artificial Intelligence” (DILEMA), and “Hague Initiative for Law and Armed Conflict” (HILAC). At the intersection of the two educational programs, on Thursday July 11th, researcher Dustin A. Lewis gave a lecture on ‘Natural and artificial intelligence in armed conflict’. The DILEMA-HILAC lecture, held by Dustin A. Lewis, explored and analysed fundamental settled and open legal questions related to natural and artificial intelligence in armed conflict. Dustin A. Lewis is the current Research Director of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (HLS PILAC), as well as an Associate Senior Researcher in the Governance of Artificial Intelligence Program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). On Thursday’s lecture, the researcher presented a wide range of potential applications of artificial intelligence (AI) in the military domain, exploring the legal relationship between natural and artificial intelligence in armed conflict. In a timely discussion, Mr. Lewis reflected on the need for regulations concerning the military use of AI, States’ legal obligations and the importance of accountability.
- [The Future of European Deterrence: a Three-Pillar Approach for Advancing Capability Development and Interoperability](https://finabel.org/the-future-of-european-deterrence-a-three-pillar-approach-for-advancing-capability-development-and-interoperability/) - On 24 February 2022, when Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe experienced an apparent fog-clearing moment. (Besch & Quencez, 2022). For several years, the European Security debate followed a caricatured binary opposition between the US-led transatlantic security and the need for EU autonomy as a geopolitical power, partly motivated by the notion of an imminent US retreat from Europe (Tocci, 2021). Now, while the war (temporarily) restored general confidence in American commitment to European security, it also revealed how dependent European states are on the US for their defence (Puglierin, 2024). As a result, after more than two years of conflict, the subjects of the binary intellectual confrontation have emerged with more defined roles: NATO has reaffirmed its prerogative in conventional deterrence, while the EU has given proof of its crisis management abilities, primarily through financial tools (Weber, 2023). Accepting the transatlantic partnership as the sole and definitive European deterrence strategy is imprudent and short-sighted. The US’ shifting priorities and waning leadership require Europe to decide on a path forward to more strategic responsibility. Among the priorities, an increased commitment to NATO is imperative – especially with a Republican in the White House. At the same time, efforts must be made to reconsider the US national commitment and investments in European deterrence, as well as the role of the EU and its initiatives.
- [Intelligence Sharing in the EU: Legal Implications and the Role of the European Union Military Staff](https://finabel.org/intelligence-sharing-in-the-eu-legal-implications-and-the-role-of-the-european-union-military-staff/) - The term intelligence refers to the process of collecting, analysing, evaluating, and presenting information to decision-makers to prevent tactical or strategic disruptions (Şeniz, 2015). Specifically, military intelligence is a component of intelligence with its own rules, procedures and intelligence tools. It refers to military threats, armed violence and military operations involving States and non-state actors in traditional armed conflicts as well as in asymmetric warfare. Intelligence has long been part of tactical and operational command and control in order to reduce the uncertainties of the battlefield, which Carl von Clausewitz referred to as the “fog of war”, and to assist military decision-makers in making effective decisions. Intelligence was initially conceived to provide information and analysis to assist the commander in making more effective decisions during conflicts (Rolington, 2013). Nowadays, military intelligence aims to study potential or actual adversaries and identify the risks or dangers in operational areas. Primarily, it aims to support the chain of command at strategic, operational and tactical levels, involving both political institutions and military staff. Military intelligence in the EU is linked to the Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) and reflects the ideological construction of the EU’s identity and international action (Gruszczak, 2023).
- [Dehumanising trends in Humanitarian Law: the breach of the obligation to protect medical units. Violations of IHL during the war in Ukraine](https://finabel.org/dehumanising-trends-in-humanitarian-law-the-breach-of-the-obligation-to-protect-medical-units-violations-of-ihl-during-the-war-in-ukraine/) - On July 8th 2024, the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv suffered an airstrike that killed at least 42 civilians, five of them children, and injured at least 190 (HRW, 2024). The hospital was hit during a wave of Russian Federation missile attacks on different cities in Ukraine (UNSC, 2024). Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has sustained at least 9,560 civilian casualties, and 21,450 more injuries, including 1,796 children (594 killed and 1202 injured) (HRW, 2024). The Russian Federation claims that it was an accident, going so far as to declare that: “claims about a deliberate Russian strike on civilian targets in Kyiv are not true. The destruction was caused by the fall of a Ukrainian air defence missile [...] If this were a Russian strike, there would have been nothing left of the building and all the children would have been killed and not wounded”, as stated in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting the day after the attack (UNSC, 2024). This is one aggression in a long list of strikes on hospitals and medical facilities, which are places that enjoy a special regime of protection within International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This paper explores the norms that protect these spaces and the people inside them, aiming to shed light on a worrying trend of unlawful warfare. Firstly, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols are examined, with Article 14 of the IV Geneva Conventions as the backbone foundation upon which the legal protection is built. Secondly, an account of the prohibition of attacks on hospitals and safety zones is explored, which proposes different options in which this breach of IHL could be prosecuted. Lastly, this article briefly oversees the international community’s response to the aforementioned attack and compares it to other conflicts in which similar attacks have occurred.
- [The Baltic States' Military Support to Ukraine](https://finabel.org/the-baltic-states-military-support-to-ukraine/) - On February 24, 2022, when the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic States - Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia - were among the first to respond to the request for military and humanitarian assistance. According to the Ukraine Support Tracker, between January 24, 2022, and January 15, 2023, they were among the largest providers of military aid to Ukraine relative to their GDP – Estonia - 1.469%, Latvia - 1.128%, and Lithuania - 1.145% (Trebesch et al., 2023). One of the most important motivating factors could be the common historical past connecting the countries: the states were all part of the Soviet Union, and later, they secured their independence (Simpson, 2023). Therefore, the population of these countries, understanding the price of freedom, strives to support Ukraine on the way to its victory comprehensively. The historical experience of the Baltic States, which were under occupation until the collapse of the USSR, and the ongoing war in Ukraine have significantly influenced the perception of their security and the possible threat from Russia today. For instance, understanding the security challenges connected with the war in Ukraine, in 2023, the Latvian government adopted a law on compulsory military service, which had been abolished in 2006. This law restores mandatory military service for men and voluntary military service for women from January 1, 2024 (Fremer, 2023). Moreover, in 2024, the Baltic States and Poland called on the EU to build a defence line on the border with Russia and Belarus to prevent possible military and hybrid threats (Brzozowski, 2024).
- [EUDIS Hackathon First Edition 2024](https://finabel.org/eudis-hackathon-first-edition-2024/) - The EUDIS Hackathon, a part of the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), is an outreach event that brings together people from various backgrounds to solve challenge. It was simultaneously held in six countries in a hybrid format: Belgium, Poland, Italy, Greece, Lithuania, and Hungary. The theme of this first edition was “Digital in Defence' and it centered on three challenges: improving situational awareness, subsea infrastructure protection, and cybersecurity in defence.
- [European Defence giants Leonardo and Rheinmetall form a 50/50 Joint Venture for the development of the next Land Defence Systems](https://finabel.org/european-defence-giants-leonardo-and-rheinmetall-form-a-50-50-joint-venture-for-the-development-of-the-next-land-defence-systems/) - The Italian manufacturer Leonardo and the German arms maker Rheinmetall signed a strategic partnership on 3 July 2024 to establish a 50/50 joint venture for the industrial development and the subsequent commercialisation of a new battle tank for the Italian Army’s ground system programs. The new-born entity will be based in Italy, where 60 % of the overall production will take place (Leonardo, 2024). Over the next ten years, the two industrial groups aim to win contracts worth an estimated 20 billion euros from the Italian Army (Dragoni, 2024). The terms of the agreement will have a positive impact on the Italian supply chain as a whole and could capitalise more than 50 billion US dollars on the European market, as preannounced by Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger (Reuters, 2024). The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the two counterparts is now subject to approval by the European Commission and national competition authorities.
- [The Crime of Genocide: an Analysis of the Legal Framework and the Srebrenica Case](https://finabel.org/the-crime-of-genocide-an-analysis-of-the-legal-framework-and-the-srebrenica-case/) - In light of the horrific events of the Holocaust, which lacked a legal definition and regulation, the International Community and therefore the Nuremberg Tribunal recognised the urgent need of finding an adequate solution to this legal vacuum. Following several attempts of codification, finally in 1948 the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the Genocide Convention. Said Convention defined genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (Art. II, Genocide Convention, 1948). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) replicated the definition, but prosecuting the perpetrators of said actions and proving the required factual and mental element still poses challenges. After a brief overview of the International and European Community’s inadequate response to the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the outcome of said inadequacy, the paper will analyse the relevant legal framework of genocide, focusing on the crime's codification and challenges in proving the intent above. Finally, the paper will present Ratko Mladić’s case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which led to the individual's prosecution and life sentence for the crime of genocide in the Srebrenica massacre.
- [The Impact of Regional and Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCA) on EU Security and Defence Cohesion: Causing Divisions or Promoting European Defence? The Cases of the Nordic Defence Cooperation and US-Nordics DCAs](https://finabel.org/the-impact-of-regional-and-bilateral-defence-cooperation-agreements-dca-on-eu-security-and-defence-cohesion-causing-divisions-or-promoting-european-defence-the-cases-of-the-nordic-defen/) - Between 2016 and 2023, the US signed extensive bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) with Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway as part of a strategy conceived to ensure regional security. The evolving security challenges in the Nordic and Baltic regions, exacerbated by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, paved the way for the conclusion of the DCAs. These agreements were crucial to Finland and Sweden’s entry to NATO, as they had already legitimised and governed US presence on their territories. Under the DCAs, the US Armed Forces have been granted unrestricted access to almost all military infrastructures and bases of these countries (Edvardsen, 2023). In addition to that, these agreements aim to enhance defence capabilities through joint exercises, training missions and logistical support. From the jurisdictional point of view, all Nordic countries renounced their right to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over US military personnel. The Nordic countries are not the only ones who have signed bilateral agreements in the field of defence with the United States. For instance, Poland and the Baltic states have both recently concluded similar treaties. Consequently, it is necessary to consider this phenomenon not as a series of isolated events but as a part of a broader pattern of bilateral defence cooperation agreements designed to increase the American presence in the Nordic-Baltic region. This, in turn, facilitates the deployment of equipment and personnel in the event of an emergency. This paper will analyse the influence of bilateral defence cooperation agreements on the European Union’s security and defence framework, with a focus on those between the US and Nordic countries,. In this regard, some argue that this kind of cooperation undermines the Union’s efforts to advance towards a real common security and defence policy through separate negotiations with the Transatlantic partners. Others claim that the DCAs with the Nordic states enhance European security. In fact, leveraging their EU membership / as EU Member States, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland could act as catalysts for a more cohesive European Defence integration framework. The paper also examines the evolution of Nordic countries’ relations with the United States in the defence field, as well as their type of regional cooperation within the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). In any case, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that, due to the current challenges and the slow advancement of the EU in the field, the Nordic countries did not have other choice but to pursue this course of action, even though this system can lead to several inefficiencies at the European level.
- [A New Beginning for European Defence Fund, Reinforced by a Programme (EDIP) and a Strategy (EDIS)](https://finabel.org/a-new-beginning-for-european-defence-fund-reinforced-by-a-programme-edip-and-a-strategy-edis/) - The European Defence Fund (EDF) needs to review its strategy and programming after only three years of existence. It was created in 2021 under the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), thanks to the push made by EU Member states at the time. The political will to invest in European security has gained significant momentum thanks largely to the EDF, particularly in strengthening the European Defence and Technology Industrial Basis (EDTIB). The objective is to fund armament and spend in common. The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), proposed by the Commission in March 2024, is more precise than the EUGS on defence matters and marks the EU’s first-ever defence strategy. The EDIS was created to achieve industrial defence readiness by 2035 and strengthen the European Defence and Technological Industrial Basis (EDTIB) (European Commission 2024b). This strategy will influence the EDF’s programming and its presentation in the next Multi-Financial Framework.
- [Restoring Conscription in Germany: Lessons from Scandinavian Models and Key Considerations](https://finabel.org/restoring-conscription-in-germany-lessons-from-scandinavian-models-and-key-considerations/) - The Russo-Ukrainian War has heightened security concerns across Europe. In response, European countries are not only looking to enhance their capabilities to face modern types of warfare but also experiencing a resurgence of interest in traditional security measures such as military conscription. This shift is evident as nations reassess their defence capabilities, both within multinational alliances such as NATO and by bolstering their national defence. In response to these evolving security needs, the German government has turned its attention to the recently restored Scandinavian conscription systems as a role model to embark on the process of reintroducing conscription. The success of these Scandinavian systems, which makes them attractive to other European countries, lies in adapting to their changing societies by presenting innovative models of conscription. Furthermore, this type of draft is based on choosing the best and most motivated people. The highly selective draft is helping these countries to move from military service as something men were forced to do to something now people select to do for their personal and professional growth. Following the success factor of Scandinavian models in reflecting changing societies and making it attractive for professional growth, the reintroduction of conscription in Germany presents significant challenges, with wider social implications in terms of making the Bundeswehr an inclusive and attractive model for professional and personal growth for youth. A reformed conscription system in Germany can be achieved by focusing not only on intermediate security needs but on how the military can provide opportunities for youth. Germany’s government should consider including the essential elements that make Scandinavian models successful, such as being highly selective or competitive in the job market. Moreover, in Germany’s particular case, an essential element to reflect its social reality is the inclusion of migrants or inhabitants with a “migrant background”. This would help to foster greater social cohesion and counter recent events where nationalist sentiments have resurfaced. The latter is of paramount importance given Germany’s historical context and the risk of the military’s potentiality to fuel nationalist sentiments. The careful management of nationalist discourse within recruitment campaigns is essential. The first section of this paper provides an overview of the Swedish and Norwegian conscription models highlighting the elements of success that are necessary to achieve a renovated conscription system in Germany. The second section briefly presents the context of conscription in Germany. Then the paper outlines a key consideration for restoring conscription in Germany when trying to reflect their current social reality.
- [What is in the Inbox of the EU’s Next Foreign Policy Representative, Kaja Kallas?](https://finabel.org/what-is-in-the-inbox-of-the-eus-next-foreign-policy-representative-kaja-kallas/) - At the European Council Summit in Brussels on the 27th of June, EU leaders gathered to approve the bloc’s new leadership following the outcome of the European elections. Among the appointments, Kaja Kallas was tapped as the EU’s next High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, succeeding the Spanish Josep Borrell. Currently the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kallas recognised the “enormous responsibility” she is entrusted with and reiterated her commitment to strengthening the EU’s defence capabilities (Kallas, 2024). Before being talked about for this position, her name had floated to lead NATO, as well as for the proposed role of EU Defense Commissioner, which Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised to create if re-elected (McElvoy, 2024). Just like Von der Leyen and future EU Council President Antonio Costa, Kallas will need to get formal approval from EU lawmakers and the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in the next fall (Nardelli and Tammik, 2024).
- [Strengthening the Defence Sector through Circular Economy Initiatives](https://finabel.org/strengthening-the-defence-sector-through-circular-economy-initiatives/) - Circular economy principles are already widely adopted in the civil sector, however, the defence sector lags behind, facing several challenges that hinder its uptake. Western countries are increasing defence expenditures despite financial constraints, resulting in a steady rise in carbon emissions from military processes. Circular economy practices, which are not yet widespread in this sector, present an attractive long-term solution to both these concerns. In a turbulent security landscape, amid an environmental crisis, a shift from the ‘take-make-waste’ (Knight, 2023) approach to a circular economy model is crucial as it offers the sector economic resilience, autonomy, operational efficiency and civil-military synergies in times of instability, strengthening the sector overall. As the European Defence Agency argues, ‘strengthening Europe's security capabilities is a challenge that requires strategic planning and an efficient use of resources’ (Katainen, 2016). The Incubation Forum for Circular Economy in European Defence (IF CEED), established by the European Defence Agency in 2021, plays a crucial role in applying the circularity principles of the EU Green Deal to the European defence sector (European Defence Agency, 2023). The goal of the IF CEED is to apply principles and policies from the civilian sector to the defence sector, under the premise that a European circular economy can only be achieved through the participation of all sectors (European Defence Agency, n.d.). This paper starts with the definition of circular economy. It then analyses the current state of military expenditure and carbon emissions. Finally, it presents three project ideas of the IF CEED - Circular Data, Additive Manufacturing and Circular Materials for Textiles (European Defence Agency, n.d.) and the value they bring to the European defence sector.
- [Echoes of the Cold War: Strategic Implications of Russia's First Tactical Nuclear Drill Since Soviet Era](https://finabel.org/echoes-of-the-cold-war-strategic-implications-of-russias-first-tactical-nuclear-drill-since-soviet-era/) - For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia announced the beginning of a two-phase tactical nuclear exercise in Southern Russia, near Rostov-on-Don and close to parts of Ukraine currently under control by Russian forces. The drills included the participation of Belarus troops and simulated the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons with the upgraded ‘Iskander ballistic missile systems and ‘Khinzal’ hypersonic missiles. Moscow states that the military drill is a direct response to 'militant statements' from Western leaders, especially from the United States, France and Britain, who have recently reiterated their continued financial and military support to Ukraine (Trevelyan, 2024). However, the pattern and timing of these exercises point towards a bigger strategic objective. Beyond the official statements, these exercises are a strategic move intended to intimidate the West and divide NATO from within. Russia is trying to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities and readiness, thereby frightening those Western countries who are showing support to Ukraine. The move serves as a message to NATO nations weighing further military aid in the region. These drills are going on against a backdrop of heightened global tensions, with nuclear language seeing a resurgence in international communication and collaboration. These exercises not only display military strength but also assess the extent to which Western nations are willing to stand up to or cooperate with Russia (Trevelyan, 2024). The paper will first detail the specifics of the Russian tactical nuclear exercise, explaining in depth the two phases that characterised this exercise, its motives and objectives. Then, the paper will assess potential future threats and analyse the strategic response of the West as it once again comes to terms with Russian nuclear rhetoric.
- [Chemical Weapons in Armed Conflicts](https://finabel.org/chemical-weapons-in-armed-conflicts/) - The use of chemical agents as a weapon of war has a history that extends back over two centuries. The first instance of a large-scale deployment of chlorine gas, for instance, occurred in April 1915 when German troops attacked Ypres (France Diplomacy, 2022). Moreover, the two world wars saw the greatest proliferation of chemical weapons on the battlefields of Europe, in Nazi concentration camps or in Asia (Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2023).
- [The Combined Space Operations Initiative: an Opportunity for European States?](https://finabel.org/the-combined-space-operations-initiative-an-opportunity-for-european-states/) - Space is increasingly considered an operational domain relevant to states’ security, not only because space capabilities benefit multiple economic sectors, thus making space highly strategic, but because some countries have developed a wide range of counter-space technologies (NATO, 2024). Accordingly, national armies have begun urging the development of militarily-relevant space capabilities and the activation of international cooperation over such issue. In fact, the improvement of dual-use, potentially offensive, space technologies evolved as a much faster pace than the elaboration of international space law aiming at regulating the use of space. The Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO), involving US, UK, Canada, Australia, Germany, France, New Zealand, Italy, Japan and Norway, is one of the multilateral efforts to face the challenge of a militarised space domain, gathering an ever-increasing amount of spacefaring nations. However, this US-ed cooperation is not unproblematic, both because of some policy inconsistencies that limit the US capability of sharing information on space matters, and because of the inhibitory effect that reliance on the US for space security has on some parts of the European space industry and on EU strategic autonomy.
- [An Opportunity for Europe to Expand Joint Defence Funding](https://finabel.org/an-opportunity-for-europe-to-expand-joint-defence-funding/) - The European Defence Fund (EDF) was launched in 2017 as an aspect of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to increase coordination and investment in defence research and development (R&D) and improve interoperability between European national armed forces. Domestic demand for defence technologies in Europe has fallen sharply in recent decades, which has led to smaller investments in R&D, increased dependence on civilian sectors, and stagnation of military-industrial skills. Small and medium-sized enterprises, especially those from smaller European states, struggle to compete with larger corporations from bigger economies. Furthermore, European military spending has become mired with inefficiencies and duplications. After an initial pilot period, the EDF has been allotted €8 billion for R&D. And while this is a start, the EDF requires a serious expansion for the current and future European capability needs. There are significant hurdles that Europe faces, some of which remain outside the scope of the EDF, such as the lack of an open European defence equipment market. These issues cannot be ignored when conventional warfare has returned to Europe.
- [Addressing Wartime Rape and Sexual Crimes Under International Law: Post-Conflict Developments in Former Yugoslavia](https://finabel.org/addressing-wartime-rape-and-sexual-crimes-under-international-law-post-conflict-developments-in-former-yugoslavia/) - Rape, sexual enslavement and sexual crimes have always been intertwined with warfare throughout history. Nowadays, these atrocities are often labelled as “war weapons” when deployed as tactics in conflicts. This paper seeks to delve into the evolution of international legal frameworks concerning the crimes of rape and sexual violence, culminating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) contribution to the rules and jurisprudence, and offers insights into advancing the progress made thus far in addressing these grave violations. Rape’s association with warfare is as old as war itself, it even consolidated in the common imagery through idyllic myths or legends. A well-known example is the legend of the founding of Rome, which includes the story of the Rape of the Sabine women, immortalised in sculptures and paints over the centuries (Brownmiller, 1993). However, these mythological picturings deviate from a truthful and realistic narrative. Historically, there has been a lack of comprehensive understanding regarding the prevalence and severity of rape during conflicts. This widespread unawerness on the matter has hindered efforts within the international legal community to fully recognise and prosecute rape as a war crime under international law until the 1990s (Dei, 2014).
- [Moldova and the EU: a Comprehensive Overview of Security and Defence Partnership](https://finabel.org/moldova-and-the-eu-a-comprehensive-overview-of-security-and-defence-partnership/) - On the occasion of the establishment of the civilian CSDP EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM) in April 2023, Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) noted: “As one of the countries most affected by the fallout of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, we witness increased and continued Russian attempts to destabilise Moldova with hybrid actions” (Council of the EU, 2023). In light of geopolitical tensions and persistent threats from Russia, Moldova and the EU are seeking to establish greater cooperation in the field of security in defence. After the deployment of the EUPM in May 2023, the representatives from the EU and Moldova signed the Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) on 21 May 2024. Moldova is the first third state to sign such an agreement with the EU (Euractiv, 2024). The Partnership is envisaged to enhance the resilience of the country, allowing the EU and Moldova to jointly address shared security challenges and explore new areas of cooperation and dialogue (EEAS, 2024). The EU’s goal is to create a network of selected partners in the field of security and defence, boosting cooperation in fields ranging from cyber security, hybrid threats, disinformation, training, and capacity building (Benakis, 2024; Euractiv, 2024). Moldova’s alignment with European standards, fostering interoperability and robust cooperation, is important for reinforcing regional security and advancing Moldova’s European integration aspirations. This paper gives a comprehensive overview of EU-Moldova cooperation in security and defence. It proceeds as follows: The first section briefly outlines the relations between Moldova and the EU against the background of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The second part explores and contextualizes the newly established Security and Defence Partnership.
- [The application of the Law of the Sea to the EU legal system and its implications for European Defence](https://finabel.org/the-application-of-the-law-of-the-sea-to-the-eu-legal-system-and-its-implications-for-european-defence/) - States have long been considered the primary, but not only, subjects of International Law. To be considered a State, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention (1933) sets out four criteria: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (Montevideo Convention, 1933). A State's sovereignty is here limited to its territory, over which its legal system has complete jurisdiction. However, defined territory is not uncomplicated, as States control their airspace and have a border to outer space, and coastal State’s territory encompasses maritime zones surrounding their land (Gioia, 2019). This article analyses the International and European legal framework regulating States in their maritime areas. Then, it will focus on the interaction between those legal sources and their implications for European Defence.
- [SpaceX Involvement in Military Operations and EU Space Policy](https://finabel.org/spacex-involvement-in-military-operations-and-eu-space-policy/) - The space sector in the EU has long been geared toward civilian, scientific, and commercial use. Accordingly, private companies and scientific associations have played a substantial role in space technology innovation (Kriege & Russo, 2000, p.34). However, space is becoming increasingly securitised and militarised, and armed forces are investing more consistently in space assets (Calcagno et al., 2022). Moreover, space technology’s dual-use and slow-to-develop nature leads to a tendency to adapt existing space products and assets to military use and the direct involvement of private and non-defence space companies in military operations. SpaceX, in particular, has become central to several states’ militaries through Starlink, a large-scale low-orbit satellite internet and communication service (Rousselle, 2024). After seeing widespread Ukrainian civilian and military use of Starlink, SpaceX services have been considered by several governments and regional organisations. The EU itself has recently turned to SpaceX to launch four of its Galileo satellites. However, planned and ongoing American military use of SpaceX technologies and assets raises questions over how appropriate EU reliance on SpaceX for rocketry and connectivity would be. First, the agreement with SpaceX undermines the EU’s strategic autonomy, as it delegates fundamental launching services to a private company outside EU jurisdiction. Secondly, it increases dependence on the US both because it is the country that has jurisdiction over SpaceX, and because the launching operations take place from American soil. Thirdly, relying on SpaceX and on the US undermines the autonomist intent of the EU Space Programme, especially of the Galileo project which was meant to become a European alternative to the American navigation system. Fourthly, increasing SpaceX's involvement in US military operations entails broader implications for European defence by increasing the risk of an orbital arms race.
- [From Optimism to Pragmatism: the changing landscape of peace operations and the EU response](https://finabel.org/from-optimism-to-pragmatism-the-changing-landscape-of-peace-operations-and-the-eu-response/) - In recent days, articles have started to circulate regarding the end of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). It has been reported that the Somali Minister of Foreign Affairs Aimed Moa Fiji has formally requested the United Nations (UN) to end the mission in a letter to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General Antonio Guterres (Ross & Paravicini 2024; Africanews 2024). This event would reflect a broader trend of growing scepticism and distrust towards peacekeeping missions, as well as a shift towards “pragmatic peacekeeping”, characterized by smaller mandates focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and by the prioritization of conflict containment(Karlsrud, 2023). Other examples of this tendency are the conclusion of the peacekeeping mission in Congo (MONUSCO) in 2024 and the expulsion of peacekeepers from Mali (MINUSMA) in December 2023.
- [Legal Implications of a Ukrainian Defeat on European Defence](https://finabel.org/legal-implications-of-a-ukrainian-defeat-on-european-defence/) - This paper examines the potential strategic and legal consequences for the European Union’s defence cooperation following a hypothetical defeat of Ukraine. With the EU deeply involved in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, the implications of a possible defeat go beyond immediate military losses and encompasses broader ramifications for the EU and NATO, especially in their military defence, cooperation, and credibility. This paper focuses on how defeat could affect European military strategy, its legal position on defence commitments and the Union’s overall political cohesion.
- [In the West but Unlike the Rest: The Bulgarian Defence’s Difficult Path Toward Interoperability](https://finabel.org/in-the-west-but-unlike-the-rest-the-bulgarian-defences-difficult-path-toward-interoperability/) - As part of NATO's Eastern flank, Bulgaria’s defence capabilities are crucial to European security. While Sofia has embarked on crucial reforms since the fall of the Communist bloc in 1991, its Armed Forces are still far from being at the same level as its NATO allies. Nevertheless, Bulgaria is boldly enhancing its military power. Initiatives such as its accession to FINABEL show the political commitment to share defence and interoperability.
- [Nordic joint action: Sweden and Denmark enhance defence cooperation](https://finabel.org/nordic-joint-action-sweden-and-denmark-enhance-defence-cooperation/) - Pal Jonson, Swedish Defence Minister, and Troels Lund Poulsen, Danish Defence Minister, signed a letter of intent on enhanced defence cooperation on 7 May 2024. The letter of intent is framed in “light of the concerning security situation in Europe and beyond and the need to continue building upon the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding” (Government of Sweden, 2024) the two countries signed in 2016 that guides their cooperation in defence matters. This agreement aligns with broader cooperation frameworks, including the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), and the countries’ willingness to increase collaborative defence efforts.
- [Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg meet in Rome to Discuss Ukraine, Defence Spending and Mediterranean Security](https://finabel.org/italian-prime-minister-giorgia-meloni-and-nato-chief-jens-stoltenberg-meet-in-rome-to-discuss-ukraine-defence-spending-and-mediterranean-security/) - On 8 May 2024, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Rome, Italy. Their discussion mainly focused on what will be at the heart of the upcoming NATO Summit, taking place in July in Washington, with the war in Ukraine leading the conversation (ANSA, 2024a). The Secretary General reiterated that sending boots on the ground to Ukraine is currently not an option for NATO, nor something that the Ukrainians have asked (ANSA 2024b). Instead, what Ukrainians are in desperate need of is additional military aid, especially in light of the recent territorial advance by the Russian army in the northeastern region of Kharkiv (Dettmer, 2024).
- [Jus ad bellum: Protecting Sovereignty and Diplomatic Immunity in the Israel-Iran conflict](https://finabel.org/jus-ad-bellum-protecting-sovereignty-and-diplomatic-immunity-in-the-israel-iran-conflict/) - In the complex landscape of international relations, the right to self-defence is fundamental in shaping state action when faced with aggression. This right is set within the framework of international law through the United Nations (UN) Charter in article 51 (UN Charter, 1945), which delineates the limits to how states can respond to threats to their sovereignty and security. Recent events, such as the Iran-Israeli conflict, have reopened discussions on the application and interpretation of the right of self-defence. As tensions escalate and geopolitical dynamics evolve, it is essential to take a closer look at the legal foundation of states’ notion of self-defence and its relevance in contemporary conflicts. This article examines the nature of self-defence in international law and explores its core elements through an analysis of the recent retaliatory spiral that started with Israel’s strike on Iran’s embassy in Syria.
- [Western military and financial support to Ukraine](https://finabel.org/western-military-and-financial-support-to-ukraine/) - After more than two years of war, Ukraine is experiencing a shortage of ammunition and military equipment, since the United States and European partner's struggle to resupply the country’s military (Bertrand & Bo Lillis, 2024). The lack of ammunition and personnel is having direct consequences on Ukraine’s position on the battlefield, as it deteriorates, Russia achieves new tactical successes near the village of Berdychi and Semenivka, both north of Avdiivka (Al Jazeera, 2024) a city captured by Russia in March 2024. The threat of a Ukrainian significant loss has prompted the European Union, the EU Member States, and the United States to consider sending military and financial aid packages in 2024 to respond to Ukraine’s shortages.
- [Securing Europe: France’s Defence Strategy Amidst Rising European Industry Growth and Defence Readiness](https://finabel.org/securing-europe-frances-defence-strategy-amidst-rising-european-industry-growth-and-defence-readiness/) - In the past years, the Mediterranean Sea has become a theatre of both tragedy and lifesaving efforts, as the ongoing migration crisis has prompted a surge in sea rescue operations. Amidst this complex landscape, the Iuventa case stands out as a pivotal case study, representing the challenges faced by humanitarian NGOs engaged in saving lives at sea. This paper explores the legal framework governing sea rescue operations and analyses the legal intricacies and landmark decision of the Iuventa trial before the Italian Court.
- [The Letta Report: Suggestions for European Defence](https://finabel.org/the-letta-report-suggestions-for-european-defence/) - On 29 April 2024, the Italian Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto and his French counterpart Sébastien Lecornu met at the military camp Raffalli in Calvi, Corsica, to sign a Letter of Intent boosting military cooperation between their respective land forces. The two Ministers signed the Letter as part of their commitment to enhance Europe’s defence posture by integrating industrial bases. This partnership allows French and Italian defence companies to share their financial, personnel and technological expertise and build more competitive industrial centres in the domain of Land Forces. By harmonising their standards, equipment, procedures and training protocols during joint operations and missions, the two countries will enhance the effectiveness of Europe’s ground defence capabilities (Ministère des Armées, 2024).
- [The Iuventa Case and the Criminalisation of Sea Rescue Operations](https://finabel.org/the-iuventa-case-and-the-criminalisation-of-sea-rescue-operations/) - In the past years, the Mediterranean Sea has become a theatre of both tragedy and lifesaving efforts, as the ongoing migration crisis has prompted a surge in sea rescue operations. Amidst this complex landscape, the Iuventa case stands out as a pivotal case study, representing the challenges faced by humanitarian NGOs engaged in saving lives at sea. This paper explores the legal framework governing sea rescue operations and analyses the legal intricacies and landmark decision of the Iuventa trial before the Italian Court.
- [(De)-escalation in the Iran-Israel Conflict: An Analysis of the April 2024 Incidents and their Aftermath](https://finabel.org/de-escalation-in-the-iran-israel-conflict-an-analysis-of-the-april-2024-incidents-and-their-aftermath/) - The Iran-Israeli conflict is a long-standing part of Middle Eastern politics that is rooted in a history of mutual hostility and mistrust. After decades of low-intensity hybrid conflict characterised by retaliatory strikes on and through proxies, mutual accusations of supporting terrorism, and other types of covert and hybrid warfare, a recent series of escalations culminated in the direct Iranian attack on Israeli territory on 13 April 2024, and Israel’s subsequent response on 19 April 2024. This exchange raised concerns over the possibility of region-wide conflict between the two states. The global community, including the U.S., the EU, and the UN have called for de-escalation to prevent further deterioration in the region’s security and stability. This paper looks at the events leading to the aggravation of the conflict, the responses from Iran and Israel, and the reactions from international players. It assesses the strategies employed, examining both military actions and diplomatic efforts, as well as the global and regional perceptions, and considers the possibilities for future (de)escalation. Ultimately, the research offers insights into the intricacies of the Iran-Israel conflict and its implications for regional stability in the Middle East.
- [France and Italy take major step to Reach Interoperability of European Land Industries](https://finabel.org/france-and-italy-take-major-step-to-reach-interoperability-of-european-land-industries/) - On 29 April 2024, the Italian Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto and his French counterpart Sébastien Lecornu met at the military camp Raffalli in Calvi, Corsica, to sign a Letter of Intent boosting military cooperation between their respective land forces. The two Ministers signed the Letter as part of their commitment to enhance Europe’s defence posture by integrating industrial bases. This partnership allows French and Italian defence companies to share their financial, personnel and technological expertise and build more competitive industrial centres in the domain of Land Forces. By harmonising their standards, equipment, procedures and training protocols during joint operations and missions, the two countries will enhance the effectiveness of Europe’s ground defence capabilities (Ministère des Armées, 2024).
- [Space Domain Awareness and the EU’s Securitization of Space](https://finabel.org/space-domain-awareness-and-the-eus-securitization-of-space/) - Since the EU introduced the 2021-2027 Space Programme, it has assumed an entrepreneurial role in coining new concepts and terms to frame its increasingly versatile space activities. As the EU’s action in space gradually developed to increase new projects, so did the terminology employed in the EU’s official document addressing space affairs. In particular, the EU conceptual framework for space expanded to include comprehensive notions such as Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Domain Awareness (SDA) that add to the more pragmatic ones of Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) and Space Traffic Management (STM). This paper analyses how diverse notions have come to be in some of the EU’s space-related programmatic documents and how they relate to one another. Such an analysis is key to understanding the current trends of the EU’s action in space, trends which in turn imply restructuring the space policy governance.
- [Climate Justice and its implications on the EU Defence System: a legal analysis](https://finabel.org/climate-justice-and-its-implications-on-the-eu-defence-system-a-legal-analysis/) - The effects of climate change have become a solid reality that cannot be ignored for human life on Earth. Europe's shifting climate landscape sees a surge in legal battles, highlighting the deepening understanding of the link between environmental well-being and human rights. This paper analyses the legal framework of so-called climate litigation, where organisations and interest groups litigate a lack of climate action on the part of governments, and its implications for and application to the Defence and Security sector. Indeed, due to the increasing number of legal challenges against governments and institutions for their inaction on climate change, there has been a growing awareness of their role in protecting citizens from increasingly frequent climate events. This awareness has impacted all areas of public governance, including defence. In fact, even the defence sector, faced with this worrying reality, has had to change itself and its practices to comply with the legal framework, which is composed not only of laws but also of judgments that are increasingly openly determining how the state and institutions have a duty to protect their citizens, through comprehensive action, from the reality of climate change.
- [Back to Basics: Europe’s Struggles and Successes with 155mm Shell Production](https://finabel.org/back-to-basics-europes-struggles-and-successes-with-155mm-shell-production/) - The early days of the war in Ukraine seemed to favour agile and relatively innovative capabilities which appeared to be the new protagonists of future battlefields. In fact, the fate of the war appeared to rest on Stingers and Starstreaks, Javelins and NLAWs, FPV commercial drones and on the Bayraktar TB2. However, as the chaotic first phase of the conflict ended, the focus shifted to the centuries-old king of battle: artillery. Much has been written on the rediscovered importance of artillery at the tactical and operational levels (Oltei, Potin, & Clarke, 2024). In contrast with the precision-oriented doctrine prevalent in the West, the war in Ukraine is revealing how precision- guided munitions can only complement and not substitute conventional indirect fire. The industrial capacity to produce this military ordinance en masse can indeed still determine victory on the battlefield. This analysis will thus focus on the 155mm NATO-standard artillery shell, the European states’ ability to produce it, and their significant shortcomings and progress.
- [Mobilising Artillery – Developments, Challenges and the Russo-Ukrainian War](https://finabel.org/mobilising-artillery-developments-challenges-and-the-russo-ukrainian-war/) - As a key instrument in the long-range destruction, neutralisation, and suppression of enemy positions, artillery has long been indispensable in warfare, evolving from early contraptions used to hurl rocks and shoot arrows to the modern battlefield’s exceptionally mobile and accurate cannons launching highly explosive projectiles (Defense Technical Information Center, 1983). On the modern battlefield, artillery possesses several unique abilities. It can operate close to and in cooperation with ground forces to destroy and degrade enemy ground capabilities near the front lines, its range allows it to target vast swathes of territory with heavy indirect fire, it can be operated day and night, is fairly mobile, and can be concealed to boost survivability (McGrath, 2013).
- [Navigating Complexity: Security Challenges and EU Strategies in the Sahel and West Africa](https://finabel.org/navigating-complexity-security-challenges-and-eu-strategies-in-the-sahel-and-west-africa/) - Since achieving independence in the 1960s, several nations across the Sahel and West Africa have grappled with violent extremism stemming from a blend of ineffective governance, economic instability, and the increasing impacts of climate change. This convergence has triggered a surge in violence, conflict, and criminal activities over the past decade, transcending national boundaries and posing formidable challenges to countries both within and beyond the region. The Sahel region remains a crucial transit corridor for migrants journeying from sub-Saharan Africa to northern coastal countries and onward to Europe, presenting, along with mounting terrorism, a significant security concern for the EU (European Parliament, 2021). Further exacerbation of violence could increase displacement and migration rates from the region, compounding pressures on northern and coastal African nations as well as Europe (Center for Preventive Action, 2024). Against this backdrop, this article delves into the multifaceted dynamics shaping the Sahel and West Africa, and examines the root causes of violence, the rise of non-state actors, and the implications of recent geopolitical shifts. It explores the efforts of the EU and other organizations to address these challenges through strategies such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), development assistance, and regional cooperation. The article highlights the obstacles and complexities inherent in these endeavours, offering insights into the evolving landscape of security and governance in the Sahel and West Africa.
- [European Cyber Agora Conference 2024](https://finabel.org/european-cyber-agora-conference-2024/) - On 23 April 2024, the European Cyber Agora (ECA) Conference began in Brussels, Belgium. This conference is a multistakeholder initiative aimed at promoting the responsible development and use of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Nanna-Louise Linde, Microsoft’s Vice-President of European Government Affairs, opened the event by highlighting the significant role of global collaborative efforts and raising awareness of AI governance concerns in an increasingly digital security domain.
- [From Resolution to Reality: Understanding the Role of the United Nations Security Council in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict](https://finabel.org/from-resolution-to-reality-understanding-the-role-of-the-united-nations-security-council-in-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/) - The article aims to examine what a United Nation Security Council (UNSC) resolution is, when and how it can be issued, its legal status and the practical implications of this UNSC’s instrument. It will also address the outcome of the resolutions that have been adopted in the context of the recent Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- [The European Defence and Security Summit 2024](https://finabel.org/the-european-defence-and-security-summit-2024/) - The 7th European Defence and Security Summit, held in Brussels on 17 April 2024, brought together distinguished speakers from EU institutions, national governments and the European defence industry to discuss pressuring security issues. The summit tackled critical issues concerning Europe’s response to ongoing conflicts and emerging security threats, focusing on how Europe can meet today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges.
- [The European Union and Egypt Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership: an in-depth analysis of the dynamics and challenges](https://finabel.org/the-european-union-and-egypt-comprehensive-and-strategic-partnership-an-in-depth-analysis-of-the-dynamics-and-challenges/) - Since its creation in 2003, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has provided a platform for political dialogue, economic cooperation, and the promotion of shared values, and Egypt has served as a pivotal platform fostering political dialogue, economic cooperation and the promotion of sharing values. The European Union-Egypt Agreement (Agreement), presented on 17 March 2024, signifies a strategic and comprehensive partnership aimed at advancing mutual interests across various domains, including diplomatic development, economic stability and migration. While on the one hand the matter of energy procurement has emerged as a significant push factor, driving the European Union-Egypt partnership, on the other hand, concerns have been raised regarding human rights violations in Egypt. The European Union-Egypt Agreement, marks a significant milestone in the ENP, signifying a strategic and comprehensive alliance aimed at advancing mutual interests across various domains, including diplomatic development, economic stability, and migration management. This paper seeks to delve into the dynamics of the European Union-Egypt relationship. It not only outlines the key components of the Agreement, but sheds light on the main push factors driving this collaboration and addresses the critical issues surrounding human rights violations in Egypt.
- [The New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Can the EU walk the talk?](https://finabel.org/the-new-european-industrial-defence-strategy-can-the-eu-walk-the-talk/) - On March 5, 2024, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the first European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS, hereafter ‘the Strategy’) that she had announced in the 2023 State of the Union speech (European Commission, 2023; 2024b). The Strategy is an important milestone in the EU’s efforts to establish itself as a prominent security and defence actor. It sets out an ambitious plan to scale up the EU’s defence industry to improve the Union’s overall defence capability. EDIS signals the European Commission’s determination to assume a more prominent role in defence amid efforts for a greater European component in defence to navigate increasingly volatile world politics and the return of conventional warfare to European soil. Nevertheless, EDIS bears unresolved issues, most notably pertaining to the Strategy’s budget. It remains undecided and unclear where the financing necessary to pursue and implement the Strategy’s objectives will come from. The main obstacles here are a lack of political unity and differing member state priorities, as well as a lack of trust between the defence industries and governments. This paper examines the EDIS and assesses the EU’s ability to implement the Strategy’s objectives and address emerging challenges while accounting for differing member state perspectives. For the EU to “walk the talk” and live up to its commitments, there is a need for long-term financial incentives at the EU level and strong support from the Capitals to compensate for a previous deficit in defence spending in the past and make the Union a capable actor in security and defence.
- [Understanding Cope Cages: From Origins to Standardisation](https://finabel.org/understanding-cope-cages-from-origins-to-standardisation/) - Tank warfare remains a favourite among online aficionados due to the enduring cultural fascination with heavy armour. Events from the Russo-Ukrainian War, particularly the recent incident involving the apparent disabling of a Russian T-90M tank by two Ukrainian-operated US-supplied Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) have reignited interest in armoured combat. The ongoing debate surrounding the effectiveness of various tank designs continues to resonate across social media platforms and official channels. However, the emergence of distinct netting structures above tank turrets and other armoured vehicles has garnered significant attention since their increased use in the Russo-Ukrainian War as well as the more recent Israeli-Hamas War (Parker et al., 2022; Axe, 2023). Considered a form of improvised cage armour, these humorously labelled ‘cope cages’ remain relatively prevalent despite increasing scepticism of their utility. This study provides an overview of these improvised armour structures, analysing their origin and current standardisation and assessing their perceived impact.
- [Sweden in NATO: Legal Status and Future Challenges](https://finabel.org/sweden-in-nato-legal-status-and-future-challenges/) - On 7 March 2024, after decades of close partnership, Sweden finally joined NATO. Its accession followed a strict process involving the approval of all Parties of the Alliance. Before this pivotal moment, Sweden’s application to NATO was engaged in an unstable diplomatic negotiation between former Allies. This paper aims to analyse the legal framework and the future setup of NATO after this substantial transformation.
- [Ammunition Aid: Kosovo's Contribution to Ukraine's Defence](https://finabel.org/ammunition-aid-kosovos-contribution-to-ukraines-defence/) - The announcement made by Ejup Maqedonci, Kosovo's Minister of Defence, during the 20th Meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group on 19 March 2024 is a significant development in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Kosovo's pledge to provide military aid to Ukraine underscores the country’s political alignment with both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) and its willingness to join collective efforts in support of Ukraine's defence. Kosovo has committed to supply two military aid packages, which includes essential resources such as trucks, tactical vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, and mortar artillery shells. This is the first time the country has provided military assistance to Ukraine. Amidst Ukraine's acute shortage of ammunition, a confluence of factors including the political deadlock in the US Congress and production constraints in Europe have accentuated the severity of this situation. This prompts a closer examination whether Kosovo's military aid package, though undoubtedly valuable, sufficiently grapples the enormity of Ukraine’s ammunition crisis.
- [From Theory to Practice: Understanding Nuclear Deterrence and Sharing Agreements in European Security](https://finabel.org/from-theory-to-practice-understanding-nuclear-deterrence-and-sharing-agreements-in-european-security/) - The European Union faces the imperative of increased defence autonomy. As geopolitical dynamics evolve and traditional alliances undergo scrutiny, the EU must assert its strategic independence by bolstering its defence capabilities. Over the years, statements by European leaders, including but not limited to President Emmanuel Macron (President of the French Republic, 2022), Chancellor Angela Merkel (Chancellor of Germany, 2018), and President Ursula von der Leyen (President of the European Commission, 2023), often stress the need for the EU to reduce its reliance on external actors, particularly in defence and security matters.
- [Turkish Drone Exports: Implications for NATO Relations](https://finabel.org/turkish-drone-exports-implications-for-nato-relations/) - The proliferation of Turkish drone technology on the global arms market has raised concerns within the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) regarding its potential impact on regional security and alliance cohesion. At the crux of these concerns lies Türkiye’s 'no- questions-asked policy' in drone exports, allowing for the unrestricted sale of advanced military technology without stringent checks (Borsari, 2022; International Crisis Group, 2023). Considering Türkiye’s aspirations to solidify its position as a credible drone exporter, this info flash delves into Turkish drone developments, assesses their role in contemporary conflicts, and examines the implications for Ankara’s relations with NATO countries.
- [Ground Robotics in Modern Combat](https://finabel.org/ground-robotics-in-modern-combat/) - The automation of military vehicles and systems has long been a feature of warfare, but the emergence and development of ground robotics are revolutionising modern combat. Since their deployment in conflicts such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, ground robots have evolved into increasingly capable and autonomous entities integrated into military operations (Rosenberg, 2024). Fuelled by recent conflicts such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Russia-Ukraine War, which have highlighted the significant impact of military robotics on the battlefield, interest in the further development of this field continues. The development of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) has proceeded slowly, with ongoing challenges and questions surrounding their integration into military operations and ground forces (Gosselin-Malo, 2023). This paper aims to outline the advancements in ground robotics, explore the rationale for their increased proliferation in warfare, outline potential challenges in their widespread integration, and briefly analyse the deployment of such ordnance in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War.
- [Revolutionising the Battlefield: How Unmanned Ground Vehicles are Replacing Humans in Armed Conflict](https://finabel.org/revolutionising-the-battlefield-how-unmanned-ground-vehicles-are-replacing-humans-in-armed-conflict/) - Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) are becoming increasingly common in security and combat operations. The introduction of Ukraine’s Lyut tank is a clear example of how automation is revolutionising armed combat. UGVs are currently capable of operating in a semi-autonomous manner but not in the use of lethal force. This paper will analyse the ways in which fully autonomous UGVS are being developed and introduced on the battlefield as well as the role that they may play in the future of security operations. As artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming omnipresent, it is necessary to understand the debate surrounding these systems in armed conflict.
- [EU Foreign Affairs Council Approves Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF): €5 Billion for Military Aid](https://finabel.org/eu-foreign-affairs-council-approves-ukraine-assistance-fund-uaf-e5-billion-for-military-aid/) - The European Peace Facility (EPF) has emerged as a critical financial instrument for delivering EU military assistance to Ukraine following the unprovoked Russian aggression against the country (Bilquin, 2023).Conceived as part of the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the EPF was established by the Council on 22 March 2021 through Council Decision CFSP 2021/509. It substitutes and expands upon former financial instruments and it is tailored to provide quick responses to security crises (Council of European Union, 2021), funding both lethal and non-lethal military equipment and supplies (Council of the European Union, 2024).
- [Ukraine-Russia Conflict Enters Third Year: Reflecting on Two Years of Warfare](https://finabel.org/ukraine-russia-conflict-enters-third-year-reflecting-on-two-years-of-warfare/) - The war between Ukraine and Russia has now entered its third year since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a ‘Special Military Operation’ on 24 February 2022. The seeds of this conflict date back to 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in south-eastern Ukraine.
- [Ukrainian Neptune Cruise Missiles and Sea Drones – How a Country without a Real Naval Fleet is Changing the Balance of Power in the Black Sea and the Future of Naval WarfareFrom Theory to Practice: Understanding Nuclear Deterrence and Sharing Agreements in European Security](https://finabel.org/ukrainian-neptune-cruise-missiles-and-sea-drones-how-a-country-without-a-real-naval-fleet-is-changing-the-balance-of-power-in-the-black-sea-and-the-future-of-naval-warfarefrom-theory-to-prac/) - When Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his open war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, most observers expected the Ukrainians to hold out for a few days in the face of a superior armed force. After two years of war, the situation on the ground remains ambiguous for Ukraine. However, in the Black Sea, Ukraine has been able to notch several successful naval strikes. The Russian Navy having lost several critical vessels, has had to withdraw from the Black Sea Fleet's headquarters in Sevastopol in Crimea and relocate several ships to Russian harbours. Additionally, it is increasingly failing in its efforts to enforce a grain embargo against Ukraine by sea. Newly developed naval drones and anti-ship missiles are likely key factors contributing to Ukraine’s successes. This Infoflash aims to analyse these new weapons systems and their impact on the Russo-Ukrainian War, the balance of power in the Black Sea and their implications for the future of maritime warfare.
- [Internet of Military Things (IoMT): Cybersecurity challenges and non-interoperability](https://finabel.org/internet-of-military-things-iomt-cybersecurity-challenges-and-non-interoperability/) - The Internet of Military Things (IoMT) presents widespread opportunities, including enhanced efficiency, real-time decision-making, and improved situational awareness. The IoMT is “driven by military informationization requirement and information technology development. It consists of an information system capturing the physical attributes and state information of military people, equipments and materials by various information sensing means, connecting all kind of operation elements and environment elements as an organic whole by standard communication protocols to process, control and apply intelligently” (Yushi et al., 2018: 632).
- [Leaving the (Space) Door Open: ISS Missions as a Platform for International Cooperation](https://finabel.org/leaving-the-space-door-open-iss-missions-as-a-platform-for-international-cooperation/) - On 3 March, three American and one Russian astronauts took off from the Kennedy Space Center in Florida on the Falcon-9 rocket, owned by Elon Musk's company SpaceX, to reachthe International Space Station (ISS) (Le Monde, 2024). A US-Russian partnership, sustained by a private actor, might seem quite surprising amidst renewed geopolitical tension. However, neither the space cooperation between the US and Russia nor the active involvement of private companies in public-funded space operations is new in the space field. The growing impact of these trends on the space activities of other actors, such as the EU, will be significant (Jones, 2023).
- [A Threatening Heat for the European Defence: How the EU Shaped its Defence Policy to Adapt to Climate Change: Assessing the Recent Defence Policies](https://finabel.org/a-threatening-heat-for-the-european-defence-how-the-eu-shaped-its-defence-policy-to-adapt-to-climate-change-assessing-the-recent-defence-policies/) - As stated by the European Environment Agency (EEA) in 2020, our environment is disastrous and immediate action is required. In an environment where individuals have to flee uninhabitable areas and conflicts arise over key natural resources, the question raises how the EU intends to prepare the military to enable a green transition and how European defence policies adapted the militaries for the challenges caused by climate change.
- [Controversies around the EU-funded Senegalese security forces](https://finabel.org/controversies-around-the-eu-funded-senegalese-security-forces/) - On 29 February 2024, EU-funded Senegalese security forces violently suppressed pro- democracy protests (Nielsen, 2024). Controversy ensued as the Groupes d’Action Rapide – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel (GAR-SI Sahel) security forces, initially trained to combat cross-border crime along Senegal’s border with Mali, were being utilised for domestic purposes (Popoviciu & Bautista, 2024).
- [Sweden Strengthens Military Ties with France](https://finabel.org/sweden-strengthens-military-ties-with-france/) - On 31 January 2024, Sweden and France signed an agreement to deepen their partnership, engage in strategic dialogue on security and defence issues, expand cooperation in the field of research and development and advance their overall defence capabilities (Government of Sweden , 2024b). The cooperation extends to their armament industries and includes the production of essential supplies such as ammunitions, propellants, and explosives, thus rendering the European defence technological and industrial base more innovative, competitive, and resilient (Government of Sweden , 2024b). It is worth mentioning that France-Sweden defence cooperation is well- established, dating back to September 2021, when the two issued a joint declaration of intent concerning intensified defence cooperation in international operations and material provision (Government of Sweden , 2024a). Furthermore, in April 2023, they signed a framework arrangement to develop a common, improved version of a medium-range missile, paving the way for further collaboration in anti-tank missiles (Shepard News Team, 2024).
- [ESA’s ‘Security Turn’: Opportunities and Challenges for European Defence](https://finabel.org/esas-security-turn-opportunities-and-challenges-for-european-defence/) - In recent years, the European Space Agency (ESA) has seen a gradual expansion in its mission to now include ensuring space security. Such a change may have been favoured by the evolving needs of the EU, which is one of the ESA’s main partners and has become more and more concerned with the security and resilience of its space assets, as well as increasingly relevant in the ESA’s funding. Accordingly, ESA might be transitioning from a purely civilian and scientific organization to an institution entrusted with developing the security of space facilities against natural hazards and collision with man-made objects, both deliberate and unintended. While ESA’s new ‘defence for space’ approach has surely increased the institution’s military relevance, it is still unclear whether such a transition will benefit or impede European defence. On the one hand, profiting from the consolidated technical expertise of the ESA could afford European the armed forces the opportunity to increasingly rely on high-quality space facilities. On the other hand, institutional overlap and ensuring coordination with other EU bodies could present serious challenges, ones which could eventually hamper the efficacy of European space assets for military activities.
- [The European Defence Fund - A Slow and Opaque Relay Race to Yesterday's Needs?](https://finabel.org/the-european-defence-fund-a-slow-and-opaque-relay-race-to-yesterdays-needs/) - On 9 January 2024, Thierry Breton, Commissioner for the Internal Market and in charge of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and defence industry, announced that he was proposing a new €100 billion defence fund to strengthen the EU’s defence industry (Wax & Kayali, 2024). The statement came in the context of an apparent failure to supply Ukraine with a promised million artillery shells within a year, which he insisted that the Union would nonetheless accomplish, and as the EU’s defence sector becomes increasingly centralised. Most astonishing, however, is that the proposed sum largely surpasses any fund that EU institutions have previously devoted to the defence industry. With the most recent EU capability development tool for defence and security being the EDF, with €8 billion spread over the 2021-2027 period, talks about a newer and larger framework for EU defence funding raise numerous questions regarding framework and administration. While the new interest in defence spending at an EU level is inherently different to the EDF in that it is intended to finance the procurement of equipment rather than just its development, it appears to be an extension of the EDF framework.
- [Wagner’s Strategic Control in Africa: Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Legacy](https://finabel.org/wagners-strategic-control-in-africa-yevgeny-prigozhins-legacy/) - Following the recent death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the former leader of the Wagner Group, uncertainty clouds the future trajectory of this mercenary group and its strategic operations across Africa. Wagner has long been shrouded in ambiguity, often categorized as a Private Military Group (PMC), a Private Security Company (PSC), or simply a band of mercenaries. However, some analysts argue that it extends beyond these definitions, asserting that its influence campaigns are orchestrated on behalf of the Russian government to bolster Russia’s position in strategic competition with the West (Pokalova, 2023). Over the past decade, the Wagner Group has wielded substantial influence across Africa, utilising defence and security services to obtain access to strategically vital natural resources. Moreover, emerging evidence from Russian documents suggests a deliberate endeavour by the Kremlin to reshape Africa’s mining sector, with the aim of sidelining Western competitors from critical strategic areas. Despite Prigozhin’s demise, the Wagner Group’s continued expansion across various African nations, including the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Sudan, underscores its persistent pursuit of objectives with unwavering determination. After setting the context for Wagner's activities under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin, this paper will explore the current situation of the mercenary group's operations in three African countries (CAR, Mali, and Sudan). It will illustrate how the group offers security services in exchange for access to natural resources and how it has gained momentum in these contexts, partly due to the absence of a Western presence.
- [Deciphering the Novelty Franco-German Security Deal with Ukraine](https://finabel.org/deciphering-the-novelty-franco-german-security-deal-with-ukraine/) - Last Friday, February 16th 2024 saw the establishment of a milestone in Franco-Ukrainian relations in the form of the ratification of a bilateral security and relief agreement at the Élysée Palace in Paris. French President Emmanuel Macron signed an accord with President Zelensky, promising large-scale funding, the delivery of offensive weaponry and the exchange of intelligence, while also discussing the production of electronic defence and drone systems (Ratz et al., 2024). This happened only a few hours after Zelensky signed a quasi-identical deal with German chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin, as the Ukrainian leader had done in January with Great Britain’s Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (Fornusek, 2024). Thus, in a show of a slowly nascent, but steadily emerging European defence cooperation effort, the Franco-German couple pledged complementary financial relief, the delivery of heavy armament and offensive weaponry, additionally paving the way for the exchange and mutual consultation of military intelligence.
- [The Expansion of the European Sky Shield Initiative](https://finabel.org/the-expansion-of-the-european-sky-shield-initiative/) - The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) is a German-led project to build and develop a ground-based integrated European air defence system. This includes anti-ballistic missile capabilities to protect European air space. The initiative was launched in 2022 to address NATO and the European Union’s “recognised European shortfall” in the realm of air and missile defence systems following the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Barrie and Giegerich, 2023). Since then, it has expanded and, as of February 2024, twenty-one European states have participated in the initiative (Höller, 2024). Most recently, the initiative expanded to include Aegean neighbours Greece and Türkiye on 15 February 2024.
- [EU's presence in the Arctic](https://finabel.org/eus-presence-in-the-arctic/) - The EU presence in the Arctic region is acquiring decisive importance in terms of security and defence, especially since the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian war. However, not only geopolitical rivalries are an important change, but also the opportunism of the effect of global warming and the increase in commercial interest in natural resources. The joint communication of 2021, October 13, A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic, proposed that the EU pursue a secure, stable, sustainable, peaceful, and prosperous Arctic region. There is a need to adopt a strengthened maritime security policy, especially in the areas of economic development, free trade, transport, and energy security.
- [EU Mission Aspides to Secure Trade in the Red Sea: An Opportunity for Decisive EU Foreign Policy and Interoperability or Doomed to Failure?](https://finabel.org/eu-mission-aspides-to-secure-trade-in-the-red-sea-an-opportunity-for-decisive-eu-foreign-policy-and-interoperability-or-doomed-to-failure/) - The military conflict that broke out in Gaza in October 2023 spread when, out of self-proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (BBC, 2024), the Yemenite Shia Islamist Houthis began attacking civilian merchant ships in the Red Sea at the end of 2023. Due to Yemen's geopolitically significant location at the entrance to the Red Sea, the attacks led to a massive decline in trade through the corridor, which is of crucial importance for Europe. The US responded decisively in December 2023 with the naval mission Operation Prosperity Guardian, however, in contrast, the EU's own response, designated Operation Eunavfor Aspides, was slow to get off the ground. Notwithstanding, now that the EU’s plans have been finalised, this InfoFlash aims to analyse the EU mission with regard to its operational realisation, its creation and mandate, what exactly the EU can achieve through it, and its risks and challenges. Moreover, this InfoFlash will delve into the international consequences of the mission, and how it may shape the perception of the EU on the world stage. In this respect, the mission has the potential to provide a wide array of opportunities to the Union. For instance, the EU could seize the opportunity to demonstrate to the world that it is an internally united global player who is prepared to effectively carry out risky missions in order to fulfil its foreign policy responsibilities by promoting security and stability in the world.
- [An EU Space Law on the Horizon: Decoding Legal Foundations and Navigating Policy Frontiers](https://finabel.org/initiatives-an-eu-space-law-on-the-horizon-decoding-legal-foundations-and-navigating-policy-frontiers/) - In recent years and through the dissemination of documents, strategic initiatives, and legislative measures, the European Union recognised the need for a substantial space regulation framework that would ensure responsible and sustainable activities in outer space. Member States [MSs] have begun drafting national laws to meet space-related challenges such as satellite proliferation, risks of congestion and collision, and security threats against space assets (European Commission, 2023a). To mitigate fragmentation, the EU is ready to establish a dedicated legal framework that aligns withinternational space law within its legal system. As a matter of fact, in the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence of March 2023, the Commission announced that it is working on the proposal for an EU Space Law. This legal instrument will be available in early 2024 and will allegedly envisage common EU rules for the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities and operations. The risk of fragmentation in the absence of a regulatory framework canimpact the competitiveness, security, and worldwide influence of EU industries in international fora (European Commission, 2023a). This mesmerising topic has attracted interest from academia, industry, and the private and public sectors which expressed their views through a targeted consultation.
- [The Potential Rise of Russia’s Nuclear Space Arsenal](https://finabel.org/the-potential-rise-of-russias-nuclear-space-arsenal/) - As the rhetoric of Russian officials continues to fueltensionsby fostering verbal escalations,the last weeks have seenan increased fear of themilitarisation of spaceby the Kremlin,against the backdrop of European military leaders’ general doubts about the West’s readiness to assist and supply Kyiv sustainably in its continued defence efforts.On 17 February 2024, at the Munich Security Conference, Secretary of State Antony Blinken voiced his concerns regardingalleged Russianplans to install satellite-disrupting technology as well as unconventional weaponry in outer space (New York Times, 2014). Such claims, if proven to be true, would constitute a clear breach of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty of the non-militarisation of outer space and potentially harm the worldwide transmission of data to global positioning systems (GPS) (Starling and Massa, 2024).This would,in turn, constitute a novel transgression ofinternational lawwhich,inthe absence of deterring sanctioning tools, would likely once again result ina loss of credibility for the international system (The Conversation, 2024b).Until then, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty had established a common framework for the prohibition of nuclear testing and stationing of unconventional missiles in space (The Conversation, 2024a).The Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies reported that Russia allegedly went ahead with testing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as far back as 2021 against formerly operable Soviet space satellites, while simultaneously planning and carrying out routine exercises of cyber- and jamming attacks against neighbouring spatial equipment (BBC, 2024).
- [The U.S. is Discontinuing FARA to Invest More in Reconnaissance UAVs. Europe was Already Ahead.](https://finabel.org/the-u-s-is-discontinuing-fara-to-invest-more-in-reconnaissance-uavs-europe-was-already-ahead/) - The war in Ukraine is teaching us the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in reconnaissance because they are cheaper to produce and run than conventional military aircraft. UAVs have played a significant role in Ukrainian intel gathering. This signal has been picked up by the military industry in the United States and changes have been made accordingly. On the other side of the Atlantic, Europe already made the same move in 2019.
- [EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence](https://finabel.org/eu-space-strategy-for-security-and-defence/) - In recent years, the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence has assumed paramount importance, driven by shifts in the geopolitical landscape and the imperative to update collective policy approaches. In this context, the enlargement of NATO and the ramifications of the Russo-Ukrainian war pose significant questions (Kolovos, A., 2023). More specifically, these geopolitical shifts underscore the urgent need for a unified defence system against potential common threats. This is an especially complicated task considering that the space domain presents nuanced challenges akin to those of the Arctic, where borders lack the tangible delineation seen in traditional realms of air, land, or maritime boundaries. In this sense, the new approach to space defence and security includes both military considerations and political and legal dimensions.
- [Geopolitical Tightrope in the South Caucasus: EU’s Strategic Interests Amid Escalation on the Armenia-Azerbaijan Border](https://finabel.org/geopolitical-tightrope-in-the-south-caucasus-eus-strategic-interests-amid-escalation-on-the-armenia-azerbaijan-border/) - Azerbaijan, backed by Russia, has made clear that it will not hesitate to use force to open the Zangezur Corridor (also known as Meghri Corridor) through the Armenian territory to its exclave of Nakhchivan and its ‘brother’ Turkey. The attack occurred from Azerbaijani positions within Armenian territory that had been previously invaded. The fact that the incident occurred within the sovereign state borders of Armenia fuels the growing security concerns of the Armenian population, sceptical about the peaceful coexistence alongside Azerbaijan. On 13 February, the Armenian Ministry of Defence released a statement that four soldiers were killed and one was wounded in an Azerbaijani open fire at a post in the southern region of Armenia’s Syunik. In return, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence claimed that Armenian troops fired on the village of Kokhanabi in Azerbaijan’s Tovuz District on the evening of 12 February, injuring one border guard and prompting the launch of a “retaliatory operation” in revenge.
- [Finland in NATO - What’s Next?](https://finabel.org/finland-in-nato-whats-next/) - Finland’s official entry into NATO on 4 April 2023 marked the culmination of a meticulously orchestrated 11-month accession process, catalysed by the destabilising events surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While Finland’s accession to NATO may appear straightforward, it was expedited in light of the urgent security imperatives prompted by the invasion. Nevertheless, the transition to NATO membership calls for careful consideration of the multifaceted security dynamics between Finland and the alliance. In this context, this paper endeavours to cast a forward-looking perspective, examining the future trajectory of NATO-Finnish cooperation post-accession. Concretely, it will look at what the next steps are that NATO and Finland could and/or should take after the latter’s accession to the former. Central to this exploration is an assessment of the potential avenues for Finland to further integrate into NATO’s operational framework. Specifically, a detailed analysis will be undertaken to evaluate the feasibility and implications of expanding NATO’s presence within Finnish territory through initiatives such as the enhanced forward presence (eFP). Then, the paper will explore the prospects for enhanced collaboration within the Northern Group, leveraging Finland’s NATO membership to deepen regional defence cooperation. Furthermore, consideration will be given to the merits of Finland joining the Bucharest Nine (B9) group, elucidating the potential benefits and strategic imperatives associated with such a move.
- [The ‘Ukraine Effect’: UK and EU Security Cooperation After the Ukraine Invasion](https://finabel.org/the-ukraine-effect-uk-and-eu-security-cooperation-after-the-ukraine-invasion/) - Theresa May’s gnomic phrase ‘Brexit means Brexit’ echoed around British and international media outlets following the 2016 British referendum to withdraw from the European Union (EU). The ‘British Exit’, or ‘Brexit’, after a process lasting three years and overseen by various Conservative Party leaders, has indeed been achieved. However, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine has posed a collective threat to the continent, including the United Kingdom (UK). With a renewed effort to cooperate on security matters, the ‘Brexit means Brexit’ aphorism has seemingly become tainted. With political analysts declaring that this renewed closeness is imperative both for saving Ukraine (Blewett-Mundy, 2024) and for the freedom and security of the UK and its EU neighbours (Ricketts, 2024), it is no surprise that there is an interest in analysing the increased momentum in EU-UK security cooperation. In this context, exploring how and why the UK and the EU have resumed their security cooperation is topical.
- [Unpacking the 2024 Munich Security Conference: The future of Europe’s Defence and Transatlantic Security Policy](https://finabel.org/unpacking-the-2024-munich-security-conference-the-future-of-europes-defence-and-transatlantic-security-policy/) - This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Munich Security Conference (MSC). From February 16 to February 18, one of the central forums for debate on foreign and security policy took place in the Bavarian capital. The conference was marked by a palpable sense of urgency and concern regarding European defence. It was largely overshadowed by the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the fall of Avdiivka, the death/murder of Alexei Navalny, ammunition shortages in Ukraine, and former U.S. president and current Republican frontrunner Donald Trump’s comments on NATO (Dorman, 2024), all of which contributed to an uneasy atmosphere. This News Flash dissects the key topics and most significant issues and challenges in European defence and Transatlantic security policy covered throughout the conference. The present analysis explores the two following panel discussions as primary sources: (i) Europe’s Finest Hour? Building a Defense Union in Challenging Times (MSC, 2024a)and (ii) In It to Win It: The Future of Ukraine and Transatlantic Security (MSC, 2024b).
- [Poland's reaction to the Ukraine war and its effects on the European Security Architecture](https://finabel.org/polands-reaction-to-the-ukraine-war-and-its-effects-on-the-european-security-architecture/) - The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 immeasurably disturbed the European security landscape greatly fuelling fear of Russia's neo-imperialistic ambitions, particularly in the former Soviet sphere of influence. In Eastern Europe, especially in the Baltic states and Poland, these fears have grown steadily since Russia's hybrid forms of aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In particular, Poland has felt threatened by various hybrid threat scenarios since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, including a potential attack on its own territory. Poland's response to the war in Ukraine has been and continues to be influenced by both geographical and historical considerations. With a border shared with Russia's exclave, Kaliningrad, and the escalating tensions since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the fear of a Russian invasion through the Suwalki Gap, a crucial Polish-Lithuanian border, emerged as a concerning potential contingency since the collapse of the Eastern bloc. As a result, Poland has decided to act decisively. In concrete terms, this has materialised as the massive expansion of its defence forces and staunch support for its attacked neighbour.
- [Russian Nuclear Strategy: Implications for Deterrence and Arms Control](https://finabel.org/russian-nuclear-strategy-implications-for-deterrence-and-arms-control/) - Against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, expectations of a stable, predictable, and indivisible European security order have seemingly failed to materialise. Given the implications of the war, debates surrounding nuclear weapons returned to public scrutiny after long being confined to a niche of experts and policymakers. Arguably, the conflict triggered the most serious nuclear crisis since the end of the Cold War, which is exacerbated by the allusive wording of Russian officials and pundits regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Anxiety about Moscow’s first strike against Kyiv or its allies slowed down support for the invaded country. As such, this InfoFlash considers the implications of Russian nuclear posture for Ukraine and Europe, analysing the structure of Russian nuclear forces and doctrine, and their relations with Moscow’s strategic goals.
- [Nato Support Mission to Earthquake Relief Efforts in Turkey](https://finabel.org/nato-support-mission-to-earthquake-relief-efforts-in-turkey/) - NATO, when required, carries out disaster relief operations and missions in response to natural or humanitarian disasters. In response to the devastating earthquakes in Turkey in February 2023, NATO established temporary shelters for thousands of people and coordinated an airbridge to deliver vital supplies from allies and partners. The mission, complying with the general principles of International Humanitarian Law, acted in a very unstable political environment, considering the strategic position of Turkey as a powerful state in the Mediterranean Sea and a member of the Alliance. This paper analyses the legal framework in which the mission has been acting, and its conformity to it,as well as its political implications in the light of the complex diplomatic relations between Turkey, United States, and NATO.
- [Expanding Horizons: Assessing the Implications of EU Enlargement towards Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia for European Security & Military Cooperation](https://finabel.org/expanding-horizons-assessing-the-implications-of-eu-enlargement-towards-moldova-ukraine-and-georgia-for-european-security-military-cooperation/) - In an era marked by dynamic geopolitical shifts and evolving security challenges, the European Union (EU) finds itself at the crossroads of an ambitious endeavour, namely the broadening of its horizons to integrate Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. As the EU works towards extending its reach to the eastern fringes of Europe, the implications of doing so extend beyond political and economic integration. This analysis delves into a critical facet of this transformative process, specifically the ramifications for European military interoperability. In a historic turn of events, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia have pursued EU membership since early 2022. Following a rigorous evaluation process and exercise of political will, the three Eastern Partnership countries were granted candidate status, signifying a step toward their full integration into the EU. The year 2023 marked a pivotal moment, with negotiations for accession formally opened in December for both Moldova and Ukraine (European Commission, 2023).
- [Are Laser Weapon Systems the Solution to Drone Dominated Conflicts?](https://finabel.org/are-laser-weapon-systems-the-solution-to-drone-dominated-conflicts/) - Currently, there is no effective international legal consensus which defines the use of drones as weapons, despite a steep rise in their use by states, both in the proportion of modern air forces and volume of military operations. This trend is especially concerning due to their employment by non-state actors in hybrid warfare, as it has been reported it happened in the Red Sea. Until an effective legal consensus is agreed upon by states, developing a physical solution to drone attacks seems to be the United Kingdom’s objective. The UK’s new laser-based weapons system, DragonFire, provides a window into how states are preparing for a future of drone-dominated conflicts.
- [Politics of Aid During the War on Ukraine](https://finabel.org/politics-of-aid-during-the-war-on-ukraine/) - It is becoming difficult to analyse the 2022 conflict in Ukraine without also evaluating the political debate in Washington, D.C. This debate is becoming particularly relevant among 'America First' supporters who question the continued financial and military aid provided by the United States. Despite initial bipartisan support for aid packages, dissent has been growing, with critics arguing for fiscal caution rather than continued support. This paper outlines the aims of the ‘America First’ foreign policy. The primary aim of ‘America First’ politicians is that US allies contribute their fair share to collective deterrence in NATO and internationally. This paper highlights that since 2022, many European allies have contributed more than their fair share of defence spending. ‘America First’ politicians also demand that the foreign policy focus on cost-effectiveness. Understanding the specifics of this term is critical to measuring the success of the US aid program to Ukraine.
- [An Analysis of the Interplay between Environmental Regulations and Armed Forces](https://finabel.org/an-analysis-of-the-interplay-between-envoronmental-regulations-and-armed-forces/) - In an era where environmental concerns are at the forefront of international discourse, this paper examines the intersection of legislation governing environmental protection and the activities of military forces worldwide with a particular focus on European Union Member States. To this end, case studies such as that of the 1991 Kuwaiti oil fires and oil spills are employed to illustrate instances where armed forces have disregarded environmental mandates. The tension between military necessities and environmental protection forms a central theme, prompting a critical evaluation of the inherent conflicts and potential synergies. The paper concludes by highlighting the need for more consistent legislation as well as a more holistic approach to the protection of the environment. In essence, this paper highlights that there is no complete and comprehensive legal framework regarding the protection of the environment in general, let alone in military contexts.
- [A Comparative Study of Article 5 of the NATO and Article 42(7) of the Treaty on The European Union](https://finabel.org/a-comparative-study-of-article-5-of-the-nato-and-article-427-of-the-treaty-on-the-european-union/) - Over the past decades, Europe has enjoyed an extraordinary period of peace, but this has not been achieved without any cost. Indeed, the membership of European states within the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has played a key role, primarily through their commitment to mutual defence, contained in Art. 42 (7) of the Treaty of the European Union and Art. 5 NATO Charter. By establishing such clauses, the signatory parties commit to support each other in case of attack against any of them. Despite their importance in ensuring the security of all allies, scenarios such as the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US or the 2016 terrorist attacks in Paris showed their limitations when the affected states invoked these clauses.
- [European Peace Facility](https://finabel.org/european-peace-facility/) - Defence policy, together with foreign and security policy, is one of the areas where states have historically been reluctant to surrender their competences to an inter/supranational entity. As a result, no significant progress was made during the first years of the European Union’s existence, with the fields being categorised as intergovernmental in nature by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty so as to leave countries free to consult themselves without the obligation to coordinate efforts at the EU institutional level and harmonise legislation on the matter. It was not until the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 (entered into force in 2009) that the EU’s founding documents set up a fully-fledged Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). They did so through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar in charge of crisis management, inter-state coordination and cooperation in defence matters (Council of the EU, n.d.-a).
- [The EU Barbed-Wire External Perimeter](https://finabel.org/the-eu-barbed-wire-external-perimeter/) - In May 2021, an increasing number of people started to sporadically cross the European borders from Belarus. These migratory flows, artificially created by state-sponsored actions from President Alexander Lukashenko, mainly affected three European bordering countries: Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. This specific case exemplifies the heavily debated instrumentalisation of migration, or, as specified by the European Commission, the series of events in which “a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the Union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third-country nationals to the external borders”. It can be easily understood that these actions are perpetrated with the objective of destabilising and asserting pressure on the Member States and the European Union (EU) at large, with the final intention of undermining vital State functions, such as territorial integrity and national security in primis. In the short term, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have reacted to the growing number of undocumented individuals through stricter border controls, whilst in the long run, the instrumentalisation of migration has translated into a proper humanitarian crisis that has shaken the Union. Whilst the latter had already sanctioned key political and economic figures of the Belarusian regime after the fraudulent presidential victory of 2020, EU countries bordering Belarus have proceeded in different ways, at times even acting against the EU acquis and international law.
- [Navigating Instability: EU’s Strategic Response to African Security Challenges and Future Initiatives](https://finabel.org/navigating-instability-eus-strategic-response-to-african-security-challenges-and-future-initiatives/) - The withdrawal of French contingents from Niger marks the end of a decade-long EU military involvement in the Sahel. With Niamey announcing the end of EUMPM and EUCAP Niger, EU presence in the country has met a fate much like the one in Mali and Burkina Faso. Concerns are being raised regarding the future of European troops stationed in other African countries, all the while the United Nations Security Council unanimously agreed on the gradual withdrawal of peacekeepers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Yet, while its prospects seem bleak, ensuring sustainable stability in Africa will likely remain a European priority in the coming years.
- [Artillery in Ukraine – A Critical Evaluation](https://finabel.org/artillery-in-ukraine-a-critical-evaluation/) - This study will critically evaluate defence and international affairs specialist James Bosbotinis’ article (2023) titled ‘The Lessons of the Ukraine War and its Implications for Artillery,’ weighing up its strengths while also providing analysis on the topic of artillery in Ukraine. Bosbotinis’ article is an in-depth and well-sourced study of what NATO and its Western allies more generally can learn from the tactics and weapon systems used by both sides of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Presenting an exhaustive analysis of the use of artillery, it evaluates the complementary nature of higher-end precision or guided systems and cheaper unguided conventional weapons. The nature of the war has highlighted the vulnerabilities that NATO countries could encounter if they were to directly engage against Russia. From munitions stockpiles to the risks associated with having large logistical chains, to the ever-increasing importance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), artillery seems to have proven itself to be a key player in the waging of modern warfare.
- [Europe’s Future Capabilities in Space and in the Higher Atmosphere: HYDEF Hypersonic Interceptors, Satellite Resilience, and Space Commands](https://finabel.org/europes-future-capabilities-in-space-and-in-the-higher-atmosphere-hydef-hypersonic-interceptors-satellite-resilience-and-space-commands/) - In the ever-evolving landscape of modern warfare, the significance of space in military operations has reached unprecedented heights. As nations gear up for multi-domain operations, the theatres of battle extend far beyond the traditional land, sea, and airfields. The critical role of space for the defence sector has forced EU member states to upgrade their capabilities in this area. In this paper, we briefly show how the armed forces of European states increased their interoperability in space and the upper atmosphere. To do this, we refer to the new European space commands, the investments of European countries, military exercises concerning the space domain and, finally, the most recent developments concerning European high-atmosphere hypersonic missile interceptors.
- [The Changing Mediterranean: Geopolitical Tensions and Challenges](https://finabel.org/the-changing-mediterranean-geopolitical-tensions-and-challenges/) - The Mediterranean Sea holds unparalleled strategic importance for several states in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Serving as the natural connection between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans through Gibraltar, Suez, and Bāb el-Mandeb, this maritime space is of inescapable centrality for the global trade system, with 90% of trade still concentrated at sea. Consequently, states highly dependent on the import of natural resources and the export of high-value goods, mainly European countries, consider the overall stability of this sea essential for their economic well-being and national security. Additionally, the Mediterranean’s relevance has increased due to recent discoveries of large offshore oil and gas fields in its Eastern quadrant, between the territorial waters of Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt. As noted by ISPI (2021), the Mediterranean is also crucial when it comes to fishing activities, migration flow, the presence of pipelines and fibre optic cables, and security competition among various state actors in the region.
- [Orbiting a Solution to Anti-Satellite Weapons](https://finabel.org/orbiting-a-solution-to-anti-satellite-weapons/) - One of the many problems that the scientific community is facing today is space debris. Space debris is exceptionally dangerous as it can cause the Kessler Effect, a scenario where objects in space collide, creating an exponentially growing mount of rubble orbiting the planet. What is especially concerning is the use of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), which leave hundreds of thousands of debris items in space, putting astronauts and other satellites at risk. If states continue to test their ASAT weapons or use them to attack other satellites, this could have a dramatic impact on all space actors as well as future generations. This study will explore why the international community has not banned the use of ASATs yet and it will investigate how to achieve this outcome through an in-depth analysis of space-related treaties.
- [Space Lessons Learned from the War in Ukraine](https://finabel.org/space-lessons-learned-from-the-war-in-ukraine/) - With each passing conflict, the space industry is gaining more and more relevance in the operation command chain, especially during interstate wars. The war in Ukraine is the perfect example of this, revealing the most significant trajectories in the space domain, and highlighting flaws and rapid developments; in a nutshell, this war is shaping the future of space, especially in the military sector. The focus of this paper will be first on the Russian entanglement in the conflict, followed by an analysis of the Ukrainian rapid adaptation of the new rules in space guided by Western help, and finally, conclusions will be drawn from the very interesting evolvement of the space industry in this war.
- [Navigating the Green Horizon: NATO’s Emission Reduction Initiatives and the Pursuit of Sustainability](https://finabel.org/navigating-the-green-horizon-natos-emission-reduction-initiatives-and-the-pursuit-of-sustainability/) - Climate change is widely acknowledged as one of the most pressing issues today. As time passes, the environmental repercussions and global impact of greenhouse gas emissions grow increasingly apparent, leaving no alternative but to act. All industrial and commercial sectors must work together to drastically minimise their effect on our planet and avoid a global disaster. This encompasses the long-ignored global military industry, including its supply chain, which uses enormous amounts of fossil fuels and accounts for a significant portion of government spending.
- [Danish F-16s: Ukraine or Argentina?](https://finabel.org/danish-f-16s-ukraine-or-argentina/) - In mid-2023, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway pledged to train Ukrainian pilots and donate several F-16s to help Ukraine defend itself against the ongoing Russian invasion (Breaking Defence, 2023; Dubois, 2023). More recently, the US Congress approved the transfer of 24 Royal Danish Air Force F-16s to Argentina after White House pressure, in a deal reportedly worth $338 million (Segovia, 2023). However, while this development contradicts the recent Western pledge to support Ukraine, by apparently deviating to another country the Danish planes publicly earmarked for Kyiv, it will be argued that they do not conflict because of equal geopolitical priorities and, thus, can mutually complement.
- [The Ariane 6 Rocket: Europe’s Civilian and Military Sovereignty in Space at Stake. Private Competition and Reusability in the Future of European Space Policy ](https://finabel.org/the-ariane-6-rocket-europes-civilian-and-military-sovereignty-in-space-at-stake-private-competition-and-reusability-in-the-future-of-european-space-policy/) - Ariane 6 is set to be the next flagship launch vehicle of the European Space Agency (ESA). On 30 November 2023, after years of delays and unfortunate circumstances, ESA Director General Josef Aschbacher finally announced that the rocket’s first flight will take place in the summer of 2024 (Foust, 2023d). [VI1] Ariane 6 is designed to carry into orbit payloads commissioned by private contractors, national governments, ESA member states and the European Union Space Programme (EUSPA). It aims to replace the recently retired Ariane 5 rocket, which was entrusted with the delivery of Europe’s heaviest and most advanced payloads during its 117-flights-long career from 1996 to 2023 (ESA, n.d. - a).
- [Legal Dimensions of the Militarization of Space: An Examination of International Space Law ](https://finabel.org/legal-dimensions-of-the-militarization-of-space-an-examination-of-international-space-law/) - Space law is a complex system governing outer space activities which comprises international treaties, conventions, United Nations General Assembly resolutions, as well as rules and regulations of international organisations. This paper will lay the international legal framework of space law, examining key documents like the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. Beyond this legal framework, the paper explores the militarisation of outer space, scrutinizing the intersection between space law and the evolving military activities taking place in outer space.
- [IRIS²: The Dawn of EU Leadership in Space? ](https://finabel.org/iris²-the-dawn-of-eu-leadership-in-space/) - As great power politics returns to the world stage, so does space policy. States that can afford to are funnelling money into their space programmes in pursuit of everything from space-based weaponry to technological development, research, and communications. The European Union, in a bid to become the leading space actor, has also launched a flurry of projects and established both an operational agency and a specialised directorate-general for its space policy.
- [THE ISSUE OF FRAGMENTATION IN EU SPACE GOVERNANCE](https://finabel.org/the-issue-of-fragmentation-in-eu-space-governance/) - With the advent of the so-called “space race” era during the Cold War, states started giving major consideration to developing their space capabilities, having realised the many advantages they could bring. Indeed, military operations in space primarily concern satellite-based surveillance, communications, and intelligence operations, thus allowing states to benefit from them as space-related development can, among many things, extend the range and capabilities of communications, improve missile early warning and enhance situational awareness beyond any terrestrial capability.
- [Navigating the Evolution of EU Fiscal Rules: A Possible Special Status for Defence Spending?](https://finabel.org/navigating-the-evolution-of-eu-fiscal-rules-a-possible-special-status-for-defence-spending/) - Amid a paradigm shift in EU economic governance, a draft compromise seen by Euractiv reveals that, under the new Economic Governance Review (EGR), defence spending might be granted special status within European Union (EU) fiscal rules (Pugnet &Allenbach-Ammann, 2023). According to Euractiv, this document, tabled by the Spanish presidency of the EU Council on 3 November 2023, seeks to stimulate member state investment in defence. It is also part of a grand effort to overhaul current EU debt and deficit reduction rules, which were suspended for four years in order to allow increased spending and will be returning in full force in 2024 (Leali & Smith-Meyer, 2023).
- [The 2023 Capability Development Priorities](https://finabel.org/the-2023-capability-development-priorities/) - On November 14, the 27 EU Ministers of Defence approved the 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities (EDA, 2023). This constitutes the fourth revision of the Capability Development Plan (CDP). Earlier versions were drafted in 2008, 2014 and 2018 (Defence Talk, 2008; EDA, 2014, 2018). The CDP is a tool to periodically assess Member States’ military capabilities and inform them on priorities and opportunities for cooperation in capability development (EDA, n.d.).
- [Russo-North Korean Military Cooperation – A Strategic Partnership Reborn?](https://finabel.org/russo-north-korean-military-cooperation-a-strategic-partnership-reborn/) - From 13 to 17 September 2023, Kim Jong-un embarked on his first visit to a foreign leader in over four years as he travelled to the Russian Far East to meet Vladimir Putin. This meeting symbolised a convergence of interests in opposing the U.S.-led Western order from which both countries find themselves increasingly isolated. Hence, although the summit did not produce an explicit statement of what was discussed or agreed on at the surface level, the meeting sparked fears of a potential arms deal between the two countries, which could well contribute to revitalising Putin’s war machine in Ukraine (Ye Hee Lee & Bolton, 2023).
- [The Abraham Accords Have Backfired - The Destabilisation of the Middle East.](https://finabel.org/the-abraham-accords-have-backfired-the-destabilisation-of-the-middle-east/) - The eruption of yet another armed conflict between Israel and Palestine is wreaking havoc within a geopolitical region which has recently been under a process of progressive stabilisation and pacification. The Abraham Accords have been a critical component of this process and its diplomatic formalisation. However, Hamas’ terrorist attacks on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent Israeli retaliation are hampering this entire pacification process. If tensions continue to escalate, they will conceivably deter the continuation and extension of these ambitious accords. The Abraham Accords were brokered in 2020 between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain as a result of the diplomatic mediation of the Trump administration.
- [European Defence Industry Lobbying in Brussels.](https://finabel.org/european-defence-industry-lobbying-in-brussels/) - A recent article by Politico shed light on how defence lobbyists are increasingly concentrating their efforts on EU officials and policy-makers (Wheaton & Bayer, 2023). While lobbying activities have traditionally interested Member States, defence and security integration at the European level has progressively drawn the attention of both European and American defence companies (Wheaton & Bayer, 2023).
- [Russia Has Formally Withdrawn from the CFE Treaty: What Now?](https://finabel.org/russia-has-formally-withdrawn-from-the-cfe-treaty-what-now/) - The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) has been one of the cornerstones of European security for the last thirty years. Negotiated during the twilight years of the Cold War, and signed on 19 November 1990, it was a landmark security treaty. The CFE entered into force on 13 July 1992 and aimed to limit the number of conventional arms—battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—of State Parties (Art 4(1) CFE, 1990). The Treaty was particularly important as it addressed the core dilemmas of the security context of the time; although the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the context was very much dominated by bloc tensions between the Warsaw Pact states and NATO (Witkowsky et al., 2010). At the time it entered into force, it “adapted to the changes that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and contributed predictability and transparency in military forces as Europe was transforming throughout the 1990s” (Witkowsky et al., 2010).
- [Defending International Law in Sudan.](https://finabel.org/defending-international-law-in-sudan/) - Since gaining independence in 1956 from Britain and Egypt, Sudan has seen multiple revolutions and civil wars. Many violations of international law took place during these conflicts. It is worth examining the measures which the International Criminal Court (ICC) took to hold individuals accountable during the Bashir era of Sudan’s recent history. During this era, Sudan was the location of extreme violations of international law, including genocide and crimes against humanity (ICC).
- [Joint naval and aerial exercises in the Indo-Pacific and new regional alignments in 2023.](https://finabel.org/joint-naval-and-aerial-exercises-in-the-indo-pacific-and-new-regional-alignments-in-2023/) - On October 22, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (US) navies completed the anti-submarine exercise called ‘Silent Shark’ in the waters of Guam. Since 2007, Silent Shark has been conducted biennially. The live-training exercise involved the nuclear-powered fast attack submarine USS Topeka (SSN-754) and the diesel-electric submarine ROKS Jung Ji (SS-073), along with maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft from the US Navy’s Squadron 8 and the ROK’s Navy Squadron 611.
- [Terrorist Attack in Belgium in 2023: National Security, Resilience and the Role of the Army](https://finabel.org/terrorist-attack-in-belgium-in-2023-national-security-resilience-and-the-role-of-the-army/) - Belgium has been a target of terrorist attacks in recent years. The country faced its largest terrorist attack in 2016 at Brussels Airport in Zaventem and at the Maelbeek/Maalbeek metro station. This incident prompted Belgium to revise its national security strategy, focusing on addressing threats related to terrorism and extremism.
- [Mine Clearance Technology and the Russo-Ukrainian War.](https://finabel.org/mine-clearance-technology-and-the-russo-ukrainian-war/) - In 1997, the international community signed the Ottawa Treaty as a response to the humanitarian crisis caused by the global proliferation of anti-personnel mines. They agreed on banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines. Twenty-six years later, these explosive remnants continue causing around 5000 casualties per year. This number is significantly rising. In 2020, Syria was most affected by anti-personnel mines with at least 2729 casualties.
- [EDIRPA: Latest Advancement in EU Defence Procurement Regulation](https://finabel.org/edirpa-latest-advancement-in-eu-defence-procurement-regulation/) - In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe has been battling a series of challenges, including the pressing need to fortify its defence capabilities. This realisation has led to significant developments in the EU’s defence policy landscape, including adopting the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through the Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) in October 2023. This Act’s adoption symbolises Europe’s determined response to the evolving security dynamics on the continent and the world stage.
- [U.S. Integrated Deterrence and Europe’s Strategic Autonomy: Issues for Deterring Russia](https://finabel.org/u-s-integrated-deterrence-and-europes-strategic-autonomy-issues-for-deterring-russia/) - The Ukraine war has had a myriad of geopolitics outputs in Europe, from grain commerce, energy supply, and to defence architecture of the continent. For the latter concept, it is well known that the United States plays a significant role in the deterrence equation through NATO (NATO, 2022). Nevertheless, the situation before Russian aggression is likely to change, and the burden of forward posture efforts from the different allies will be realigned.
- [The Sahel Crisis - What is Happening in Niger? Foreign Actors and Further Developments.](https://finabel.org/the-sahel-crisis-what-is-happening-in-niger-foreign-actors-and-further-developments/) - Today, Niger hosts Niger Air Base 201—the US’s largest drone base (Jones, 2023), located in the city of Agadez—which is used to monitor extremist groups (Gordon, 2023), and to which, “as a precautionary measure” (Mitchell, 2023) after 26 July, the US repositioned a portion of its personnel. Following the coup, which the US only acknowledged as such on 10 October (Miller, 2023), monitoring drone flights were suspended; as of mid-September, they have slowly and discreetly resumed (Gordon, 2023).
- [Italy’s New Defence Plan: Nuclear Readiness Exercises, New German Tanks and Billions in Expenditures](https://finabel.org/italys-new-defence-plan-nuclear-readiness-exercises-new-german-tanks-and-billions-in-expenditures/) - The commitment of Prime Minister Meloni to military spending became tangible after the Defence Ministry released, with an unusual delay of six months, its budget projections for 2023-2025. Integrated expenditures for defence are set to reach an all-time high of €31.4 billion in 2025, a €2 billion increase from 2022. Italian expenses for procurement are expected to rise by 43% in the next two years, with €4.6 billion allocated to thirteen new military programmes.
- [Eastern EU Members Rearm after the Russian Invasion: Soaring Military Expenditures, Tank Modernisation and Two New Rising Axes of Army Interoperability](https://finabel.org/eastern-eu-members-rearm-after-the-russian-invasion-soaring-military-expenditures-tank-modernisation-and-two-new-rising-axes-of-army-interoperability/) - After the annexation of Crimea, every EU country that was either associated within the Warsaw Pact or part of the Soviet Union became a founding member of the Bucharest Nine (B9) initiative to discuss defence concerns in yearly summits. In those countries, now increasingly referred to as ‘Europe’s eastern flank’, allied military presence increased sevenfold to 300,000 units just four months into the Russian invasion. Their unyielding defence intent, stated during NATO’s summit in Vilnius, is reflected in B9’s growing military spending, which is bound to shape NATO’s most prominent defence transformation and modernisation effort since the Cold War.
- [Is the Western Support for Ukraine Beginning to Falter? - Cracks from the US and Eastern Europe](https://finabel.org/is-the-western-support-for-ukraine-beginning-to-falter-cracks-from-the-us-and-eastern-europe/) - Some of the most consequential NATO member states (MSs) which have played a major role in providing financial, military, and humanitarian aid to Kyiv since the beginning of the Ukrainian war, are now reassessing their position in this conflict. Having been the leading forces in sustaining the Ukrainian military effort against the Russian military, they are now displaying a decreasing tendency to continue on the path followed until now.
- [The Sahel Crisis - What is Happening in Niger? A First Look](https://finabel.org/the-sahel-crisis-what-is-happening-in-niger-a-first-look/) - On 26 July 2023, the military seized power in Niger. General Abdourahamane Tchiani, leader of the Presidential Guard, declared himself head of state, completing the second coup d’état that the country has seen in the last decade, and the fifth since its independence. Four days later, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) issued a one-week ultimatum to the junta: they demanded that President Mohamed Bazoum be restored to power, threatening to impose sanctions and to “use military force in Niger if necessary”.
- [Is the United Nations Security Council's Practice of Authorising CSDP's Military Operations Incompatible with the EU's Ambition to Become a Major Player in the International Arena? The Demand for a new Legitimacy for CSDP deployments.](https://finabel.org/is-the-united-nations-security-councils-practice-of-authorising-csdps-military-operations-incompatible-with-the-eus-ambition-to-become-a-major-player-in-the-international-arena-the-demand-for-a/) - The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is authorised to take action in accordance with international law, including resorting to the use of armed force, in order to address threats to international peace and security (Article 42 of the United Nations Charter). The collaboration between the European Union (EU) and the relevant parties has played a pivotal role in upholding world peace and security and this partnership is merely one facet of the various modes of cooperation established between these two entities.
- [Digital Resilience. A New Contribution Agreement Between the EU Commission and ESA for the EU Connectivity Programme.](https://finabel.org/digital-resilience-a-new-contribution-agreement-between-the-eu-commission-and-esa-for-the-eu-connectivity-programme/) - The EU Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA) have just signed a Contribution Agreement as part of the EU Secure Connectivity Programme. Established in the first trimester of 2023, the EU Secure Connectivity Programme provides for the creation of Iris2 (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite), promoting digital autonomy and strategic relevance for the EU.
- [The Aerial Chessboard: Russian Aviation's Struggles Against Ukraine's Ground Defences](https://finabel.org/the-aerial-chessboard-russian-aviations-struggles-against-ukraines-ground-defences/) - After one year and a half of war, none of the belligerents achieved to take the upper hand in the air. Air superiority in the Ukrainian sky is still denied to Russia. Why is the Russian Aerospace Force (VKS), theoretically superior by number and by equipment, having difficulties against the outnumbered Ukraine Air Force? What conclusions should Europeans armies draw from this modern interstate war?
- [Towards A New Era Of European Defence: The First-Ever EU Live Military Exercises.](https://finabel.org/towards-a-new-era-of-european-defence-the-first-ever-eu-live-military-exercises/) - “Today we are creating a new page for European defence”, declared Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on the first-ever EU live military exercises (MILEX) that are taking place in the Rota Naval base in Southern Spain this week (Euronews, 2023).
- [Vietnam has Upgraded Ties with the United States to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’.](https://finabel.org/vietnam-has-upgraded-ties-with-the-united-states-to-a-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/) - The US-Vietnam relationship has entered a new diplomatic phase. Ties between both countries greatly strengthened following the G20 Summit in New Delhi, as the US President Joseph Biden was received in Hanoi by Nguyen Phu Trong, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee (The White House, 2023). During the summit, both leaders agreed to upgrade the US-Vietnam relationship to the status of a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (CSP) (Tatarski, 2023). As proclaimed jointly by the two leaders, this new status contributes to peace, cooperation, and prosperity (The White House, 2023).
- [Towards the Implementation of the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)](https://finabel.org/towards-the-implementation-of-the-european-defence-industry-reinforcement-through-common-procurement-act-edirpa/) - On October 9, the Council of the EU adopted a regulation establishing an instrument that further paves the way for the entry into force of the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). This new instrument involves a €300 million budget that provides partial reimbursement to Member States jointly purchasing capabilities through consortia of at least three Members. Further conditions are set out for EDIRPA. Contractors and subcontractors must be established and must have their executive management structure in the EU or in an associated country. Moreover, at least 65 percent of the end products’ components must originate from the EU or an associated country.
- [EU Divided on Status of Palestine Aid Following Hamas Attack on Israel](https://finabel.org/eu-divided-on-status-of-palestine-aid-following-hamas-attack-on-israel/) - On October 7, Hamas launched a massive surprise attack on Israel (see Clarke, 2023). The Commission’s response so far has been a rare display of internal disunity, as Commissioner Várhelyi (2023a; 2023b) announced on October 9 that the EU would review and immediately suspend all aid to Palestine only for Commissioner Lenarčič (2023) to contradict him, saying that humanitarian aid would continue for as long as needed. Later, on October 9, the European Commission issued a statement confirming that it will not suspend aid, but that it is launching an urgent aid review (2023).
- [A Humanitarian Crisis With Catastrophic Outlooks: The Impact Of The Lachin Corridor Blockade Within The Armenian-Azeri Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh](https://finabel.org/a-humanitarian-crisis-with-catastrophic-outlooks-the-impact-of-the-lachin-corridor-blockade-within-the-armenian-azeri-conflict-over-nagorno-karabakh/) - Since hostilities revamped in September 2020 after a long latency period, the ethnic Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh has suffered from inhuman and degrading treatment by the Azeri forces trying to restate control over the contended province. Notwithstanding the presence of Russian peacekeepers and the conditions imposed by the ceasefire agreement reached after the Second Karabakh War, Baku restricted locals’ freedom of movement with measures like the blockade on the Lachin Corridor, which represents the only road connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.
- [Are Drones A War Game Changer? The Ukrainian Case](https://finabel.org/are-drones-a-war-game-changer-the-ukrainian-case/) - We cannot ignore or underestimate any more the increasingly important role that drones play in contemporary wars. The argument for which the usage of drones is dramatically changing historically deep-rooted war dynamics and allowing for quick military takeovers by those who more largely recur to these technologies still does not find a general consensus. However, the fact that their use is surging and having an impact on the conduct of modern warfare is undisputable.
- [Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s Visit to France and Italy to Boost Cooperation with the Two](https://finabel.org/indian-defence-minister-rajnath-singhs-visit-to-france-and-italy-to-boost-cooperation-with-the-two/) - On 9 October 2023, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh embarked on a diplomatic visit to France and Italy that will last until the 12th of the same month. Singh is set to meet with his Italian and French counterparts, Guido Crisetto and Sebastien Lecornu, to bolster the Indian strategic defence partnership with these nations and explore opportunities for military industry cooperation.
- [European Main Battle Tank: Momentum for Interoperability](https://finabel.org/european-main-battle-tank-momentum-for-interoperability/) - The land forces operations paradigm demands a series of cornerstones to be effective on the ground. In that context, a crucial feature is the tank, a weapon that has proven to be fundamental in the ground force realm since its creation. The future of Europe is to operate in collaborative frameworks thus, creating a tank collaborative framework is essential. However, the reality shows that there are problems in pursuing this objective.
- [How can a Commercial Action Hide Security Threats: Chinese Investments in EU Critical Infrastructure](https://finabel.org/how-can-a-commercial-action-hide-security-threats-chinese-investments-in-eu-critical-infrastructure/) - The means by which the People’s Republic of China is seeking to become a global power capable of competing with the United States have been various throughout the years and mainly based on economic actions that can tie China with other countries and allow it to exert influence in the area.
- [Defence and Security Outsourcing within the Common Security and Defence Policy](https://finabel.org/defence-and-security-outsourcing-within-the-common-security-and-defence-policy/) - The controversial involvement of the Wagner Group in Ukraine and Russia’s domestic politics has recently shed light on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). Before that, the American PMSC Blackwater, now Academi, also drew public attention for misconduct during its involvement in Iraq (Singer, 2007). While outsourcing defence and security tasks to private actors by public authorities dates back centuries, PMSCs are a strictly post-Cold War trend (Singer, 2003).
- [The Imperative of Joint Procurement in Europe: Defragmenting our Defence Industry](https://finabel.org/the-imperative-of-joint-procurement-in-europe-defragmenting-our-defence-industry/) - The 2023 ‘Future Shocks’ report of the European Parliamentary Research Service points out the drastic changes to the European security landscape following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the return of war on European soil (EPRS, 2023). Europe faces a multi-faceted conventional and non-conventional threat that requires short-, medium-, and long-term action from European policymakers (Anghel, 2023). The European defence architecture ought to be transformed deeply to face the new geostrategic urgency (Anghel, 2023). The key lies in greater and more collaborative investments. It is both economically and strategically untenable to operate in silos when it comes to defence. Billions are lost every year and defence capabilities remain insufficient, outdated, and lack interoperability. Should Europeans have any hope of holding a leading role in the geopolitical environment of today, it is imperative to increase collaborative efforts across the EU.
- [Financing the Defence Industry – A Comparison of the Investment Climate in the European Union, United States and China](https://finabel.org/financing-the-defence-industry-a-comparison-of-the-investment-climate-in-the-european-union-united-states-and-china/) - The global military expenditure rose by 3.7 per cent in real terms in 2022 to a record high of $2.24 trillion (Tian et al., 2023). The United States, China and the European Union (as the aggregated national expenditures of its member countries) make up the three largest (see first chart). Given the rising demand, governments and the defence industry are increasing their investments. Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each market will be essential in determining the necessary steps forward.
- [From New Generation Warfare to Lost Generation Warfare: Training Deficiencies of the Russian Battalion Tactical Groups](https://finabel.org/from-new-generation-warfare-to-lost-generation-warfare-training-deficiencies-of-the-russian-battalion-tactical-groups/) - Since the Russian invasion of Crimea, Western military analysts had difficulty defining Russia’s art of war. The scholarly descriptions ranged from ‘fourth-generation warfare’ to ‘non-linear warfare’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ (Czekaj & Howeverd, 2019, p. 179). However, prominent Russian scholars, such as Slipchenko, Major General Vladimirov and General Gareev offered an alternative concept to distance themselves from the Western rational framework.
- [EU Missions in Somalia: Successes, Challenges and Future Prospects](https://finabel.org/eu-missions-in-somalia-successes-challenges-and-future-prospects/) - Since the overthrow of dictator Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has been widely considered a failed state. For over three decades, the country has been afflicted by violent conflict, clan rivalries, corruption, piracy, terrorism and humanitarian disasters. These issues have had significant implications for regional and global security and stability, prompting numerous international interventions. While there have been notable successes, Somalia continues to face substantial challenges towards lasting peace, security, and socio-economic development.
- [Switzerland Reintegrates Bunkers into the National Defence Strategy due to Russo-Ukrainian War](https://finabel.org/switzerland-reintegrates-bunkers-into-the-national-defence-strategy-due-to-russo-ukrainian-war/) - On 18 September 2023, Lieutenant General Süssli announced that Switzerland will halt the selling of bunkers and reintegrate them within the national defence strategy. This decision marks a significant change to Switzerland’s previous policy (Allen, 2023, para. 2). In 2010, the Swiss Defence Minister Maurer stated: “The nature of military threats has changed. The bunkers are poorly placed and the weapons they contain will only last for another ten or twenty years. It's not worth maintaining something that you're not going to use in the future” (Allen, 2023, para. 4).
- [Restructuring the European Defence Industry: Consolidation and Internationalisation](https://finabel.org/restructuring-the-european-defence-industry-consolidation-and-internationalisation/) - Defence constitutes a rather atypical industrial sector. Due to the sensitive nature of its products, it has long been strictly protected by states and ‘placed outside the bounds of free-market economy’. Countries with a relevant industrial base have traditionally sought self-sufficiency in arms production for national security. States’ control over their domestic industry has frequently slowed or even hindered attempts at cross-border European cooperation. This has ultimately resulted in a significant fragmentation of the European defence industry.
- [Germany Back with France on MGCS after Rumours of a Separate Tank Project with Italy, Spain and Sweden](https://finabel.org/germany-back-with-france-on-mgcs-after-rumours-of-a-separate-tank-project-with-italy-spain-and-sweden/) - On 11 September, Handelsblatt (2023) reported that Germany was moving away from the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), a Franco-German joint venture for the development of a next-generation main battle tank (MBT). On 22 September, however, a new meeting between the French and German MoDs rebuilt hope for the project, although postponing its delivery up to 2045 (Kayali et al., 2023).
- [New Anti-Tank Missiles for the Belgian Armed Forces and the Development of European BLOS Capabilities](https://finabel.org/new-anti-tank-missiles-for-the-belgian-armed-forces-and-the-development-of-european-blos-capabilities/) - The Belgian Armed Forces will be supplied with 761 AKERON MP missiles. They will be integrated into Jaguar EBRC vehicles procured by Belgium under the Capacités Motorisée (CaMo) partnership. Delivery will begin in 2025 and is expected to continue until 2029. The new missiles are intended to replace SPIKE missiles, which will probably remain in service until 2030 (Army Recognition, 2023).
- [Speeding Up The Operationalisation of The Rapid Deployment Capacity: The EU Gets Ready For The MILEX 23 Crisis Management Exercise](https://finabel.org/speeding-up-the-operationalisation-of-the-rapid-deployment-capacity-the-eu-gets-ready-for-the-milex-23-crisis-management-exercise/) - The European Union is preparing itself to hold its first live crisis management exercise as part of the incremental operationalisation of its Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) by 2025, aiming to enhance the designated EU Headquarters’ ability to plan, execute and oversee a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operation by incorporating a live Battle Group-sized element (EEAS, 2023). In the long haul, the RDC should allow the deployment of a 5,000-troop modular force at different stages of an operation (entry, reinforcement or as reserve force) in a non-permissive environment (Cyber Risk, n.d.).
- [Zelenskyy To Replace Defence Minister](https://finabel.org/zelenskyy-to-replace-defence-minister/) - On 3 September 2023, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the replacement of the country’s defence minister. The cabinet reshuffle was made despite the apparent progress of Kyiv’s counteroffensive, which has seen its forces advancing into Russian-occupied areas. Oleksiy Reznikov’s dismissal as defence chief represents the most significant alteration within this government since Russia launched its full-scale invasion last year.
- [Sweden, Türkiye, and NATO: Rational choices leading to a breakdown in negotiations?](https://finabel.org/sweden-turkiye-and-nato-rational-choices-leading-to-a-breakdown-in-negotiations/) - Sweden’s NATO application looks as if it is on the cusp of derailing once more after 21 August comments from Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In the context of Sweden’s NATO application, Erdoğan asserted that “Sweden must first of all take care of the streets of Stockholm. If they don’t take care of their streets, if these attacks on the things we hold sacred continue, then they shouldn’t blame us”. This statement follows a summer of Qur’an burnings that have soured Sweden’s relations with most of the Muslim world, Türkiye included, severely increased the risk of terror attacks on Sweden and motivated direct threats by militant Islamist groups.
- [The 2023 G20 Summit: Addressing Russia's War Against Ukraine.](https://finabel.org/the-2023-g20-summit-addressing-russias-war-against-ukraine/) - On 9-10 September, world leaders gathered at the 18th G20 Summit to discuss the prevalent issues facing the world in New Delhi, India. This year’s edition theme: ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ or ‘one earth, one family, one future’. Issues of global economic growth along with climate concerns, digitalisation, and gender equality were on the agenda (European Council, Council of the European Union, 2023). However, one topic overshadowed all others: Russia’s war against Ukraine (Bose et al., 2023).
- [Extrapolating EU’s Potential In Mutual Defence From Its Founding Treaties: The Added Value Of Art. 42(7) TEU And Art. 222 TFEU.](https://finabel.org/extrapolating-eus-potential-in-mutual-defence-from-its-founding-treaties-the-added-value-of-art-427-teu-and-art-222-tfeu/) - The EU founding treaties enshrine two clauses in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)., These clauses oblige Member States to coordinate their efforts through the Council of the EU to support a Member State suffering from armed aggression, terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters. Over time, they have come to be referred to as the mutual assistance clause (Art. 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union, TEU) and the solidarity clause (Art. 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU).
- [The 1997 Ottawa Convention and the Use of Anti-Personnel Landmines in the Ukraine War](https://finabel.org/the-1997-ottawa-convention-and-the-use-of-anti-personnel-landmines-in-the-ukraine-war/) - More than 26 years have passed since the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction of 1997, usually referred to as the Ottawa Convention, was signed. However, it has not reached its goal of eradicating such weapons since the conclusion of the agreement over 40 years ago. Indeed, it is estimated that landmines killed or maimed more than 5,500 people in 2021, mainly civilians, half of whom were children.
- [Slow But Steady Progress On Ukraine’s Path Towards NATO And EU Accession As Joint Declarations Get Signed In Athens](https://finabel.org/slow-but-steady-progress-on-ukraines-path-towards-nato-and-eu-accession-as-joint-declarations-get-signed-in-athens/) - On 21 August, as part of his tour around European capitals, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stopped in Athens for a bilateral summit with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. The two signed a joint declaration to reiterate their mutual commitment to Ukraine’s efforts to access NATO in the short-term period (Ekathimerini, 2023). At the same time, while stressing the vital nature of Kyiv’s domestic security to ensure stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, the parties expressed their full support for the newly established NATO-Ukraine Council as a forum to further expand cooperation and consolidate Kyiv’s entrance in the Euro-Atlantic family (Interfax Ukraine, 2023). Along these lines, the text of the declaration begins with Greece acknowledging Ukraine’s achievements towards integration with NATO, with special regard to Kyiv’s armed forces’ efforts in the realm of military interoperability (Amna, 2023).
- [A New Military Junta Rises To Power In ex-French Africa: Gabon’s Long-Standing President Is Ousted Based On Election Fraud And Corruption Accusations](https://finabel.org/a-new-military-junta-rises-to-power-in-ex-french-africa-gabons-long-standing-president-is-ousted-based-on-election-fraud-and-corruption-accusations/) - On Wednesday 30 August, a group of men in army uniforms unseated Gabon’s long-serving president Ali Bongo Ondimba just a few minutes after he won re-election in highly contested presidential elections (Yeung, 2023). The vote had seen the governing Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) consolidating its majority in both houses of parliament, thus guaranteeing Ali Bongo over 64% of the votes cast and a third consecutive term in office (Bonny, 2023). Whilst seizing power, the newly established junta declared the election to be fraudulent, temporarily curtailed the Internet to allegedly prevent the spread of misinformation, shut the country’s borders ‘until further notice’, refused to allow vessels to leave the post of the capital Libreville, imposed a nightly curfew and dissolved ‘all the institutions of the republic’ (BBC News, 2023; Yeung, 2023; VOA News, 2023; Rédaction Africanews, 2023).
- [Interoperability and Flexibility: Military Engagement During the Covid-19 Pandemic](https://finabel.org/interoperability-and-flexibility-military-engagement-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/) - European militaries are not only engaged in defence missions abroad. They are also active in national search and rescue activities and natural disaster response, with one prominent example being the inclusion of soldiers to combat the Covid-19 pandemic.
- [Interoperability is Vital to Combat Violent Non-State Actors](https://finabel.org/interoperability-is-vital-to-combat-violent-non-state-actors/) - The 21st century has seen the rise of “new wars” in which violent non-state actors (VNSAs) employ tactical means of asymmetric warfare and facilitate digital technologies for their purposes. To secure their population and stabilise the liberal international order, nation-states must deepen their cooperation and increase interoperability in strategy, operational approach, and information-sharing.
- [The Camp David Pact: United States, Japan and South Korea establish an institutional basis for a trilateral security partnership in the Indo-Pacific](https://finabel.org/the-camp-david-pact-united-states-japan-and-south-korea-establish-an-institutional-basis-for-a-trilateral-security-partnership-in-the-indo-pacific/) - On 18 August, U.S., Japanese and South Korean leaders held a trilateral summit at the Camp David presidential retreat, in Maryland, to agree on a new security pact to expand security and economic cooperation, while establishing a bulwark against the two greatest security threats in the Indo-Pacific region, i.e., North Korea and China. The choice of such setting had a two-fold significance: first, following the footsteps of the US-brokered peace between Israel and Egypt in 1978, it marked the opportunity for Tokyo and Seoul to consolidate a long-meditated rapprochement after decades-long grievances between them. In this line, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol decided, not without domestic discontent, to put past the memories of Japanese occupation in the early 20th century. Secondly, it reflected the relevance attached by President Joe Biden to the initiative, especially given China’s central focus of his foreign policy.
- [Tackling the Issue of Fragmentation in the European Defence Industry](https://finabel.org/tackling-the-issue-of-fragmentation-in-the-european-defence-industry/) - The fragmented nature of the European defence industry has historically been and continues to be a prominent issue hindering its evolution. It is financially untenable, fostering duplicated systems and redundancies that induce unnecessary costs. It is also strategically problematic, impeding collaborative and cooperative efforts while preventing interoperability. At a time of a strategic shift in the European Union’s (EU) security and defence, the time has come to capitalise on the momentum and rejuvenate the European defence industry. While the work of European institutions is promising, substantial efforts will be necessary to carry this momentum further. Fostering a culture of synchronised efforts and joint projects will be the key to overcoming the bottleneck of fragmentation, unravelling at last the full potential of the European defence industry.
- [Advancing European Interoperability Standards for Unmanned Systems: The INTERACT Project](https://finabel.org/advancing-european-interoperability-standards-for-unmanned-systems-the-interact-project/) - Unmanned systems have become indispensable in both civilian and military contexts, playing a crucial role in the contemporary operational landscape. These systems have the potential to transform the way military operations are conducted, offering improved efficiency, reduced risks to human personnel and enhanced collaborative capabilities. Nevertheless, realising their full potential requires overcoming interoperability challenges to enable diverse unmanned platforms to work together effectively when integrated within a mission operation network. The European endeavour to tackle this challenge is pursued through the Interoperability Standards for Unmanned Armed Forces Systems (INTERACT) project, aiming at developing a common basis for a European interoperability standard to enhance military operation capability. This Info Flash explores the growing capabilities of unmanned systems in military operations and delves into the complex challenge of interoperability, highlighting the role of the European INTERACT project in enhancing the efficiency and cooperation capabilities of European armed forces.
- [Italy Might Join the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) Initiative](https://finabel.org/italy-might-join-the-main-ground-combat-system-mgcs-initiative/) - On 24 August, La Tribune reported that France and Italy agreed on proposing to Germany Rome’s inclusion, represented by Leonardo, a prominent Italian defence company, in the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) programme (Cabirol, 2023). The MGCS aims to develop a future land warfare system that includes a Main Battle Tank (MBT) around 2040 (Oestergaard, 2021). This news was unsurprising since Italian participation had already been envisaged (Valpolini, 2020; Arivella & Moran, 2022). Until now, Paris has opposed the inclusion of other states. However, this move reflects an effort to restore balance in the initiative’s power dynamics, taking advantage of the fruitful history of Franco-Italian defence industrial cooperation (Defence Industry Europe, 2023; Meta Défense, 2023).
- [Navigating the Complex Realities of Strategic Autonomy – And Where That Leaves European Defence](https://finabel.org/navigating-the-complex-realities-of-strategic-autonomy-and-where-that-leaves-european-defence/) - The term was first adopted in the European Commission’s Communication Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector of 2013, whereby a ‘certain degree of strategic autonomy’ is necessary ‘to be a credible and reliable partner’ (European Commission, 2013, p. 3). The Communication posits that ‘Europe must be able to decide and to act without depending on the capabilities of third parties’ (European Commission, 2013, p. 3). Special notice is given to the security of supply, access to critical technologies and operational sovereignty (European Commission, 2013, p. 3).
- [Diplomatic Changes in China: Understanding the Unforeseen Replacement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs](https://finabel.org/diplomatic-changes-in-china-understanding-the-unforeseen-replacement-of-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs/) - Since his last public appearance during a diplomatic meeting alongside Sri Lankan and Vietnamese foreign ministers in Beijing on 25 June, Qin Gang, the then Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, has vanished from the public eye (Le Monde, 2023). This unexpected turn of events has triggered a surge of inquiries within the global political landscape. Curiously, his disappearance has been followed by a sequence of intriguing developments, including his abrupt removal from the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and the subsequent appointment of Wang Yi, his predecessor, as his replacement (Ng, 2023). China’s response to the unfolding situation has been characterised by attempts to downplay the affair’s significance. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Mao Ning addressed the matter during a routine press briefing in Beijing, dismissing the speculations surrounding Qin Gang’s absence as ‘malicious conjecture’ and asserting that pertinent information would be revealed in due course (France 24, 2023). Nevertheless, key details about Qin Gang’s current status and the rationale behind his dismissal from office remain ambiguous. Notably, a conspicuous omission of more than 20 queries concerning Qin Gang from the official press conference records has raised legitimate questions (Davidson, 2023).
- [The European Union Mission in Armenia: Potential for Expansion in the South Caucasus?](https://finabel.org/the-european-union-mission-in-armenia-potential-for-expansion-in-the-south-caucasus/) - Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenian-Azeri ethnic tensions in the South Caucasus have severely escalated. This culminated in the First Karabakh War between 1988 and 1994, where Armenia prevailed (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 2006). The war concluded without a formal peace agreement and Armenia took control of border territories internationally acknowledged as Azerbaijani (Mulcaire, 2015). This included Nagorno-Karabakh, a region within Azerbaijan inhabited by an ethnically Armenian population that has historically been governed by an autonomous Armenian administration (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 2006). This region has been the focal point of the recent conflict. This Info Flash will examine the ongoing Armenian-Azerbaijani border crises, which especially affects the welfare and human rights of the Nagorno-Karabakh region’s population. It will discuss the complex alliances and balance of forces in the South Caucasus. This is essential to understanding the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), an ongoing EU operation seeking to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
- [6th Generation Fighter Jets Development Implications for European Air Forces Interoperability](https://finabel.org/6th-generation-fighter-jets-development-implications-for-european-air-forces-interoperability/) - Through a winding journey European industrial cooperation developed the 4th generation Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet in the early 2000s (Heinrich, 2015). European countries, however, eventually missed an opportunity with the following generation, relying instead on the American-made F-35 Lightning II. Therefore, European states are now eager to make up for lost ground by developing a 6th generation fighter jet. Two parallel projects are underway. Firstly, France, Germany and Spain are jointly working on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a programme intended to develop a Next Generation Weapon System (NGWS) with a Next Generation Fighter (NGF) at its core. Second, Japan recently joined the UK and Italy in developing the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a follow-up of the Tempest project similarly intended to deliver a 6th generation fighter.
- [The Netherlands and Denmark pledge to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine after green light being given by the U.S.](https://finabel.org/the-netherlands-and-denmark-pledge-to-send-f-16-fighter-jets-to-ukraine-after-green-light-being-given-by-the-u-s/) - On August 20, the governments of the Netherlands and Denmark issued a joint statement to announce the intention to deliver F-16s fighter aircraft to Ukraine (Government of the Netherlands, 2023). Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen pledged to send 19 aircrafts in three instalments, while Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte did not specify any number (Sabbagh, 2023). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, for his part, claimed they reached an agreement for 42 fighter jets (Sabbagh, 2023).
- [North Korea’s Military Demonstration: Strategic Cruise Missile Test Amid US-South Korea Drills.](https://finabel.org/north-koreas-military-demonstration-strategic-cruise-missile-test-amid-us-south-korea-drills/) - On 21 August, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un oversaw a test-firing of strategic cruise missiles from a navy ship, as the state media agency Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported. This event coincided with the annual joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea (Reuters, 2023). Known as the ‘Ulchi Freedom Shield’, these drills are primarily computer-simulated command post exercises designed to enhance coordination and readiness in responding to potential security threats (Kim, 2023).
- [Tensions Mount Along NATO’s Eastern Flank as Belarus Conducts Military Provocations Around The Suwałki Gap.](https://finabel.org/tensions-mount-along-natos-eastern-flank-as-belarus-conducts-military-provocations-around-the-suwalki-gap/) - On 1 August, two Belarusian military helicopters violated Poland’s airspace by shortly flying over Białowieża, a village not far from the border between the two countries (Brzezinski, 2023). The Polish media outlet Onet deemed such incursion a provocation (Chiappa, 2023). The following week, the alert threshold was raised as Minsk held military exercises in the Grodno region, which were simulating real-combat situations, according to the Belarusian Defence Ministry (Teslova, 2023).
- [Looking Back On The Vilnius Summit Outcomes: What Is Next For NATO And The Euro-Atlantic Security Landscape?](https://finabel.org/looking-back-on-the-vilnius-summit-outcomes-what-is-next-for-nato-and-the-euro-atlantic-security-landscape/) - On 11-12 July, NATO leaders held their annual summit in Vilnius amidst an unprecedented security landscape and high expectations on the steps towards enlargement and the new courses of action to preserve collective defence in the Euro-Atlantic area and states’ resilience and capacity-building. While the Alliance delivered on its core missions (collective security and crisis management), it was not as ambitious and straightforward when it came to more sensitive matters like Ukraine and Sweden’s membership paths, or partnerships in other global regions (e.g., the Asia Pacific).
- [Narrative Warfare in the Russo-Ukrainian War: A Comparison between Ukraine’s and Russia’s Strategic Communication](https://finabel.org/narrative-warfare-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war-a-comparison-between-ukraines-and-russias-strategic-communication/) - ‘We are facing the creation of a climate of fear in Ukrainian society, aggressive rhetoric, indulging neo-Nazis and militarising the country. Along with that we are witnessing not just complete dependence but direct external control […] by foreign advisers, military “development” of the territory of Ukraine and deployment of NATO infrastructure’ (Putin, 2021).
- [Constitutional Tension and Japanese Remilitarisation](https://finabel.org/constitutional-tension-and-japanese-remilitarisation/) - Following the end of World War Two, Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers and administrated by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur. While occupying the nation, the US oversaw the drafting of a new constitution that prioritised democracy, individual freedoms and pacifism. Japan’s shift towards pacifism is enshrined in Article 9 of its Constitution and formed a central part of its foreign policy for decades. This research paper seeks to understand how Japan has shifted away from Article 9 and began the process of remilitarisation. Despite maintaining a small military capability, the Japan Self-Defence Force, Japan has relied heavily on its alliance with the US to protect its interests internationally. In recent decades, Japan has taken further steps to increase the size and strength of its military for defensive purposes but also to protect its essential interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
- [The EU as a Security Actor in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Implications of Secessionist Threats from Republika Srpska](https://finabel.org/the-eu-as-a-security-actor-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina-implications-of-secessionist-threats-from-republika-srpska/) - Approximately 100,000 people died in the 1992-1995 three-way war between the Orthodox Serbs, the Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina (The Economist, 2019). The Western-brokered Dayton Accords ultimately ended the fighting by dividing the country into two entities: the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation, where Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats share power (The Economist, 2022). The constitution adopted after the war thus implemented territorial separation along ethnic lines (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2015, p. 1). There is a risk, however, that these ethnic lines become borders. This Info Flash explores the European Union (EU) as a security actor in the region with regard to recent secessionist threats from Republika Srpska.
- [ECOWAS Imposes Sanctions Against Niger Following The 26 July Military Coup](https://finabel.org/ecowas-imposes-sanctions-against-niger-following-the-26-july-military-coup/) - On 26 July, one day after Niger’s presidential guard detained democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum, the army command endorsed the coup orchestrated by Abdourahmane Tchiani who, while declaring himself the leader of the newly established military junta, claimed that economic hardship, corruption and deteriorating security had made such move necessary (Schotte, 2023). After seizing power, the junta started to crack down on key political figures and fundamental freedoms: on 30 July, it arrested the ministers of petroleum, education and mines, as well as the ruling party’s head (Mednick, 2023). Meanwhile, junta spokesman Col. Maj. Amadou Abdramane banned the use of social media to spread content which would allegedly harm national security (Mednick, 2023).
- [Tackling Corruption in the European Defence Sector: Challenges and Ways Forward](https://finabel.org/tackling-corruption-in-the-european-defence-sector-challenges-and-ways-forward/) - On 9 December 2022, Eva Kaili, Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and then one of the institution’s fourteen Vice Presidents, was arrested in possession of €150,000 in cash (Malingre & Stroobants, 2023). Kaili was subsequently charged with corruption, expelled from the Socialists & Democrats group in the European Parliament and suspended in her role of Vice President (Stamouli, 2022). The charges brought against Kaili were partly the result of a broader investigation into Qatari, Moroccan and Mauritanian influence over European officials in which €1.5m was seized and four individuals were charged with corruption (Matriche et al., 2022). This scandal raised awareness on the issue of corruption and rendered evident that its presence remains a reality. European officials have started to pay increasing attention to the issue since then and are proposing tougher measures to counter corruption. At a time when the European defence industry is booming, it is crucial to be wary of the risks of corruption that this entails.
- [Defence Populism: The Fixation on Sovereignty and Its Effects on Security and Interoperability](https://finabel.org/defence-populism-the-fixation-on-sovereignty-and-its-effects-on-security-and-interoperability/) - Right-wing populists are increasingly competing for government participation, occasionally with success. Austria, Finland, Sweden, Hungary, Italy and Poland are just a few examples of European Union (EU) Member States that have seen populist parties as part of the governing coalition in recent years (Destradi et al., 2021, p. 663). While this kind of politics often seems far from military operations and their technical nature, they determine the resources and attention given to them. Populists often find other priorities than multilateral defence cooperation (Ivaldi & Zankina, 2023). This is particularly concerning at a time when European security is under threat. Less military support for Ukraine may, for example, directly affect the security situation in the rest of Europe. This Info Flash will investigate the impact of right-wing populism in EU Member States on defence and security matters, particularly on interoperability. To achieve this, I will first analyse the existing literature on defence populism. After that, these findings will be synthesised, tying them to EU security policies and the interoperability of land forces. At last, concluding remarks shall be made.
- [The Maturation and Future of India-U.S. Defence Relations](https://finabel.org/the-maturation-and-future-of-india-u-s-defence-relations/) - This Info Flash provides a historical analysis of the progression of India-U.S. defence relations and its implication on the Indo-Pacific. Despite decades of apathy during the Cold War, there has been a rapid progression in India-U.S. defence cooperation amidst India’s emergence as a critical global governance actor. This is none more evident in the country’s membership and role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), BRICS and its current G20 chairmanship (Panda, 2020). As such, one cannot overlook the saliency of India-U.S. defence relations, particularly in its implications on the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, this Info Flash will briefly parse through the origins of India-U.S. defence relations and its dynamic progression since the post-Soviet era. This will provide the groundwork to assess the future of India-U.S. defence relations in the coming years.
- [NATO Maritime Forces Conduct a Mine Countermeasures Exercise in the Mediterranean Sea](https://finabel.org/nato-maritime-forces-conduct-a-mine-countermeasures-exercise-in-the-mediterranean-sea/) - On 27 July, seven NATO warships from the UK, Italy, Türkiye and the United States took part in a mine countermeasures exercise in the Central Mediterranean Sea. The drill was under the combined leadership of NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 (SNMCMG2).
- [The EU Adopts New Sanctions Against Belarus Amid Heightened Tensions on the Belarus-Polish Border](https://finabel.org/the-eu-adopts-new-sanctions-against-belarus-amid-heightened-tensions-on-the-belarus-polish-border/) - On 3 August, the European Union (EU) passed a new round of sanctions targeting individuals and entities in Belarus (European Council, 2023). These sanctions were introduced amid escalating tensions along the Polish-Belarusian border. On 1 August 2023, Poland accused Belarus of violating its airspace south of the Suwałki Gap (Haq et al., 2023). Belarusian helicopters were reportedly spotted flying over Polish territory at low altitudes, making radar detection difficult (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023). This incident led to heightened military activity, with Wagner troops, in collaboration with Belarusian forces, and Polish troops rushing to their respective sides of the border (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023). Additionally, on 7 August 2023, Belarus also started a military exercise, resulting in an even more tense international environment (AP News, 2023).
- [EU Military Mobility: An Obstacle Race To Turn Long-Standing Pledges Into A Defence Policy Flagship](https://finabel.org/eu-military-mobility-an-obstacle-race-to-turn-long-standing-pledges-into-a-defence-policy-flagship/) - In the unstable world we live in, military mobility becomes a paramount condition for states to maintain domestic, regional and international security. In the European Union’s case, it enables Member States’ armed forces to respond to crises breaking out at the external borders or beyond; bolsters transport infrastructure’s efficiency; avoids delays in cross-border military transits (displacement of personnel, materiel and assets) in and outside the EU territory; and ensures the alignment of efforts with partners like NATO by increasing inter-state policy synergies.
- [(In)Security Outcomes from the Coup in Niger](https://finabel.org/insecurity-outcomes-from-the-coup-in-niger/) - On the night of 25 July and 26, Niger experienced a coup which resulted in the arrest of President Bazoum by Chief Abdourahmane Tchiani, the leader of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Nation (CSNP) military junta, who claimed legitimate executive and legislative power in the country. Located in the Sahel region, Niger shares borders with Algeria and Libya to the north, Chad to the east, Nigeria and Benin to the south, and Burkina Faso and Mali to the west.
- [A Ticket For Russians Inside The EU: The Golden Passports](https://finabel.org/a-ticket-for-russians-inside-the-eu-the-golden-passports/) - On 21 March 2023, the European Commission brought an action before the Court of Justice of the EU, claiming that the republic of Malta is in violation of article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union and compromises the integrity of EU citizenship. This action is a consequence of the Maltese practices of issuing passports to non-EU citizens for which the government receives financial compensation instead. This lucrative business is made possible by national laws; however, the problem lies in the fact that European citizenship is acquired automatically when acquiring national citizenship and, thus, the holder of the national citizenship has access to the entire EU. Moreover, not only the Maltese government uses this practice, but also the Bulgarian and Cypriot governments offered their passports for the right price, although the latter two officially stopped doing so in 2022 and 2020, respectively. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the question must be asked: how desirable it is that access is offered by individual member states to citizens of nations EU member states have sanctions drawn up? Can the EU prevent the issuance of passports and, furthermore, impose a revocation?
- [Overcoming Challenges: Advancing the MGCs Future Main Battle Tank](https://finabel.org/overcoming-challenges-advancing-the-mgcs-future-main-battle-tank/) - On 10 July of this year, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius and his French counterpart Sebastien Lecornu met in Berlin to discuss the advancement of the long-planned MGCS (Main Ground Combat System) project. The two ministers reinforced the willingness of their respective governments to push forward with the joint procurement of a new generation tank capable of integrating the technologies and characteristics needed on the battlefield of the future, drawing from the lessons of the ongoing Ukrainian war. The cooperation between the two countries on the MGCS tanks was part of a larger package of joint procurements agreed upon between Macron and Merkel's administrations in January 2019. It included a fighter jet (FCAS), an armed drone, artillery systems and a maritime reconnaissance aircraft
- [Türkiye’s Objection to Sweden’s NATO Bid: Concessions and its Final Path into the Alliance](https://finabel.org/turkiyes-objection-to-swedens-nato-bid-concessions-and-its-final-path-into-the-alliance/) - More than a year has passed since Finland and Sweden jointly submitted their applications to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on 18 May 2022. Since then, neither of the countries has achieved their desired outcome of swiftly becoming a member of NATO. Unlike Sweden, Finland initially faced a veto from Türkiye. However, this block was eventually lifted following multiple rounds of negotiations, after which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recognised that the issue of ‘Kurdish terrorist activity in Finland had been addressed.
- [The EU Military Committee: Dissecting the Reference Body for Inter-state Military Consultation and Cooperation on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management.](https://finabel.org/the-eu-military-committee-dissecting-the-reference-body-for-inter-state-military-consultation-and-cooperation-on-conflict-prevention-and-crisis-management/) - At the Helsinki European Council on 10 and 11 December 1999, EU heads of state and government laid the foundations for various permanent political and military bodies: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee and Committee for Civilian Crisis Management. In the short and medium term, these actors would enable the EU to enforce its responsibilities in conflict prevention and crisis management. The Council of Ministers of the then-existing Western European Union outlined such responsibilities in the June 1992 Petersberg Declaration. It included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management.
- [EU-NATO cooperation on cyber security, defence capabilities and capacity building: changes and continuities between the 7th and 8th progress report](https://finabel.org/eu-nato-cooperation-on-cyber-security-defence-capabilities-and-capacity-building-changes-and-continuities-between-the-7th-and-8th-progress-report/) - On June 16th 2023, NATO and the EU released their 8th progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the respective Councils on December 6th 2016 and December 5th 2017. This info flash aims at identifying elements of change and continuity in bilateral cooperation dynamics compared to the 7th progress report published on June 20th 2022.On June 16th 2023, NATO and the EU released their 8th progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the respective Councils on December 6th 2016 and December 5th 2017. This info flash aims at identifying elements of change and continuity in bilateral cooperation dynamics compared to the 7th progress report published on June 20th 2022.
- [Strengths and Weaknesses in EU Member States’ Cooperation Through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Framework in Relation to Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine.](https://finabel.org/strengths-and-weaknesses-in-eu-member-states-cooperation-through-the-common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp-framework-in-relation-to-russias-full-scale-invasion-of-ukraine/) - The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has unleashed the destructive potential of modern warfare within Europe, hindering Kyiv’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while causing a massive migration wave which tested the EU’s solidarity and resilience. The EU has provided Ukraine with financial and military aid while unfolding an unprecedented response under the CFSP framework through eleven packages of sanctions against Russia
- [Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Undermining the Cluster Prohibition?](https://finabel.org/article-21-of-the-convention-on-cluster-munitions-undermining-the-cluster-prohibition/) - A diplomatic conference leading to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CoCM) was held on 30 May 2008 with the aim of banning the use of cluster munitions for all countries that ratified the Convention. Currently, 111 states are parties to the Convention and 12 are signatories. Despite the high number of participants in the treaty, success remains relative as some key major powers including the United States and Russia are missing. Furthermore, there is an important nuance reflected in the treaty concluded in Article 21, which explains that parties to the treaty are allowed to cooperate militarily with states that do use these weapons that are prohibited by the Convention (Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008). Why is there controversy regarding the use of cluster munition and what are the consequences of Article 21 CoCM?
- [Poland and The United Kingdom: An Increasingly Robust Partnership](https://finabel.org/poland-and-the-united-kingdom-an-increasingly-robust-partnership/) - The UK and Poland have what is currently being described as one of the closest partnerships within NATO (GOV.UK, 2022; Martin, 2023). This research paper will examine how this relationship has developed, with a special interest in the signing of the 2017 Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation. The 2017 Treaty encouraged cooperation between the UK and Poland in a range of areas, including multiple agreements on exchanging military equipment and training of troops. These agreements became even more relevant, and arguably essential in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
- [A Renewed Commitment to Security and Stability Abroad: the EU Extends the Mandate of Three Civilian Missions in Libya and Palestine](https://finabel.org/a-renewed-commitment-to-security-and-stability-abroad-the-eu-extends-the-mandate-of-three-civilian-missions-in-libya-and-palestine/) - On June 26th, 2023, the Council of the EU unanimously extended the mandate of three civilian missions operating under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework: the EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), the EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), and the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS). While the first mission was given a 2-year renewal, with its new deadline set on June 30th, 2025, the other two benefited from a one-year extension until June 30th, 2024, with a potential one-year extension. Most relevantly, the Council widened the scope of EUBAM Libya’s mandate, which now encapsulates ambitious objectives, such as the enhancement of state authorities and agencies’ border management capabilities, the fight against human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and counter-terrorism (Council of the EU, 2023).
- [NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) Becomes Operational](https://finabel.org/natos-defence-innovation-accelerator-for-the-north-atlantic-diana-becomes-operational/) - On June 19th, 2023, NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) became operational (NATO, 2023a). DIANA is a platform which brings together representatives from state governments, private industry and academia to help innovators and businesses design start-ups and devise common standards to capitalise on emerging and disruptive technologies in accordance with NATO’s principles of responsible use, ranging from lawfulness and accountability to traceability and governability (DIANA, n.d.).
- [The EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity Initiative: Developments, Prospects, and Challenges – True Marker of a Strategic Shift or Spectre of the Past?](https://finabel.org/the-eus-rapid-deployment-capacity-initiative-developments-prospects-and-challenges-true-marker-of-a-strategic-shift-or-spectre-of-the-past/) - Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, called for Europe’s ‘geopolitical awakening’ in the foreword of the Strategic Compass, published in March 2022. The document, which marked a strategic shift in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), aimed to make the ‘EU a stronger and more capable security provider’ (EEAS, 2022).
- [Bolstering multi-domain interoperability: NATO allies complete the Neptune Strike 23-2 exercise](https://finabel.org/bolstering-multi-domain-interoperability-nato-allies-complete-the-neptune-strike-23-2-exercise/) - From 10 to 14 July 2023, NATO carried out the enhanced vigilance activity Neptune Strike 23-2, (NEST 23.2). Participating states engaged in joint training and exercises across several maritime areas to integrate NATO’s naval strike and air power capabilities (Haider, 2023). NEST 23.2 marked the second iteration of the Project Neptune cycle of exercises in 2023, allowing participating military forces to boost deterrence and assurance in the Euro-Atlantic area by executing a wide range of sea, air and land activities (StrikForNATO, 2023)
- [South Korea's Pursuit of Closer Ties: The Importance of EU Engagement on the Korean Peninsula](https://finabel.org/south-koreas-pursuit-of-closer-ties-the-importance-of-eu-engagement-on-the-korean-peninsula/) - The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly known as North Korea) has mostly been characterised by tension, limited engagement and strained diplomatic ties. Although the DPRK has embassies in most European countries, the relationship remains largely formal and marked by infrequent high-level interactions (EEAS, 2022). The EU has consistently condemned the DPRK’s unlawful weapons programmes and called for the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in line with the international community’s stance (Council of the European Union, 2023). Direct diplomatic engagement between the EU and the DPRK has been limited and there have been few substantial efforts to improve relations or foster dialogue.
- [Private Military and Security Groups: Main Successes and Failures](https://finabel.org/private-military-and-security-groups-main-successes-and-failures/) - On Saturday 24 June 2023, Russia woke up to a military mutiny. The Wagner Group, a Russian private military organisation that has played a central role in the current Ukrainian conflict, had started marching back across the Ukrainian border into Russia (Maguire, 2023). This was announced on the Telegram channel of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, while Russian channels initially did not release an official statement (Maguire, 2023)
- [Laying the Groundwork for Interoperability through Weapons Procurement: EU Institutions Provisionally Agree on Reinforcing the European Defence Industry](https://finabel.org/laying-the-groundwork-for-interoperability-through-weapons-procurement-eu-institutions-provisionally-agree-on-reinforcing-the-european-defence-industry/) - On 27 June, 2023, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement paving the way for the adoption of the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). The regulation will encourage member states to jointly procure weapons and, as a result, enhance interoperability at the supranational level (Council of the EU, 2023). To do so, the Council and the Parliament have foreseen a partial reimbursement scheme for states who, in consortia of at least three, are willing to pool their demand and jointly procure defence products (Council of the EU, 2023). At the same time, equal distribution of available funds is ensured by a 15% cap (Council of the EU, 2023).
- [The Council of the EU tops up the European Peace Facility financial ceiling by an additional €3.5 billion](https://finabel.org/playing-the-long-game-hungarian-parliament-continues-to-delay-swedens-nato-accession-bid-2/) - On 26 June, 2023, EU ministers adopted a decision to raise the financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility (EPF) by an additional €3.5 billion. This is the second top-up in only six months, with the first one (worth €2 billion) being agreed upon on 12 December, 2022 (Council of the EU, 2022) and operationalised on 13 March this year. As commented upon by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, this step provides the Union with the necessary funding to remain steadfast in “delivering concrete military support to our partners’ armed forces” (Council of the EU, 2023).
- [The Intersection between Outer-Space Security and Cybersecurity](https://finabel.org/the-intersection-between-outer-space-security-and-cybersecurity/) - The concept of space security first appeared during the Cold War, in the context of the space race between the USA and the USSR. Since the 1990s, the number of space actors has significantly increased, including new national, international and private stakeholders. Space technologies, especially satellites, have gained importance for several aspects of everyday life, and are crucial for commercial purposes, public services and military operations. Particularly in the latter case, space technologies represent a major asset for communication, surveillance and planning.
- [Playing the Long Game: Hungarian Parliament Continues to delay Sweden's NATO Accession Bid](https://finabel.org/playing-the-long-game-hungarian-parliament-continues-to-delay-swedens-nato-accession-bid/) - On 28 June 2023, the Hungarian Parliament’s House Committee rejected a proposal to schedule a weekly plenary vote ratifying Sweden’s NATO membership bid (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2023). Incidentally, this is the final week of the chamber’s spring session, meaning that Parliamentarians will not return until the ordinary autumn sessions start in late August or early September. Therefore, the only chance to vote on Stockholm’s accession to the alliance is through an extraordinary session, which may only convene upon a motion by the President, the Government or one-fifth of the Parliament’s members (Hungarian National Assembly, n.d.).
- [The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Nuclear Deterrence](https://finabel.org/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-on-nuclear-deterrence/) - The world is experiencing the fourth industrial revolution. Significant progress in computing power is facilitating the development of many new and ground-breaking technologies (Kroenig, 2021, p. 59). Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of these technologies that increasingly impacts society, as well as military operations. In the next quarter century, AI and other emerging technologies are also expected to have a massive effect on international security and strategic stability (Geist & Lohn, 2018, p. 1). They are already reshaping the global nuclear order and our understanding of nuclear strategy and deterrence (Futter, 2020, p. 27).
- [Urban Warfare](https://finabel.org/urban-warfare/) - With the ongoing war in Ukraine, the focus on urban warfare has returned to prominence in military reviews and analysis. Russian forces have engaged in urban battles in Kyiv, Mariupol, Kherson, and other Ukrainian cities.
- [Will Modi's Recent State Visit to Washington Impact India's Foreign Policy Ahead of the SCO?](https://finabel.org/will-modis-recent-state-visit-to-washington-impact-indias-foreign-policy-ahead-of-the-sco/) - The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended a four-day state visit in the United States from the 21st to the 24th of June (Chatterjee-Miller, 2023;Pandey, 2023). The leaders reached numerous agreements on tariffs, manufacturing and green energy targets (Chatterjee Miller 2023). However, the most significant agreements discussed regarded defence and security. The US company General Electric will provide fighter jet engines for the Indian Air Force.
- [Italy & Saudi Arabia: From Arms Embargo to Enhanced Diplomatic Ties](https://finabel.org/italy-saudi-arabia-from-arms-embargo-to-enhanced-diplomatic-ties/) - On 31 May 2023, the Italian government announced an end to the embargo on the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia (Armellini & Adler, 2023). Italy maintained the ban between 2019 and 2020 following the escalation of Saudi Arabia’s violence against the Iran-backed Houthi rebel group in Yemen (Middle East Monitor, 2023)
- [Reshaping Collective Defence Plans and Addressing Open Questions: How NATO is Approaching the Vilnius Summit](https://finabel.org/reshaping-collective-defence-plans-and-addressing-open-questions-how-nato-is-approaching-the-vilnius-summit/) - On July 11th and 12th, 2023, NATO heads of state and government are convening in Vilnius, Lithuania, for the Alliance’s annual summit, which is very likely to prove a watershed moment in NATO’s recent history for several reasons. Read further to discover
- [Refusing a second Finlandization](https://finabel.org/refusing-a-second-findlandization/) - Europe is again amidst a security crisis, the roots of which go far beyond the unsolved issues with post-Soviet Russia and NATO enlargement towards the East of Europe. The current invasion of Ukraine shows that two opposing international concepts are on the battleground. On the one side, there is a vision that officially supports the right of non-interference in a multipolar world whilst, in reality, abusing sovereign power, imposing it on other nations and dividing the world into areas of one-dominant country influence
- [Russia is Shaking: Wagner Mercenaries Turn their Back on Putin](https://finabel.org/russia-is-shaking-wagner-mercenaries-turn-their-back-on-putin/) - “Armed conflicts have contributed to environmental degradation for thousands of years” (Palczewska, 2022, p. 100). The war in Ukraine is no exception; the conflict already has an immense impact on the soil, water and air quality as well as the biodiversity of the largest European country.
- [The Weaponisation of the Environment in the War in Ukraine](https://finabel.org/the-weaponisation-of-the-environment-in-the-war-in-ukraine/) - “Armed conflicts have contributed to environmental degradation for thousands of years” (Palczewska, 2022, p. 100). The war in Ukraine is no exception; the conflict already has an immense impact on the soil, water and air quality as well as the biodiversity of the largest European country.
- [Germany Prepares Permanent Force in Lithuania](https://finabel.org/germany-prepares-permanent-force-in-lithuania/) - Germany is preparing to permanently station 4,000 troops in Lithuania to strengthen NATO’s Eastern Flank. This was announced by German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius during a visit to the Lithuanian capital Vilnius on Monday (The Associated Press, 2023). “We explicitly acknowledge our responsibility and our obligation as a NATO member state, as the largest economy in Europe, to stand up for the protection of the eastern flank”, Pistorius stated (Pitel & Foy, 2023). Pistorius was accompanied by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who welcomed this announcement and praised Germany for its dedication to NATO’s collective defence strategy (The Associated Press, 2023).
- [The Role of Western Training and Equipment in Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive Strategy](https://finabel.org/the-role-of-western-training-and-equipment-in-ukraines-counter-offensive-strategy/) - This Infloflash examines the role of Western training in Ukraine, specifically examining Ukraine's counter-offensive strategy that has recently occurred.
- [France says yes to Ukraine's Acession to NATO](https://finabel.org/france-says-yes-to-ukraines-acession-to-nato/) - On the 12 June 2023, a French Defence Council examined the possibility of an accession of Ukraine to NATO once the war is over (Pietralunga & Ricard, 2023). Paris used to be reluctant, alongside Berlin and Washington (Pietralunga & Ricard, 2023; Smolar, 2023). France now regards Kiev’s membership as a viable option to guarantee security in Europe in the coming years (Pietralunga & Ricard, 2023). This recent change of mind also expresses a determination to increase pressure on Moscow to halt its war in Ukraine. It further conveys France’s support to Kiev at a time when its counter-offensive is facing difficulties (Pietralunga & Ricard, 2023)
- [Belgium Officially Joins The FCAS Project](https://finabel.org/belgium-officially-joins-the-fcas-project/) - Belgium announced its desire to join the largest European arms project. On Friday 16 June 2023, the Council of Ministers agreed to propose the country to join the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) (Payne, 2023; Roberfroid, 2023). Belgium will be first granted an “observer” status for at least months to a year before fully integrating the programme (Pugnet, 2023). During the next year, the Belgian defence industries will be assessed to determine which firms will participate in the industrial development phase of the programme.
- [Germany drafts its first National Security Strategy since WW2](https://finabel.org/germany-drafts-its-first-national-security-strategy-since-ww2/) - On 14 June 2023, Germany revealed its first National Security Strategy since the end of WW2. The plan was in preparation since November 2021 (DeutscheWelle, 2023). And while the document was supposed to be delivered during the Munich Security Council in February, though its release was delayed by internal disagreements among the government’s coalition parties (Von Der Burchard, 2023).
- [Turmoil in Kosovo](https://finabel.org/turmoil-in-kosovo/) - On 29 May 2023, Serb protesters clashed with troops of the NATO-led mission in Kosovo* (KFOR) after demonstrators attempted to force their way into a government building in Zvecan, located in the Serb-majority northern part of the territory (Bytyci, 2023a). The clashes resulted in approximately 30 KFOR peacekeepers suffering injuries (Bytyci, 2023a). Prior to the incident, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic ordered, on 26 May, an urgent movement of troops to the border with Kosovo after ethnic Serbs had clashed with local police in the country (Al Jazeera, 2023).
- [Strengthening Military Cooperation between Japan and the United States in Response to Regional Instability: Historical Background and Contemporary Security Dynamics](https://finabel.org/strengthening-military-cooperation-between-japan-and-the-united-states-in-response-to-regional-instability-historical-background-and-contemporary-security-dynamics/) - This Info Flash examines the historical background to provide a comprehensive analysis of the US-Japan military cooperation. It delves into the current security situation shaping the Asia Pacific region, serving as the driving force behind the ongoing efforts to modernize and enhance military collaboration between the two nations. Despite their complex shared histories, the United States and Japan have significantly bolstered their military cooperation. The primary catalyst behind this strengthening of defence collaboration is the mounting instability within the Asia Pacific region. Japan confronts a multitude of challenges as the increasingly assertive China, which is pursuing a more aggressive regional security policy, and the persistent threat posed by North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities, including their missile launches targeting Japanese territory. Moreover, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia contributes to the volatility in the region. The resulting instability underscores the paramount importance of the alliance between the U.S. and Japan, emphasizing the need to modernize their forces and project their combined influence. This is crucial for promoting stability and upholding the rule of law in an international system that is growing increasingly turbulent.
- [PESCO launches new projects as Denmark joins the effort to improve European military interoperability](https://finabel.org/pesco-launches-new-projects-as-denmark-joins-the-effort-to-improve-european-military-interoperability/) - At the end of May, the Council of the European Union adopted 11 new projects and welcomed Denmark as a new member state of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative (European Council, 2023). These events are milestones for two reasons; first, these new operations have a focus on interoperability; and second, Denmark’s accession itself, as in the past the country was reluctant to join PESCO and European defence efforts. The 11 new projects focus on a range of military domains. These include training, land, maritime, air systems and cyber. More specifically, the projects concerning land interoperability will primarily focus on unmanned ground systems, communication and infrastructure networks (PESCO, 2023).
- [North Korea Strengthens Strategic Alliance with Russia amidst Ukrainian Conflict](https://finabel.org/north-korea-strengthens-strategic-alliance-with-russia-amidst-ukrainian-conflict/) - On 12 June 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in a message addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin, pledged to step up strategic cooperation with the Russian Federation in a joint effort to strengthen the sovereignty of both nations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MoFA], 2023). In his message, on the occasion of Russia’s National Day, Kim defended the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine and expressed his unwavering support and solidarity to the people of Russia (MoFA, 2023). In fact, since the start of the war in Ukraine, North Korea has intensified efforts to strengthen ties with the Kremlin and has consistently supported Moscow. Kim also attributed the US help to Ukraine to what he sees as the “hegemonic agenda” of the United States and the West, further aligning North Korea’s and Russia’s views on global power continuity (Reuters, 2023).
- [What Benefits and Disadvantages does Sweden and Finland get from NATO?](https://finabel.org/what-benefits-and-disadvantages-does-sweden-and-finland-get-from-nato/) - This Info Flash will first examine the international relations between Sweden, Hungary, and Türkiye, which are tense since Sweden started its accession process to join NATO in the aftermath of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. With this context, the second part of the paper will conduct an analysis of the benefits and disadvantages for Sweden, Finland, and NATO itself in accepting these new member states.
- [Nova Kakhovka Dam Collapse: what are the consequences and who is to blame?](https://finabel.org/nova-kakhovka-dam-collapse-what-are-the-consequences-and-who-is-to-blame/) - On Tuesday morning, a massive dam on the Dnipro River separating the Ukrainian and Russian forces in the south of Ukraine was breached. The dam is part of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant and holds 18 cubic kilometres of water (Faulconbridge, 2023). Thousands of civilians are likely to be affected and people have been evacuated on both sides of the river. Ukrainian officials estimated that over 40,000 people are at risk from flooding.
- [Paramilitary Groups Cross-border Incursions from Ukraine in Belgorod Region](https://finabel.org/paramilitary-groups-cross-border-incursions-from-ukraine-in-belgorod-region/) - On the 22nd of May, there was a two-day incursion in the Western Russian borderlands led by two paramilitary groups in opposition to the Russian regime, namely the Liberty of Russia Legion (LSR) and the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), whose aim is to dismantle Putin’s government and claims (BBC, 2023). The two legions were set up during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. They attracted Russian volunteer fighters willing to fight against their own country alongside Ukraine and topple Putin’s regime (EURACTIV, 2023). The two groups differ from one another. However, each group is characterised by supremacist and extremist fighters.
- [Mandatory military conscription in Europe: addressing past or present threats?](https://finabel.org/mandatory-military-conscription-in-europe-addressing-past-or-present-threats/) - This Info Flash aims to shed light on the case of Latvia, which passed a law in April 2023 calling for the mandatory reintroduction of military conscription after it was abolished in 2007. A perspective on the possible downfalls of such defence policy is analysed, while also contextualising the growing support for mandatory military service across the EU in the 21st century. A brief historical analysis also portrays the main reasons why it was abandoned by most European countries over the course of the last two decades and how the Russian invasion of Ukraine has generated a U-turn in defence policy in the Latvian case.
- [UN MINUSMA Mission: European Withdrawal and the Future of Mali](https://finabel.org/un-minusma-mission-european-withdrawal-and-the-future-of-mali/) - This Info Flash examines the motives behind the withdrawal of German and French forces from MINUSMA and analyses the reasons behind Mali's strengthened cooperation with Russia. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established to address the instability caused by jihadist and separatist groups in Mali and tackle long-standing structural issues. The mission's objectives include stabilizing population centers, rebuilding the security sector, implementing disarmament programs, facilitating national dialogue, and ensuring fair elections. Today, Mali is experiencing a deteriorating security scenario with escalating violence, intercommunal clashes, and jihadist attacks. In this context, Mali has turned to Russia for support through the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries, increasing security risks which further influenced the decision to withdraw European contingents. This raises more questions about the country’s future and the MINUSMA mission. Finally, recommendations are provided to enhance the MINUSMA mission's effectiveness and improve Mali's security situation.
- [Is AUKUS and Australia’s pledge to acquire nuclear-powered submarines a turning point in Indo-Pacific power relations?](https://finabel.org/is-aukus-and-australias-pledge-to-acquire-nuclear-powered-submarines-a-turning-point-in-indo-pacific-power-relations/) - This Info Flash focuses on the creation of the AUKUS partnership, with the main aim being that of assisting the Australian Navy in the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). The agreement raised concerns regarding the possibility of escalating tensions between China and Taiwan (Sabbagh et al. 2021). Nevertheless, despite vocal dissent from China and France, the agreement has gone ahead. The beginning of the Australian SSNs' military journey inevitably marks an important moment for the delineation of Indo-Pacific security lines. While American President Joe Biden insists that the arrival of submarines to the Australian coasts should not be understood as an act of aggression towards China (Holland & Brunnstrom, 2023), tensions remain in the region. This work assesses how the acquisition of SSNs has impacted Australian military capability and how the developments introduced in March 2023 have the potential to reshape contemporary nuclear warfare and the equilibrium of the Indo-Pacific region. Copyright Image: The Canberra Times
- [United with Ukraine: International Support for Ukraine goes from strength to strength as Western Powers Support the delivery of F16 Fighter Jets](https://finabel.org/united-with-ukraine-international-support-for-ukraine-goes-from-strength-to-strength-as-western-powers-support-the-delivery-of-f16-fighter-jets/) - International governments have pledged military assistance for Ukraine since Russia invaded in February of 2022. This support has yet again grown with the UK and Netherlands vowing to form an “International Coalition” with the express purpose of providing training and F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine (Kent et al., 2023, para. 1). Since the Russian invasion last February, the US has given $19.3 billion in aid, the UK £2.3 billion, and the EU as a coalition have transferred €3.1 million, most of which is in the form of lethal platforms and weapons (Mills & Curtis, 2023, p. 4).
- [The EU & Lula: A New Age of Cooperation](https://finabel.org/the-eu-lula-a-new-age-of-cooperation/) - This Info Flash explores the implications of the rise to power of Brazil’s new president, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. Commonly seen as the antithesis of the previous president, Jair Bolsonaro, Lula has already made significant changes to Brazil’s position on the global stage since his inauguration five months ago. It is likely that there will be a growth in the investment of EU-Brazil cooperation, which will in turn affect European politics, economies, and even security. Though Lula’s approach to politics is generally more accepted in Europe, issues may arise due to Brazil’s neutrality towards Russia’s war on Ukraine. The final section of the text touches on cybersecurity, as significant advancements were made in Lula’s previous term as president. The field is relatively developed in Latin America, and investing in it can be beneficial for European security.
- [The Role of International Actors in Sudan’s Ongoing Crisis](https://finabel.org/the-role-of-international-actors-in-sudans-ongoing-crisis/) - Sudan has been engaged in military conflict since April 15, 2023. Following the removal of the longtime ruler Omar al-Bashir and the attempt of a transition to civilian rule in 2021, a high-intensity armed confrontation has been launched across the country. The parties responsible are the Sovereignty Council’s two leaders, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, his Deputy and head of the paramilitary group known as Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
- [A Never-Ending War… Russian Forces Target Kherson Oblast Killing 6 people in 24 Hours](https://finabel.org/a-never-ending-war-russian-forces-target-kherson-oblast-killing-6-people-in-24-hours/) - On the afternoon of Monday, 8 May 2023, Russian forces once again bombed Kherson Oblast, a province in southern Ukraine, killing 6 people in the past 24 hours (Lozovenko, 2023). Additionally, an assault on the suburb of Antonivka has left a 67-year-old woman and a 42-year-old man injured and hospitalised (Lozovenko, 2023). With the woman unfortunately sustaining several shrapnel wounds to her head, chest, and abdomen, medical professionals are currently attending to her and doing their best to save her life (The Kyiv Independent, 2023). The Kherson Oblast Military Administration has reported the incident and is likely already investigating the instigators of the attack (Petrenko, 2023). Later in the same day, the village of Stanislav came under attack from the Russian military, resulting in four people getting injured (The Kyiv Independent, 2023). Finally, the village of Kizomys was also targeted with bombs, causing the destruction of two houses (Lozovenko, 2023).
- [Military Courts in the International Scene](https://finabel.org/military-courts-in-the-international-scene/) - This Info Flash reviews the structures of military courts, addressing how they function and the legal statues of these bodies. Additionally, it analyses several examples of relevant case law solved by international courts, namely, the Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court. Finally, the paper is concluded by providing some recommendations regarding how military courts can become more effective.
- [Decarbonization in the Defence Sector: Framework and Green Technologies](https://finabel.org/decarbonization-in-the-defence-sector-framework-and-green-technologies/) - This Info Flash analyses the environmental concerns that have climbed to the top of the international agenda. The armed forces and the defence sector as a whole are not exempt from this trend. Moreover, the defence sector's environmental footprint is massive, making it necessary for the armed services to devise new policies and activities targeted at minimizing this footprint. These changes represent both a threat to military institutions and an opportunity to implement new technologies that can improve operational and military capabilities (Duncan, 2023). Understanding the effects of climate change, thus, is critical for gaining a knowledge advantage. The military has to understand how climate change and shifting climatic conditions affect strategy and operational conduct. Extreme weather events, for example, may have an impact not only on the operability of military capabilities but also on their efficiency and military installations as a whole. In the future, we are also expected to witness more conflicts caused by climate change, for which security agencies will need to prepare (Wigell & Hakala, 2022).
- [Australian soldiers use their minds to manage ground drones](https://finabel.org/australian-soldiers-use-their-minds-to-manage-ground-drones/) - In a recently published video, the Australian army showcased a four-legged terrestrial drone being commanded by the brain waves of a nearby soldier.
- [A Step Forward for EU as a Defense Actor: The Jointly Procurement of Ammunition for Ukraine](https://finabel.org/a-step-forward-for-eu-as-a-defense-actor-the-jointly-procurement-of-ammunition-for-ukraine/) - This Info Flash analysis how from the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the European Union member states took several steps against the Russian government, especially in terms of individual and economic sanctions to publicly condemn the illegal and unjustified aggression of February 2022. This war has been recognized as a wake-up call for the EU, which - for the first time - devoted funds for the supply of lethal weapons to a third country. Specifically, the European Peace Facility (EPF) has become the most important budget tool for the EU to implement a number of active military operations and assistance missions. The latest project put forward by the EU—and partially connected to the EPF—has been a three-track proposal meant to collectively provide Ukraine with additional artillery ammunition. Despite the criticism and doubts that have been raised on the subject, this Info Flash represents a landmark juncture for the EU in terms of military and defence efforts.
- [Approaching the 10th Anniversary of Yaoundé – Lessons for Regional Actors in Securing Meaningful Peace in the Gulf of Guinea](https://finabel.org/approaching-the-10th-anniversary-of-yaounde-lessons-for-regional-actors-in-securing-meaningful-peace-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/) - This Info Flash approaches the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and its Architecture, taking stock of their impact on maritime security and safety in the Gulf of Guinea. The Code is a multilateral maritime security framework that coordinates State and regional involvement in combatting piracy, kidnapping and robbery in the Gulf of Guinea (Code, 2013, p. 1). To complement this strategy, the EU adopted its maritime security strategy in 2014, which sought to enhance the Code’s implementation and compliance (EU External Actions Service 2021). This was further supported by international partners such as the G7++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea (FoGG), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (Côrte-Real 2022, p.69). As a result, this Info Flash will provide a brief overview of the impact of these regional initiatives and elaborate recommendations, coastal states and their partners should consider as we approach the 10th anniversary in June 2023.
- [Going Against Machiavelli: Russia’s Increasing Reliance on Mercenaries](https://finabel.org/going-against-machiavelli-russias-increasing-reliance-on-mercenaries/) - This Info Flash examines the recent history and attempts to regulate mercenaries on national and international levels, the history of Russian mercenaries, and the implications of the use of mercenaries in Ukraine. There is a focus on the Wagner Group, which has grown in importance due to the group’s recent size increase and its leadership’s growing influence in the Kremlin. Targeting these groups through their finances and contracts is a good way for the West to counter their activities in Africa and the Middle East.
- [Russia Spy Ships Gather Intelligence in the North Sea for Future Sabotages](https://finabel.org/russia-spyships-gather-intelligence-in-the-north-sea-for-future-sabotages/) - On 19 April 2023, a joint investigation of Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish public broadcasters found that Russia has been using boats disguised as fishing and research ships to perform surveillance and gather intelligence in the North Sea.
- [Attrition in Ukraine: Where Kyiv Stands After One Year](https://finabel.org/attrition-in-ukraine-where-kyiv-stands-after-one-year/) - This Info Flash presents how the Russo-Ukrainian War has devolved into a war of attrition. With material in short supply, Ukraine depends heavily on foreign contributions to maintain the war effort. Furthermore, loss in revenue from decreased production, exports, and taxes leads to massive deficits for the national government. Post-war reconstruction is also expected to be expensive, requiring significant external assistance. As a result, while continuous military and economic support from NATO, the EU, and others is essential to Ukraine, it will be important for countries to increase the necessary defence production to maintain their stockpiles and to plan for continued financial assistance for the duration of the war and following its conclusion.
- [Tanks For Ukraine: How the European Members of NATO Have Responded](https://finabel.org/tanks-for-ukraine-how-the-european-members-of-nato-have-responded/) - This Info Flash outlines the critical security aid that has reached Kyiv from the European members of the NATO alliance. Ukraine has welcomed this aid from its European counterparts, but the nation’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has continuously pressed European leaders to allow the transfer of their main battle tanks (MBTs) to help push back Russian forces. This request has ignited debates among policymakers and analysts about whether MBTs would make a difference for Ukraine on the battlefield and whether states should grant Zelensky’s request for tanks. As a result, the policies of European NATO members regarding MBT transfers have been mixed since February 2022. Some European NATO members quickly supplied Ukraine with MBTs, while others have only recently given the green light to transfer MBT units.
- [The Su-25 and the Russia-Belarus Military Cooperation](https://finabel.org/the-su-25-and-the-russia-belarus-military-cooperation/) - This Info Flash outlines the necessity to take a closer look at Russian-Belarusian military cooperation. While increased military cooperation between Russia and Belarus can be expected in an ongoing war, this depends on many more factors, and it is rather difficult to estimate its exact form. For the European Union, however, this cooperation poses a significant risk, and even though the involvement of the Belarusian army in the war seems unlikely, many factors at play can change this. The previously reached factors and many more factors are further discussed in this work, with the main research questions focusing on how close is the Belarus-Russian military cooperation and why it poses a threat to the European Union.
- [Refusing a Second “Finlandization”? The Drivers and the Impact of Finland and Sweden’s NATO Membership on the Arctic Region](https://finabel.org/refusing-a-second-finlandization-the-drivers-and-the-impact-of-finland-and-swedens-nato-membership-on-the-arctic-region/) - This Info Flash outlines the European security crisis, which has its roots beyond the unsolved issues with post-Soviet Russia and NATO enlargement towards the East of Europe. The current invasion of Ukraine shows that two opposing international concepts are on the battleground. The goal of this research is to investigate the reasons that led two of the most prominent European neutral nations – Sweden and Finland – to take sides in the current conflict between the two contrasting visions of the international order, joining the Atlantic Alliance. It is elaborated on a historical analysis of Finland and Sweden, which shows the lessons learnt from experiences in order to determine the present-day challenges that both face due to their geopolitical position in the Arctic region. In doing so, this paper aims to understand the past, present and future international arrangements involving the Arctic as the next battlefield where the two contrasting international order visions will collide.
- [A New Era of Japan-EU Cooperation: the Digital Partnership](https://finabel.org/a-new-era-of-japan-eu-cooperation-the-digital-partnership/) - This Info Flash outlines the development of the EU-Japan cooperation that saw several improvements over the last few years in politics, development, strategy, and security. Their bilateral agenda has been constantly dominated by digital and technological issues in order to improve the degree of global connectivity. Despite the many challenges raised by the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian War, the digital partnership between the EU and Japan has broadened from public services and digital infrastructures to technological skills for citizens and innovation businesses.
- [Small but Ready: How Finland Has Prepared to Defend Itself](https://finabel.org/small-but-ready-how-finland-has-prepared-to-defend-itself/) - The Nordic nation of Finland is expected to join NATO in the coming months. Despite its size, it will be an asset, not a liability. Finland faces many national security concerns, primarily originating from Russia. However, Finland has gradually developed an impressive military well-equipped to defend the country. Significant procurements in the air force, army, and navy will reinforce Helsinki's vital role in the Baltic and even Arctic theatres. Furthermore, the Finnish comprehensive security model connects state and non-state entities in the interest of national security, leading to greater resilience and preparedness in Finnish society. This model results in a unique hybrid resilience, which is critical considering Russia's propensity for hybrid warfare.
- [Turkey’s approval of Finland NATO membership](https://finabel.org/turkeys-approval-of-finland-nato-membership/) - After several months of delay, on the 30th of March 2023, Turkey’s Parliament voted unanimously to officially allow Finland’s membership into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This event represents a major shift in the international balance of power, with Finland abandoning decades of non-alignment, to become the 31st member of the Western defense alliance (Erlanger, 2023). Thought it should be noted that the membership will only be formalized during the next NATO summit, taking place in July in Lithuania (Gardner, 2023).
- [Greece Expands Fence along the Border with Turkey: What Does the Extension Project Include?](https://finabel.org/greece-expands-fence-along-the-border-with-turkey-what-does-the-extension-project-include/) - The extension of the fence to the Evros, according to Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, is a project of utmost importance since it will contribute to further preserving the external borders of both Greece and the European Union in an effort to prevent migration flows, concentrating on strengthening military and police presence at the frontier and modernizing military hardware (ProtoThema, 2023).
- [Russia and China praise their close cooperation in Moscow](https://finabel.org/russia-and-china-praise-their-close-cooperation-in-moscow/) - The Chinese president Xi Jinping arrived on the 20th March 2023 in Russia to talk to President Putin about the Chinese-Russian relations and the war in Ukraine. President Xi stayed for two days and had several official talks. The visit came the day after an arrest warrant was issued for Vladimir Putin by the International Criminal Court (ICC) (UN News, 2023). This being the case, although neither Russia nor China are members of the Court, this seemed to put Putin under a lot of pressure, in terms of meeting the positive expectations for the outcome of the meetings.
- [A Common Candidate for the Upcoming Turkish Elections: What Could a New Turkish President Mean for the Future of Western Security?](https://finabel.org/a-common-candidate-for-the-upcoming-turkish-elections-what-could-a-new-turkish-president-mean-for-the-future-of-western-security/) - After a long and arduous debate, the Turkish opposition coalition has agreed on a presidential candidate for the upcoming national elections.
- [Rethinking Military Service in Europe](https://finabel.org/rethinking-military-service-in-europe/) - From 2023 Latvia will rely again on conscription, after abandoning it in 2007, when the country joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The decision was taken to strengthen army forces, that now rely only on 7,500 active soldiers and national guardsmen (Euronews, 2022). The Russian invasion of Ukraine created the need to reinforce the army potential, and conscription – the mandatory enlistment of people in the national armed forces of their citizenship country – helps to reach this goal by increasing the number of reservists. The Latvian Ministry of Defence plans to recruit some 500 young men aged 18-27 twice a year; Riga hopes the quotas will initially be filled by volunteers, with the compulsoriness becoming effective only at a later stage (Balčiūnas, 2022).
- [Arms Transfer Through the European Peace Facility](https://finabel.org/arms-transfer-through-the-european-peace-facility/) - Since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the EU has provided about €2.5 billion worth of military assistance to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility (EPF), with some of the weapons coming from the EU countries’ stocks (Preussen, 2022). The EPF is a fund of €5 billion financed outside the EU Budget for a period of seven years (2021-2027), established by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 based on Articles 30 and 41 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (Council of the European Union, 2021).
- [The Remilitarization of the Black Sea](https://finabel.org/the-remilitarization-of-the-black-sea/) - This Info Flash outlines that recent Russian attacks on Ukraine's infrastructure have highlighted the devastation of twenty-first-century warfare and the resulting vulnerability to civilian life. The hybrid threat is a major component of modern warfare, and Russia is a particularly aggressive perpetrator. The return of war to Europe has created conditions that necessitate an increased NATO focus on this dynamic: it highlighted the importance of the region in energy security terms and shed light on the need for an increased transatlantic effort including military security, economic rehabilitation and regional security (Dupuy, 2022). Thus, the Black Sea Region needs NATO as a steadying influence and NATO needs to address the Alliance’s interests in the region (Horrell, 2016).
- [Bringing Back Military Mobility](https://finabel.org/bringing-back-military-mobility/) - This Info Flash outlines how the conflict in Ukraine has reignited concerns within Europe regarding military mobility because of several factors like bureaucratic delays in border crossings and much of Europe’s infrastructure not prepared for military use. As a result, significant work needs to be done to ensure seamless military movement across Europe’s many borders. Fortunately, the European Union already has large infrastructure projects which can be updated to incorporate military requirements. In addition, NATO's involvement has been and continues to be an important factor in hosting training exercises and setting goals. Finally, it can be presumed that the EU will allocate more funding for this continental project, while also focusing on cyber defence threats
- [Responding to the T-14 Armata](https://finabel.org/responding-to-the-t-14-armata/) - This Info Flash outlines the challenge that Russian main battle tank (MBT) developments, the T-14 Armata now challenges all of NATO’s platforms. With the war in Ukraine signalling that conventional warfare is far from over, NATO must re-evaluate its armoured capabilities. The capabilities of the Russian T-14, the American M1 Abrams, the German Leopard 2, the British Challenger 2, the French Leclerc, the Italian C1 Ariete, the Polish PT-91 Twardy, and the upcoming Turkish Altay are investigated in order to understand why the United States must choose between what it is accustomed to in the Abrams or move on to something entirely new. Simultaneously, the bilateral relationship between France and Germany is taken into consideration for understanding the need for inviting other European states into its Main Ground Combat System project.
- [The EU in Kosovo*: Consolidating European Military and Defence Identity](https://finabel.org/the-eu-in-kosovo-consolidating-european-military-and-defence-identity/) - For decades, the European security policy has been an open question, as its highly political relevance never conceded a fully supranational approach that would enable comprehensive interoperability. All security aspects are grounded in an intergovernmental logic dating back to the conception of the ‘second pillar’ established in Maastricht in 1992. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains ‘common’ only in some aspects, leaving wide discretion to a single MS. The same was likely to be the case for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Being specifically designed as the military component of the CFSP, the CSDP was decisive in offering Europe the opportunity of independently taking charge of its security issues on the military level by enhancing interoperable mechanisms among national forces.
- [The Western Balkans: a Crossroads of Interests of the EU, Russia, and China](https://finabel.org/the-western-balkans-a-crossroads-of-interests-of-the-eu-russia-and-china/) - Western Balkans is a term that refers to seven countries in Southern and Eastern Europe: Republic of Albania, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Croatia, and Republic of Serbia (Bugajski, 2019). This report aims to analyse Russian and EU influence on Western European countries, also taking into account China's growing engagement in the region and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Lastly, in light of these considerations, the paper provides some insights into the strategy the EU adopts in the Western Balkans.
- [Rheinmetall, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman Sign an F-35 LOI](https://finabel.org/rheinmetall-lockheed-martin-and-northrop-grumman-sign-an-f-35-loi/) - On February 17th, German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall signed a letter of intent (LOI) with American companies Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman regarding Germany's freshly procured F-35 fighter jets.
- [The NATO and EU Missions in Kosovo*: Drawing Lessons From the Past to Face Current](https://finabel.org/the-nato-and-eu-missions-in-kosovo-drawing-lessons-from-the-past-to-face-current/) - In the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 (1999), whereby a NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) would be deployed to stabilise the region and prevent further violence. Though initially composed of around 50,000 personnel, NATO’s presence was progressively downsized as the security environment improved. The mission successfully prevented the resumption of hostilities in the Western Balkans and supported the transition towards peace and democracy in Kosovo. However, sporadic incidents of violence have often revived unresolved tensions in the country. The impossibility of reaching a consensus on Kosovo’s international status and its declaration of independence in 2008 led to an extension of KFOR’s presence in the region. As the declaration of independence threatened to trigger another wave of violence, the European Union also established the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which focused on supporting Kosovo’s authorities in upholding the rule of law and reforming Kosovo’s police, judiciary and customs.
- [France’s strategic pivot to Europe and its impact on the international fight against terrorism in the Sahel region](https://finabel.org/frances-strategic-pivot-to-europe-and-its-impact-on-the-international-fight-against-terrorism-in-the-sahel-region/) - This Info Flash outlines the history of Operation Barkhane, offering a general overview of French and European efforts to maintain stability in the Sahel region over the past ten years. The principal causes of France’s disengagement are analysed taking into account external factors, such as the Russian-Ukrainian war at the end of February 2022. Because of the sensibility of this issue, Professor Luca Ranieri, one of the most prominent scholars dealing with security problems in the Sahel region, builds in an interview a critical assessment of Operation Barkhane. Understanding the main weaknesses of this initiative poses extreme usefulness in order to avoid repeating the same errors in the future.
- [What are the Potential Ramifications of a Digital Euro Upon the Defense Sector](https://finabel.org/what-are-the-potential-ramifications-of-a-digital-euro-upon-the-defense-sector/) - This Info Flash outlines the digitalization of China’s currency in 2021, opening the question of if the United States and the EU would respond to this shift with their own digital currencies. As a result, both the EU and the US are designing, debating and experimenting with their own versions of a central bank digital currency. Few discussions exist concerning the potential impacts on national defence industries within Europe, and as a result, there is a need to understand what potential consequences and benefits the digital currency transition could bring to the defence sector.
- [Negotiations between Poland and Ukraine culminated in an agreement to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine](https://finabel.org/negotiations-between-poland-and-ukraine-culminated-in-an-agreement-to-send-leopard-2-tanks-to-ukraine/) - This Info Flash is aimed at outlining the current motions in the extremely sensible relationship between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine. The current developments are very much centred on Germany and Poland’s cooperation that is becoming more and more expressive with some of the particular military aid that these countries plan to send to Ukraine. Poland and Germany have determined that Ukraine deserves more profound military help and support from the EU and its members states (Radford, 2023). However, this hot topic about the Leopard tanks is debatable and controversial because of its urgency, and equally because of its importance in terms of its effects on EU-Russia relations.
- [Third EU-NATO Joint Declaration signed on 10th January 2023](https://finabel.org/third-eu-nato-joint-declaration-signed-on-10th-january-2023/) - On 10th January 2023, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg; the President of the European Council, Charles Michel; and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen signed the 3rd EU-NATO Joint Declaration in Brussels. The first and second joint declarations between the EU and NATO were signed in 2016 and 2018 respectively.
- [Lessons of Operation Barkhane for Future European Engagement in the Sahel](https://finabel.org/lessons-of-operation-barkhane-for-future-european-engagement-in-the-sahel/) - On August 15, 2022, the last French soldiers involved in Operation Barkhane left Malian territory. The operation began nearly a decade earlier and had the primary objective of fighting against terrorist groups in the region (Burgess, 2018, p. 5). The situation in Mali, however, appears worse now than before. Jihadist violence continues to escalate, anti-Western sentiment runs rampant, and Russian Wagner mercenaries have established a firm footing in the country.
- [Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Use and Deterrence Over Ukraine](https://finabel.org/japan-uk-italys-tempest-fighter-jet-project-to-be-signed-a-turning-point-in-non-eu-defence-technology-cooperation/) - Written by Octavio Bellomo Edited by Tomas Farinha Carney The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has brought with it new concerns regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons. Considering NATO’s notable conventional superiority, the Russian Federation has relied on its nuclear armed forces for deterrence and power projection. As a consequence, Russia has actively maintained a
- [Outsourcing the Cloud: Cross-border Public-Private partnership and European Interoperability for Cloud Infrastructures](https://finabel.org/outsourcing-the-cloud-cross-border-public-private-partnership-and-european-interoperability-for-cloud-infrastructures/) - In the past decade, the cyber domain, or cyberspace, has become the most challenging and pressing issue of recent times in the area of international security. In an ultra-connected world, where information travels at an uncontrollable rate and data is becoming the new resource to be mined; it ultimately affects every aspect of modern life. From the economy to civil liberties, it has become the new focus of national security strategies and legal frameworks.
- [Japan-UK-Italy's Tempest Fighter Jet Project to Be Signed: A Turning Point in non-EU Defence Technology Cooperation?](https://finabel.org/https-finabel-org-wp-content-uploads-2023-01-japan-uk-italys-tempest-fighter-jet-project-to-be-signed-a-turning-point-in-non-eu-defence-technology-cooperation-vincent-chaput-1-pdf/) - Written by: Vincent Chaput Edited by: Tomas Farinha Carney The United Kingdom, Japan and Italy are on the verge of signing up an unprecedented agreement to begin the construction of a next-generation twin-engine stealth fighter jet with hypersonic weapons: The Tempest Project. As the last phase of negotiations reaches its conclusion, the consortium of Leonard,
- [Radicalisation in the Armed Forces](https://finabel.org/radicalisation-in-the-armed-forces/) - The topic of radicalisation is strictly linked to terrorism since, usually, the former leads to the latter. However, they are not synonyms, and the processes behind each are very different and complex to analyse. The radicalisation topic dominated public opinion following the surge of terrorist attacks in Europe by ISIS militants starting in 2015. These events led national and local institutions to commission projects and programs to tackle radicalisation by raising awareness on the topic in civil society. This paper aims to investigate radicalisation in European militaries to create a European framework in which armed forces and civil society can join to fight radicalisation processes related to armies. To do so, this analysis will focus on radicalisation processes within the military and amongst individuals who have left the armed forces.
- [Ukraine's ammo shortage raises tensions between Germany and Switzerland](https://finabel.org/ukraines-ammo-shortage-raises-tensions-between-germany-and-switzerland/) - Ukraine hunts for Ukrainian Gepards Switzerland’s long-standing condition of neutrality is globally well-known. This status has been enforced since the Treaty of Paris in 1815, but many scholars date the origins of Switzerland’s neutrality back to 1515 when 10,000 Swiss soldiers lost their lives in the 16-hour Battle of Marignano and the government afterwards decided to stay neutral in European conflicts, avoiding the risks of being on the losing side in any war (Cafiero, 2022).
- [The Role of Interoperability in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine](https://finabel.org/the-role-of-interoperability-in-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/) - Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Kyiv’s Government received unprecedented military support from NATO members. The military cooperation between Ukraine and the Atlantic Alliance goes back to the early nineties, and it underwent an intensification process after the Crimea in 2014. The Western support during the 2022 conflict took the form of economic assistance, weapons supply, and training of troops. Despite NATO’s military aid certainly played a role in Ukraine being able to resist Moscow’s aggression, problems on and off the battlefield raised concerns about the Alliance’s interoperability capacity, not only with respect to its partners but also between its Member States. Therefore, NATO Chiefs of Staff need to identify and address these issues to steer the conflict in Kyiv’s favour and to avoid the re-emergence of these issues in the future.
- [Estonia Set to Boost its Defence with Twelve New Howitzers](https://finabel.org/estonia-set-to-boost-its-defence-with-twelve-new-howitzers/) - Estonia took another step on January 14 to bolster its defence as the nation’s Ministry of Defence announced the signing of a new €36 million contract to procure twelve K9 Thunder Self-Propelled Howitzers (Ministry of Defence Estonia, 2023). The deal, signed with the company Hanwha Defence, is a result of what Defence Minister Hanno Peukur referred to as “lessons learned from the war in Ukraine” (as cited in Estonian World, 2023). The 47-ton, 155 mm howitzers manufactured in South Korea feature a maximum firing range of 40 kilometres and can reach a top speed of 67 kilometres per hour (European Defence Review, 2022).
- [Explaining EU Maritime Security Cooperation through the Coordinated Maritime Presences Tool](https://finabel.org/explaining-eu-maritime-security-cooperation-through-the-coordinated-maritime-presences-tool/) - Since the creation of the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the Union has launched three naval operations under this framework. The inclusion of maritime security and anti-piracy operations increasingly shows that EU security and defence cooperation has acquired a naval dimension (Nováky, 2022, pp. 56-57). The three designated naval operations undertaken through CSDP measures are Operation Atlanta (EU NAVFOR), a counter-piracy operation to protect maritime traffic off the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean; Operation Sophia (EU NAVFOR Med), which sought to combat the network of human smugglers and traffickers in the Central Mediterranean from 2015 to 2020; and Operation IRINI (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI), which is focused on the enforcement of the United Nation’s arms embargos against Libya since 2020 (Nováky, 2022, p. 57).
- [The nexus between climate change and terrorism: An analysis of ISIS’ weaponization of water in Syria and Boko Haram activities in the Lake Chad Basin](https://finabel.org/the-nexus-between-climate-change-and-terrorism-an-analysis-of-isis-weaponization-of-water-in-syria-and-boko-haram-activities-in-the-lake-chad-basin/) - The MENA and Sahel regions are suffering from climate-induced phenomena that are accelerating societal tensions and translating into insecurity. These regions are safe havens for violent extremism and non-state actors, who easily recruit young men willing to engage in behavioural radicalisation to sustain their families. Whilst in Syria, ISIS has been weaponizing water and resources to intimidate populations and coerce their enemies, in the Lake Chad Basin Boko Haram is recruiting members of local communities deprived of their harvest and fishing due to climate unpredictability and the disruption of the water cycle. Foreign actors, as well as regional authorities, should act now to revitalise the ecosystem, educate local communities, empower the youth and women, and frame strategic responses against terrorist activities.
- [Airbus and VDL Group Team Up to Manufacture Aircraft Laser Communication Terminal](https://finabel.org/airbus-and-vdl-group-team-up-to-manufacture-aircraft-laser-communication-terminal/) - Airbus and the Dutch industrial supplier VDL Group struck a partnership on January 10th to develop and manufacture a laser communication terminal for military aircraft. The communication terminal, known as UltraAir, would allow for more significant amounts of data sharing between ground terminals, satellites, and crewed aircraft or autonomous drones. The two organisations will begin preparing a prototype and aim for a first test flight in 2024 (Airbus, 2023).
- [Diplomatic Means of Preventing Global Conflicts](https://finabel.org/diplomatic-means-of-preventing-global-conflicts/) - Wars are considered to be dangerous and this is why preventive diplomacy is practised by a majority of states. Prevention diplomacy is commonly thought to be an indirect instrument for avoiding conflict and global disasters. A frequent question is raised in practice: “Is preventive diplomacy effective?”. This question aims to point out its importance and its tactful applicability. Many studies have shown the essence of what prevention diplomacy means. Some of the research considers it to be an “art of conducting relationships for gain without conflict” (Freeman et al., 2022). The purpose of preventive diplomacy is to strengthen the state or the nation. In consequence, if this measure fails, then war may ensue, even though diplomacy is useful even during a war.
- [Progress Made on Leopard 2 Shipments to Ukraine](https://finabel.org/progress-made-on-leopard-2-shipments-to-ukraine/) - Several European governments have decided or have seriously been considering sending tanks to Kyiv as more intense fighting is expected with the coming of spring. In particular, there have been discussions regarding the German Leopard 2 main battle tank. Polish President Duda seems to have already determined that “A company of Leopard tanks for Ukraine will be transferred as part of building an international coalition” (Kancelaria Prezydenta, 2023).
- [The Future of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) after February 24th: Implications for Russia’s Hegemony in Post-Soviet Asia](https://finabel.org/the-future-of-the-collective-security-treaty-organization-csto-after-february-24th-implications-for-russias-hegemony-in-post-soviet-asia/) - Since February 24th, the world seems to live every minute of the war on Ukraine to its fullest. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has not only sent shockwaves through the rest of Europe but also shattered the widely held belief that the horrors of the Second World War were a thing of the past. Since then, powerful undercurrents of change have been at work in the new understanding of the security challenges of the twenty-first century. Very few in the West were able to predict that Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea would durably transform the entire international system into an increasingly bipolar confrontation between newly emerged military blocs. Even fewer strongly warned against the temptation of thinking that the world was right back on the track of the old Cold War logic.
- [Charter of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic - Diana Program](https://finabel.org/charter-of-the-defence-innovation-accelerator-for-the-north-atlantic-diana-program/) - Allied foreign ministers met in Brussels on 6 -7 April 2022 and approved the Charter of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic or DIANA. DIANA will bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies to solve critical defence and security challenges. The alliance has also announced additions to the technology list DIANA will focus on what NATO has identified as priorities, including artificial intelligence, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space. (NATO website, 2022).
- [Montenegro and Serbia: A Clash Beyond Religion](https://finabel.org/montenegro-and-serbia-a-clash-beyond-religion-2/) - The passive dispute between Serbia and Montenegro took shape on 5 September 2021 with a physical clash between protesters and riot police in Cetinje, the former royal capital of Montenegro. The conflict was provoked by the inauguration of Bishop Joanikje II as the new Head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. Protesters put up barricades and were allegedly throwing rocks and fireworks at police officers in an attempt to prevent the inauguration, compelling riot police to respond with tear gas and to dismantle the barricades. The conflict resulted in many arrests and left at least 60 people injured (Deutsche Welle, 2021).
- [Cybersecurity: Is NATO Doing Enough](https://finabel.org/cybersecurity-is-nato-doing-enough-2/) - Cyberspace has become the fifth battle space in an increasingly complex security landscape, and cyber threats have been part of the international security arena. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has tackled cyber threats for over a decade. NATO’s awareness towards cyber threats started rising in the late 1990s, following cyber-attacks by Serbian hackers against NATO Supreme Command’s (SHAPE) website during the bombing campaign on Serbian positions as part of the response to the violence in Kosovo* in 1999. The cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 and in the context of the conflict in Georgia in 2008 urged the Alliance to take these new threats seriously. NATO is today the most advanced international organisation regarding cyber defence.
- [Interoperability Between European Armed Forces in 2022](https://finabel.org/interoperability-between-european-armed-forces-in-2022/) - The security environment in Europe has and is still experiencing significant changes in its configuration. If the 2016 referendum and the United Kingdom’s exit from the Europe- an Union – the so-called Brexit – significantly altered the nature and level of defence cooper- ation on the continent. Seemingly in the long term, the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine reminded all Europeans how not cooperating with countries sharing the same values and principles was not a strategically sensible approach and even created unneces- sary risks for the concerned nations.
- [Russia’s Rosoboronexport in Visit to DefExpo India 2022 for Joint Production of AK-203 Assault Rifles](https://finabel.org/russias-rosoboronexport-in-visit-to-defexpo-india-2022-for-joint-production-of-ak-203-assault-rifles/) - According to the Financial Express Online, a special delegation from Rosoboronexport, the sole state agency for Russia’s export and imports of weapons and one of the leading actors in international arms trade, took part in the DefExpo India 2022 that was held from October 18th to 22nd in Gandhinagar (Siddiqi, 2022). The exhibition represented a formidable opportunity for the Russian delegates to discuss the future local production of Kalashnikov AK-203 assault rifles within the framework of the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) (Orujie Rossii, 2022).
- [An Overview of MANET Technologies: Advantages and Disadvantages in the Military](https://finabel.org/an-overview-of-manet-technologies-advantages-and-disadvantages-in-the-military/) - Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, also known as MANETs, are self-configuring networks of wireless devices whose applicability ranges from civilian and commercial uses to highly tactical military strategies. The variety of MANETs characteristics and typologies, together with their significant usage adaptability, make these technologies particularly advantageous when deployed in critical contexts.
- [Sweden and Finland’s Accession to NATO](https://finabel.org/sweden-and-finlands-accession-to-nato/) - The constant escalation of Russia’s war on Ukraine led the Nordic countries to scale up their defence cooperation and preparedness, making Finland and Sweden take the decision to join NATO. On 18 May 2022, both countries handed their official letters of application to join the organization over to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and had their accession protocols signed on 5 July, after the completion of the pertinent accession talks (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2022). The protocols must now be ratified by all the Allies in accordance with their national procedures.
- [Russia Threatens a Retaliatory Strike Against Civilian Space Infrastructure](https://finabel.org/russia-threatens-a-retaliatory-strike-against-civilian-space-infrastructure/) - During the meeting of the United Nations Council on October 26, a new threat to pro- Ukrainian Western nations was identified. The Russian Senior Foreign Ministry official Konstantin Vorontsov stated that "quasi-civilian space infrastructure can be a legitimate target for retaliation” (Voronstov, 2022). The main targets may include the American companies Space X, Iridium and Maxar, since they provide critical communication services for the Ukrainian people. The first of these supports Ukrainian troops with broadband Internet access; the satellite communication company contributes with a satellite network; and the latter captures images of the war from satellites (Roulette, 2022). However, Vorontsov has not yet mentioned any specific names of satellite companies that might be attacked.
- [Russia Deploys Bastion Coastal Defence Systems in the Kuril Islands Amid Tensions with Japan](https://finabel.org/russia-deploys-bastion-coastal-defence-systems-in-the-kuril-islands-amid-tensions-with-japan/) - On December 5th, 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defence (Ministerstvo Oborony Rossii) declared that Russia had deployed mobile coastal defence missile systems – K-300P Bastion Systems – on the northern Kuril Island of Paramushir (Japan Today, Dec 6, 2022). The Russian Bastion missile system is known to be an effective mobile launch platform of the supersonic anti-ship P-800 Oniks (NATO codename SS-N-26 Strobile) that have reportedly been launched in the southern districts of Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion (The Eurasian Times, Dec 5, 2022).
- [National Strategic Review: Macron’s Next Grand Defence Strategy for 2030](https://finabel.org/national-strategic-review-macrons-next-grand-defence-strategy-for-2030/) - On Wednesday, November 9th, 2022 France’s President Emmanuel Macron presented the new “Revue Nationale Stratégique” aboard the amphibious helicopter carrier Dixmude in Toulon, France (Ministère des Armées, 2022). The released document aims to define France’s main national and international security objectives for 2030. The document addresses the role of France as a respected actor in international security and at the core of the European strategic autonomy initiative.
- [Hyper-Connectivity as a Trigger for Strategic Autonomy in the European Union: Through a Transformative and Disruptive Technological Transition](https://finabel.org/hyper-connectivity-as-a-trigger-for-strategic-autonomy-in-the-european-union-through-a-transformative-and-disruptive-technological-transition/) - Over the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has intensely recalibrated its strategies to fulfil its mission of promoting peace and security and guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, freedoms, human rights, and equality to its citizens. Given the increase in non-conventional threats in the cyber, hybrid, and “cybrid” domains, the EU has started to strengthen its response to this changing security environment. In this context, technological change has become the main character in a society whose governments, economies, people, and armies are highly dependent on hyper-connectivity and impacted by it. The technological transition has transformed how enemies attack their counterparts, fostering digital rivalries and tighter industry competition. To this end, the Union has recently launched the EU’s Secure Connectivity Programme (2023-2027), which encloses the third EU constellation of strategic space infrastructures called IRIS2. The latter, inter alia, has been designed to foster strategic autonomy in the Union, thereby reducing foreign dependencies. It is fundamental for the Union to enhance its ability to respond and counter cyber challenges with a comprehensive and collaborative approach, as individual and protectionist actions from the Member States obstruct the achievement of a higher degree of strategic autonomy in the technological and defence arenas.
- [Allegations of Genocide - Ukraine's Case Against Russia Before the International Court of Justice](https://finabel.org/allegations-of-genocide-ukraines-case-against-russia-before-the-international-court-of-justice/) - On the 26th of February 2022, Ukraine instituted proceedings against the Russian Federation at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning a dispute related to the interpretation, application, and fulfilment of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention). Ukraine contends that the claim of “genocide” in the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, which Russia used as a pretext for its invasion of the country, is completely nonsensical (ICJ, February 2022). As such, Ukraine has requested that the Court reach a judgement and also indicate provisional measures ordering Russia to immediately cease all military operations in the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts (ICJ, February 2022). While the Court has not yet reached a final judgement, it has already released its order on the provisional measures, which will be discussed on this paper.
- [Systematic Errors in Kabul: What did Brussels Learn from the Afghan Failure?](https://finabel.org/systematic-errors-in-kabul-what-did-brussels-learn-from-the-afghan-failure/) - Twenty-one years ago, Western powers led by the US started to engage in Afghanistan militarily and politically to reform the country according to "Westernised" ideals. After the Bonn Agreement, two realities were created: whereas on the one hand Afghan society received aid from third countries which were actively working on the ground, on the other hand, the Taliban formed a parallel structure that matured over the years and eventually ended up regaining control of the country. Whilst one could think that systematic errors were the result of inefficiencies perpetrated over time, they were already present from the beginning and grew larger. In fact, the failure of nation-building started much earlier than the summer of 2021. As for the EU, it has never been the protagonist behind the short-lived democratisation of Afghanistan, but it targeted the country mainly with humanitarian missions. To understand the reasons why these missions were not successful and how they fostered a sequence of miscalculations and mistakes that developed either inside the Union or as a consequence of exogenous hurdles, it is fundamental to learn the social, ethnic, religious, geographical, and political context of Afghanistan.
- [Assessing Africa-EU Relations vis-à-vis Russian Influence in Africa](https://finabel.org/assessing-africa-eu-relations-vis-a-vis-russian-influence-in-africa/) - This paper will analyse to what extent Africa past relations with Russia and the West have affected present African geopolitics. To reach this goal an historical overview of the legacy of the USSR will be provided, complementing this theoretical part with the effects that the colonial legacy still produces, hampering EU-Africa relations. Following this, in order to assess future developments in Russia-Africa relations, it is fundamental to evaluate the implications of the food and economic crisis in Africa as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as evaluating the effects of the recovery of many European countries with energetic ties with Africa after Russia’s weaponization of the energy policies. Finally, this research paper aims to provide some recommendations to strengthen Africa-EU relations in the near future as a result of the window of opportunity opened by the Russia-Ukraine war.
- [From the "Alligator" to the LCAC: How Amphibious Military Vehicles Evolved in Time](https://finabel.org/from-the-alligator-to-the-lcac-how-amphibious-military-vehicles-evolved-in-time/) - In recent times, amphibious warfare returned to prominence, with many military operations around the world being conducted by amphibious troops. From D-Day to Ukraine, marines from different countries have a long history of successful deployment in war theatres, mainly due to their preparation and their capabilities. Readiness, flexibility, and cross-domain operativity are the basic features of amphibious units, which find themselves fighting in one of the most difficult types of warfare. Sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace are all fundamental domains to organising and carrying out a successful amphibious operation. For this reason, to operate in such a complex and multifaceted environment, amphibious units benefit from unique vehicles and assets that help them in their operations.
- [Rare Earth Metals and F-35 Supply Chain](https://finabel.org/rare-earth-metals-and-f-35-supply-chain/) - Rare earth elements (REEs) are a collection of 17 elements composed of cerium, dysprosium, erbium, europium, gadolinium, holmium, lanthanum, lutetium, neodymium, praseodymium, promethium, samarium, scandium, terbium, thulium, ytterbium, and yttrium. These elements are highly valued for their “conductive and magnetic properties” (Chang 2022).
- [Dassault and Airbus Agreed to Develop the Next Phase of the FCAS Programme.](https://finabel.org/dassault-and-airbus-agreed-to-develop-the-next-phase-of-the-fcas-programme/) - After a year of negotiation and uncertainties, France and Germany found a new agreement for the development of the future air combat system (FCAS) next 6th generation aircraft (Vincent & Bezat, 2022). On Thursday 1st 2022, Airbus and Dassault, the main constructors for the FCAS, announced the launch of the next phase of development for the fighter jet. This phase is mainly about the design of the demonstrator for 2029.
- [Technological Improvements in the Military Field: How New Technologies Can Shape the Future of Logistics Inside the Military](https://finabel.org/technological-improvements-in-the-military-field-how-new-technologies-can-shape-the-future-of-logistics-inside-the-military/) - Technological innovations are present in many civil sectors, with the military being no exception, making processes faster and more efficient. New technologies, which can include unmanned systems, Additive Manufacturing (AM), Artificial Intelligence (AI) or even 5G, are changing warfare and its logistics tail, which is the amount of personnel and material needed to supply and support, at the same time. The introduction of these improvements is essential for the development of military capabilities and operations, as well as for improving defence logistics by enhancing accuracy, intelligence and resources while reducing costs and risks in multiple areas (Institute for Defence & Business, 2022). This Info Flash aims to analyse and provide examples of how new technologies can shape the future of logistics in the military, especially for the European Armed Forces.
- [European Command and Control Capabilities in Executive CSDP Missions and Operations](https://finabel.org/european-command-and-control-capabilities-in-executive-csdp-missions-and-operations/) - The European Union aims to strengthen its security and defence capabilities in an increasingly contested strategic environment. Recent initiatives have pursued deeper military cooperation and integration among the European member States, but also the development of the EU’s platforms and programmes - including in the area of Command and Control (C2). Whereas CSDP missions and operations tended to rely on ad hoc, temporary C2 solutions chosen from an array of designated Command Options, in recent years the EU has taken steps towards their centralisation by creating the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). Today, the MPCC exercises C2 over all non-executive CSDP missions and may also exercise C2 over one executive CSDP mission, albeit limited to the Battlegroup size. Although they allow for greater flexibility to adapt to every specific crisis, the EU’s current C2 architecture suffers from inefficiencies that may hinder its crisis response capabilities in its new strategic environment. This paper contends that creating a standing, permanent C2 structure for all CSDP missions and operations would allow the EU to better achieve its strategic goals.
- [Reasons Behind the European Union's Inadequacy to Create a European Army](https://finabel.org/reasons-behind-the-european-unions-inadequacy-to-create-a-european-army/) - This paper will shed light on the historical evolution of the conceptualization of a European Army, and will then analyse institutions and policies in place, as well as ways in which NATO and the EU can cooperate in the defence sector. Finally, the obstacles to the creation of a European Army are assessed against the backdrop of the current Russian war with Ukraine and the recent adoption of the EU Strategic Compass.
- [Unpacking Female Representation in the Military](https://finabel.org/unpacking-female-representation-in-the-military/) - The involvement of women in the army con- stitutes a thorny issue in several countries where women are found in the margin com- pared to male combatants and there are sever- al nuances to the topic which will endeavour to highlight. In the same context, this paper will attempt to delineate the current situa- tion as well as explore the current initiatives taken in order to ameliorate the issues. Fur- thermore, it is essential to underline any gaps which account for an obstacle in the develop- ment of this situations. Firstly, we will reflect on the current state of art whilst we will introduce a theoretical framework to contextualise how the literature approaches the bipartition “women combatants or women civilians”. In order to have a more complete image of the situation, it is essential to utilize and compare statistical data. These data not only reflect the current circumstances but also identify what has already been done while underlying any existing gaps. The data used here can be found in the 2019 NATO The Annual Summary of the National Reports where all NATO mem- ber states submitted their national data. Fur- thermore, such National Reports are of signif- icant importance due to their comprehensive analysis of the situation for both women and men in the armed forces. Lastly, we will discuss the gaps as well as the opportunities aiming to integrate women thoroughly in the army.
- [The Strategic Value of the Black Sea](https://finabel.org/the-strategic-value-of-the-black-seat/) - The Black Sea is a strategic trade and transportation artery which connects Europe and Asia (NSC, 2022). The countries surrounding the coasts of the Black Sea are EU and NATO members (Romania and Bulgaria), former members of the Soviet Union (Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia) and Middle Eastern powers (Turkey). After the Cold War, the lack of agreement between Russia and the West on the power-sharing in the region and the disintegration of the Soviet Union caused a series of conflicts, which are still ongoing. Recently, Russia and Ukraine have built up their military power in the region, and NATO has stationed additional forces in Romania to enhance the Alliance's defence strategy (Miller, 2017). The Black Sea is, therefore more militarised and less stable than at any point since the end of the Cold War. Tensions and instability in this key region can seriously affect global commercial trade and maritime activities.
- [Promises Made are Not Promises Kept: Pledged and Delivered Supplies to Ukraine](https://finabel.org/promises-made-are-not-promises-kept-pledged-and-delivered-supplies-to-ukraine/) - Since February 24, 2022, the first day of Russian aggression against Ukraine, European countries across the continent have devoted themselves to being faithful allies of Ukraine. Some countries pledged significant financial aid, many donated necessary weapons, and nearly all have drafted sanctions against Russia. However, as war rages on in Ukraine it has all but left the front pages of newspapers in Europe in favour of the recent energy crisis, public tensions between the German and French heads of state, and the sudden resignation of Liz Truss. As a result, many civilians risk losing sight of the ongoing events in Ukraine despite their intensifying nature. Simultaneously, European countries have made fewer pledges of support and delivered less on their promises than they did at the start of the war (Ukraine Support Tracker - a Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine, 3/10/22). This report presents the recent forms of support that European countries have successfully delivered to Ukraine and the pledged support to create a conclusive summary of European military aid to Ukraine in the month of October. For full transparency, this article was finalised on November 3, 2022.
- [AI in Military Affairs: Its Role in the Decision-Making Process Towards a Counter-Terrorism Operation](https://finabel.org/ai-in-military-affairs-its-role-in-the-decision-making-process-towards-a-counter-terrorism-operation/) - Artificial Intelligence (AI) is reshaping and revolutionising several sectors of civil society by improving efficiency and reducing costs, with the military and defence fields also joining in this AI revolution (Richemond-Barak, 2022). AI can be defined as a system that solves complex tasks through adopting human approaches, including learning, creating, cognitive thinking, adapting and communicating (Nadikattu, 2020). Much of the discussion about AI is focused on its negative aspects, ignoring the positive implications that it can have for military affairs and decision-making processes, especially in order to protect civilians and reduce casualties, as well as in organizing counter-terrorism operations (Richemond-Barak, 2022).
- [Consequences of the War in Ukraine on the Arctic](https://finabel.org/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-on-the-arctic/) - The desire to access the Arctic's vast mineral reserves has always been a major driver of international attention towards the region. The Arctic is believed to contain 1,699 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and various other fuels, equal to the entirety of Russia’s oil reserves and three times those of the US (U.S Geological Survey, 2008). On top of this, by 2050, it is believed that the region above the Polar Circle may be completely ice-free, considering the rate at which the ice sheet is shrinking and the multiplier effect of warming seas and surface temperatures (La Rocca, 2022). This potential development could further increase the international race for Arctic raw materials.
- [The Impact of Weather Conditions on Amphibious Military Operations](https://finabel.org/the-impact-of-weather-conditions-on-amphibious-military-operations/) - This paper will analyse how weather conditions impact amphibious planning and the conduct of military operations. More precisely, this paper will scrutinize the different components of the broader concept of weather, assessing the impact that these components can have on amphibious warfare. To write this Info Flash, mainly sources coming from the US Marine Corps were taken into consideration, since they regularly publish analyses and studies. However, analysing the American doctrine regarding amphibious operations makes it possible to make similar considerations for the NATO doctrine, since the Alliance’s doctrines are considerably influenced by the US despite not being public knowledge.
- [Cargo Drones May Be the Future of Delivery Service](https://finabel.org/cargo-drones-may-be-the-future-of-delivery-service/) - Cargo Drones, Cargo Air Vehicles, or Heavy Lift Drones are the latest in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), or drone, technology. These pieces of equipment are being developed to transport cargo manually, remotely, and autonomously and may be used in civilian and military applications (Using cargo drones in last-mile delivery | Deloitte, 2018). Boasting impressive carrying power, cargo drones can lift anywhere from 2.26 to 2449.39 kilograms (Team, 2021). This carrying power establishes new possibilities for the delivery of packages without direct human involvement and may therefore be used to deliver lifesaving supplies to dangerous locations. The technology is also more environmentally friendly than traditional delivery services. Cargo drones are most commonly “electric or hybrid-electric vehicles with four or more rotors” (Using cargo drones in last-mile delivery | Deloitte, 2018). Some cargo drones can take off and land from a standing position, known as either an eVTOL (electric vertical take-off and landing) vehicle or VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) vehicle. VTOL makes cargo drones more versatile than cargo planes as they do not require a runway for operation. Many companies are in the process of developing proprietary cargo drone technology to improve upon traditional forms of delivery services.
- [Lebanon’s Crippling Crisis: Prospects for a Further EU Involvement in the Country’s Stability](https://finabel.org/lebanons-crippling-crisis-prospects-for-a-further-eu-involvement-in-the-countrys-stability/) - The Mediterranean region and the European continent are inextricably linked from a geographical, historical, and strategic point of view. For this simple reason, it is impossible for the countries that lie on the two shores of this almost-closed sea to ignore each other for a long time. Consequently, international cooperation between them has always been intense, being reinforced by strong cultural and economic ties. Nevertheless, due to the high degree of instability that traditionally affects this area, the EU’s foreign policy towards many of its southern neighbours has usually been dominated by the theme of the security–development nexus. Lebanon is no exception. Having its modern history characterized by recurring social unrest, economic crises and civil wars, this small country has often drawn the attention of European policymakers. In 2019 the nation that was once called “the Switzerland of Middle East” has fallen again into a severe political paralysis and started to experience a deep economic downturn, which undermines inter alia the normal implementation of cooperation programmes with the EU (World Bank, 2021) The general election held in May 2022 was intended to put an end to this situation, but it didn’t. For as long as the crisis perseveres, risk Lebanon risks falling into another devastating civil war is becoming feasible. Therefore, stronger European engagement to maintain the country’s stability seems to be a matter of necessity, and it could be one of the last opportunities to save Lebanon from sinking.
- [Why Chip Production is a National Security Issue](https://finabel.org/why-chip-production-is-a-national-security-issue/) - When we talk about “semiconductors,” we are talking about microchips. Microchips are in everything from cars to cell phones to missiles but having the fastest and most powerful microchips is essential to maintaining a military advantage (Zeiger, 2022). Nowadays the production of microchips grows exponentially and Moore, an electronics engineer who went on to run Intel predicted that the number of transistors on a silicon chip would double roughly every two years (Gianfagna, 2021). This projection is now known as Moore’s Law. Sixty years ago, four transistors could fit on a given chip, whereas today the number is closer to 11.8 billion (Heffernan, 2022).
- [The Russia - Iran Strategic Partnership in the Shadow of Ukraine's War](https://finabel.org/the-russia-iran-strategic-partnership-in-the-shadow-of-ukraines-war/) - Closer ties between Putin’s Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the field of security cooperation (voennoe sotrudnichestvo) has attracted significant attention from Western foreign policy-makers and academic scholars in recent years. Diplomatic isolation and commonly shared dissatisfaction with the long-established American hegemony has driven both countries into a pragmatic, stable and mutually beneficial rapprochement nearly a decade after a new chapter in their relationships was opened in 2012 (Ghadbeigy, 2017). By this time the return of Vladimir Putin to power was clearly interpreted as marking a watershed moment in Russian foreign policy doctrine and strategies that had long since been in vogue under the rule of Dmitriy Medvedev (Kozhanov, 2015).
- [Greece Develops its First Surveillance Drone Programme in Reaction to Turkey’s Bayraktar](https://finabel.org/greece-develops-its-first-surveillance-drone-programme-in-reaction-to-turkeys-bayraktar/) - The Greek skies will soon be dominated by the newly launched multipurpose Archytas drone. As geopolitical frictions with Turkey have reached a critical juncture in the Aegean Sea, Greek defence and security officials welcomed the development of the Archytas prototype with great enthusiasm in the face of the threat posed by the Bayraktar TB2 operating in Ukraine’s war. This is nothing new, as Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan spares no instant in criticising Greece despite both countries being NATO members. But the past few years have been marked by a surge in territorial clashes and acts of intimidation, as territorial waters have been continuously contested by both sides since the 1970s. Such reasons might explain Greece’s decision to equip itself with a new generation of high-performance combat UAVs.
- [Short-Term Necessities and Long-Term Implications of the Russian “Partial Mobilisation” Call](https://finabel.org/short-term-necessities-and-long-term-implications-of-the-russian-partial-mobilisation-call/) - After the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson in August, on the 21th of September Putin launched a call for “partial mobilisation” of Russian men between the ages of 18 and 50, with the aim of enlisting 300,000 soldiers amongst the reservists and former military personnel (Il Post, 2022). Three weeks later, the recruitment operation is said to have enlisted over 200,000 people, as stated by the Russian Defence Minister Shoigu (Cancian, 2022) (Il Post, 2022). Even if it is early to say, Russia is calculating whether the new recruits should be sent to the front without proper training as “cannon fodder” (Bathon, 2022), or whether to send them to the 80 camps and 6 training centres outlined by the Russian Defence Minister (Il Post, 2022). Currently the decision appears to be somewhere in between the two, with some of the recruits trained for fewer than three days before being sent to the front, while others completing the training phase.
- [China Persists in Sanctioning U.S. Defence Giants.](https://finabel.org/china-persists-in-sanctioning-u-s-defence-giants/) - Relations between the United States and China have been strained for a few years now, but tensions have increased in recent months due to several geopolitical events. One of them was the visit to Taipei by Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi last July, underpinning the United States’ support for Taiwan’s status. The current US Administration continues to adhere to the one China policy, as most other countries in the world do. In response, over the summer, Beijing increased the number of aggressive military exercises around the islands of the South China Sea, although China’s expert Dean Cheng of Heritage Foundation argued they were “likely pre-planned for months” (Cheng, 2022). Lately, Beijing appears to have at least partially aligned with Western thinking by calling on Russia to end the war in Ukraine as soon as possible, yet friction with Washington has been enhanced by Biden's latest statement regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty. In fact, China was strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed to Biden’s comment (Reuters, 2022), when the President of the US declared that US forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
- [The European Union as a Strategic Autonomous and Defence Technological Actor: Between Promises and Reality.](https://finabel.org/the-european-union-as-a-strategic-autonomous-and-defence-technological-actor-between-promises-and-reality/) - The nexus between the concepts of European Strategic Autonomy (EU-SA) and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) concerns the old willingness of the European Union (EU) to thrive as a global defence actor with autonomous decision-making and freedom of action. However, to do so, it is indispensable to achieve stronger technological sovereignty through balanced cooperation between Member States (MSs). The latter lack, inter alia, a common strategic culture, that is delaying the competitiveness and readiness of the European defence industry while leaving behind crucial investments in modern defence technologies. The EU finds itself in a reality where national interests prevail in a fragmented market with abundant duplicates of capabilities and collective budgetary deficiencies. For instance, this paper shall delve into the reasons why the EU is not yet a strategic autonomous and defence technological actor after actively working on this since 2013. This shall be done through an analysis of the two concepts – EU-SA and EDTIB – and an evaluation of the status quo. The final goal of this project is to prove that the prevalence of national interests over collective technological sovereignty is clogging the implementation of a tangible military-industrial base, without which the EU cannot become a strategic autonomous player in the defence industry.
- [International Humanitarian Law in Urban Warfare](https://finabel.org/international-humanitarian-law-in-urban-warfare/) - Urban environments have increasingly been at the forefront of a number of armed conflicts. This should come as no surprise, since an urban setting has the capability of producing a number of advantages for the defending side by negating any numerical or mechanical advantage the opposing force may have. In addition, cities make it easier for combatants to hide and blend in with the civilian population and conduct irregular military activities. While this might constitute an advantage for the conduct of military operations, it means that civilians could become entrenched in a combat situation. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that all sides of a conflict maintain the utmost regard for international humanitarian law. In line with the current conflict in Ukraine, this contribution will focus on the scope of international humanitarian law in an international armed conflict, between two or more internationally recognised States. As such, this InfoFlash aims to provide a general overview of three of the main principles which are of special interest in an urban environment: the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
- [14 NATO Allies, plus Finland, Agree to Develop the European Sky Shield Initiative](https://finabel.org/14-nato-allies-plus-finland-agree-to-develop-the-european-sky-shield-initiative/) - In response to the Russian war on Ukraine, neighbouring countries have decided to take concrete steps towards strengthening their air security. On October 13, 2022, fourteen NATO member countries, plus Finland, signed a Letter of Intent initiating the development of a “European Sky Shield Initiative” (NATO, n.d.). The European Sky Shield Initiative creates a joint defence system “through the common acquisition of air defence equipment and missiles by European nations” (NATO, n.d.). Furthermore, the project enhances interoperability between the countries and strengthens NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATO IAMD).
- [NATO’s Interoperability in the Asia-Pacific Area](https://finabel.org/natos-interoperability-in-the-asia-pacific-areaa/) - Last February, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping solidified their mutually supportive relationship with the issuance of the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. In the document, Russia reaffirms its support for the one China policy in reference to the Taiwan dispute. In return, China opposes the NATO enlargement policy by opposing both the inclusion of Eastern European countries and the increase of the North Atlantic Council’s interests in Pacific Asia. As a result of this geopolitical shift, NATO had to revaluate its strategic agenda in both Europe and Asia-Pacific. The 2022 Strategic Concept can be considered the main pillar of a new, more cohesive NATO strategy.
- [Enhanced Cooperation Between the EU and Ukraine Through a Military Training Mission: What to Expect from the EUMAM](https://finabel.org/enhanced-cooperation-between-the-eu-and-ukraine-through-a-military-training-mission-what-to-expect-from-the-eumam/) - On Wednesday, October 12, the 27 ambassadors of the EU Member States finally agreed upon the military training mission involving Ukrainian soldiers. The so-called “European Union Military Assistance Mission”, or EUMAM, which was pending since August, will allow the Member States to host training for 15.000 Ukrainian soldiers, 3.000 of whom will receive tactical combat training and specialised courses for engineers. More details will be decided during an EU Council meeting with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU members on October 17 in Luxembourg.
- [Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) Evolution and Impact on Tank Warfare](https://finabel.org/explosive-reactive-armour-era-evolution-and-impact-on-tank-warfare/) - With the live coverage of the war in Ukraine from media all around the world, it is easy to run into photos or videos of Russian tanks. In Ukraine, Russia’s main battle tank (MBT) is the T-72, but they also deployed some T-80s and some T-90s. By carefully looking at these units, it can be noticed that Russian, but also Ukrainian tanks are equipped with small blocks all around their armour. These blocks are an additional defensive armour, which serves the purpose to protect the tank and its crew from anti-tank weapons. This additional armour is called Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA).
- [The EU Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities](https://finabel.org/the-eu-energy-security-challenges-and-opportunities/) - Europe is experiencing an unprecedented energy crisis since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine started. This is highlighting the challenges that the continent is facing, especially concerning energy. This is one of the reasons why energy security plays a central role in the common security plans of the EU and NATO allies.
- [The European Union Kickstarts its Hypersonic Missile Defence Interceptor Programme (EU HYDEF)](https://finabel.org/the-european-union-kickstarts-its-hypersonic-missile-defence-interceptor-programme-eu-hydef/) - On the 20th of July 2022, the European Commission finally approved the plans to invest nearly €100 million for the development of the concept phase of the European Hypersonic Defence Interceptor Programme, also known as the EU HYDEF. As war has regretfully returned to the European continent, this €100 million investment is the largest grant in a €1.2 billion investment round in 61 European collaborative defence research and development projects. The programme has a projected duration of 36 months. According to the EDF’s factsheet on the EU HYDEF, the main aim of the project is to develop an adequate European interceptor which is capable of achieving the highest manoeuvrability and capability to respond to high velocity threats from 2035 onwards.
- [The French Modus Operandi Amidst The Return Of War In Europe: Produce More And Faster](https://finabel.org/the-french-modus-operandi-amidst-the-return-of-war-in-europe-produce-more-and-faster/) - As a result of the ongoing Russian war in Ukraine, the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, confirmed that France is now at the “dispute alert” level, which is only followed by a military confrontation. For this reason, during a meeting with defence manufacturers on September 6th, Lecornu highlighted the importance of simplifying the French military’s procurement and producing more and faster.
- [The New Scandinavian Asset: To What Extent Sweden and Finland NATO’s Membership Will Strengthen The Alliance?](https://finabel.org/strongthe-new-scandinavian-asset-to-what-extent-sweden-and-finland-natos-membership-will-strengthen-the-alliance-strong/) - Since the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, the Nordic countries or Scandinavian countries remained divided on their willingness to join the Alliance. Whereas Norway, Denmark, and Iceland directly joined NATO, Sweden and Finland chose not to. Nevertheless, although NATO’s security provision and mutual military assistance is apparent, it is less evident what Finland and Sweden would provide to the North Atlantic Alliance and how they would strengthen NATO’s strategic position.
- [The Legality of Nuclear Weapons](https://finabel.org/the-legality-of-nuclear-weapons/) - On 21 September, Russian Federation’s President Vladimir Putin announced the partial mobilisation of Russian citizens to reinforce Moscow’s military deployment in the Russian war in Ukraine (Ellyatt, 2022). In his speech, Putin remarked that Russia will protect its territorial integrity with ‘all the means at [our] disposal’ (The Washington Post, 2022). The statement struck fear in the West, as the nuclear threat lurks over Europe. With the usage of nuclear weapons being now a tangible risk, questions have been again raised about the legal status of such armaments under current international law.
- [Burkina Faso's Latest Coup and What it Means for European Security](https://finabel.org/burkina-fasos-latest-coup-and-what-it-means-for-european-security/) - Written by Domenico Farinelli In the early morning of 30th September 2022, heavy gunfire and explosions were heard in several parts of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso’s capital. Masked men blocked the main streets of the city and soon the fighting reached the “Ouaga 2000” upscale neighbourhood housing the presidential palace and all other major institutional headquarters. In the
- [European States Boost Defence Spending](https://finabel.org/european-states-boost-defence-spending/) - Written by Manel Bernadó European states face a complicated winter. The tide seems to have changed in Ukraine, but the conflict is far from over. Energy prices keep rising and colder months anticipate an energy crisis that will force governments in Europe to make difficult decisions. In this context many European countries are updating their
- [The EU's Mission to Iraq and the Country’s Persistent Instability](https://finabel.org/the-eus-mission-to-iraq-and-the-countrys-persistent-instability/) - On 7 September 2022, the Iraqi supreme court ruled that the national parliament could not be dissolved if not by itself. In doing so, it rejected a key demand made by Moqtada al-Sadr, a 48-years-old Shiite cleric followed by millions all around the country, who had vehemently asked for early elections. Currently, he leads the largest political group inside the Iraqi parliament, controlling as many as 73 of the chamber’s 329 seats. The top court’s decision followed a period of turmoil and social unrest that had started in late August, when al-Sadr publicly announced that he was seriously considering withdrawing from politics. Since then, its supporters have engaged in numerous armed clashes with both security forces and rival militias, throwing the entire country into disarray. How can it be that Iraq’s main political force advocates for a return to the polls, instead of taking part in the nation’s government? The reason should be sought in the fierce rivalry that opposes different Iraqis Shiite parties and which is becoming increasingly violent.
- [The Benefits of Lifting the Arms Embargo on Cyprus: Future Defence Developments](https://finabel.org/the-benefits-of-lifting-the-arms-embargo-on-cyprus-future-defence-developments/) - Written by Raquel Velasco Ceballos On the 16th of September, the US administration released an official statement lifting defence trade restrictions on Cyprus for the coming fiscal year. The embargo entered into force in 1987 to create a negotiated settlement to the conflict that involved Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Its main purpose was to prevent
- [Fittinging Ukraine’s Essentials into the American Industry Interests](https://finabel.org/fittinging-ukraines-essentials-into-the-american-industry-interests/) - Recent Ukrainian Armed Forces’ successes in the counteroffensive in the Kharkiv are outstanding. The liberation of Izyum and Kupiansk areas are mounting up to 6,000 km2 of the territory occupied by Russia. Western support, in particular the U.S. and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), have played a significant role in it.
- [What does International Law Say About Military Use of Outer Space, Legal Analysis of the McGill Manual](https://finabel.org/what-does-international-law-say-about-military-use-of-outer-space-legal-analysis-of-the-mcgill-manual/) - Since 2009, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has promoted and supervised a series of initiatives to improve interoperability between the Member States in joint operations involving the employment of helicopters. The Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP) has so far produced sixteen joint exercises, which have progressively gained wider participation, with eight countries (France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Portugal) providing their infrastructures for the operations.
- [Reinforcing European Military Cooperation: EDA’s Helicopter Initiatives](https://finabel.org/reinforcing-european-military-cooperation-edas-helicopter-initiatives/) - Since 2009, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has promoted and supervised a series of initiatives to improve interoperability between the Member States in joint operations involving the employment of helicopters. The Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP) has so far produced sixteen joint exercises, which have progressively gained wider participation, with eight countries (France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Portugal) providing their infrastructures for the operations.
- [The Road to Atlantic: China’s naval projection](https://finabel.org/the-road-to-atlantic-chinas-naval-projection/) - In the past decades, China has profoundly invested in the modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) moving China to the first position as the world’s largest maritime force with its size expected to grow in the future (U.S. Department of Defense 2021). Whereas China’s initial goal is to strengthen its Navy to match or surpass the United States global influence or power in the Indo-Pacific region, it is also to project its forces to protect China’s national interests abroad and gain a more important place in the international system. In doing so, China is using a combination of economic, political, and military tools, under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to evade the United States’ containment strategy and secure its strategic position.
- [Training a New Generation of Soldiers: the Use of Simulation Systems in the Swedish Armed Forces](https://finabel.org/training-a-new-generation-of-soldiers-the-use-of-simulation-systems-in-the-swedish-armed-forces/) - Since armies existed, countries faced the need to train them. In fact, the level of training and the modernisation of the equipment, tactics, morale, and other factors less reliant on human capital determine an army’s strength. This article aims at underlying how training techniques for the military are currently undergoing the biggest leap forward they have witnessed since the adoption of firearms. Here the author will take advantage of this topic to present his first-hand experience with modern-day military training techniques involving simulators.
- [The New German Vision of the EU as a Geopolitical Power: Implications of the "zeitendwende" Doctrine for the EU’s Security and Defence (Part II) ](https://finabel.org/the-new-german-vision-of-the-eu-as-a-geopolitical-power-implications-of-the-zeitendwende-doctrine-for-the-eus-security-and-defence-part-ii/) - On Monday 29th August 2022, the German Chancellor gives one of the founding speeches of the future Germany’s EU policy. Four years after Emmanuel Macron’s Sorbonne speech, Olaf Scholz drew in sand 4 pillars of upcoming changes for the EU as a geopolitical creature and global power. But just " noting a change of era does not yet make a programme " (Mennerat, 2022) and since EU already operate deep change at its levels. In this second part, this paper will intents to explore from a legal point of view what such a doctrine could implies for EU’s defence and security future but also for it bilateral and multilateral cooperation, regarding the most substantial proposals made the German Chancellor to build a new German’s impulsed EU policy.
- [Prioritising European Security Flanks: Extrapolating the EU’s Geopolitical Power to Ukraine](https://finabel.org/prioritising-european-security-flanks-extrapolating-the-eus-geopolitical-power-to-ukraine/) - The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), put into motion by the Maastricht Treaty, was supposed to underpin the EU's actorness and strengthen its defence capabilities. CSDP brings ‘an operational capacity to deploy civilian and military missions abroad’ (EEAS, 2022). Consequently, when it comes to interoperability per se, it should be considered from two perspectives: the technical and 'political' ones. The former envisages enhancing the cooperation among land forces on the ground while the latter grows in reaching coherence, efficiency and, even more critical – solidarity in pursuing the agreed strategy (Strategic Compass, 2022).
- [The New German Vision of the EU a Geopolitical Power: Implications of the "zeitendwende" doctrine for the EU’s security and defence (Part I)](https://finabel.org/the-new-german-vision-of-the-eu-a-geopolitical-power-implications-of-the-zeitendwende-doctrine-for-the-eus-security-and-defence-part-i/) - On Monday 29th 2022, the German Chancellor delivered one of founding speech preparing the future Germany’s EU policy. Four years after Emmanuel Macron’s Sorbonne speech, Olaf Scholz drew in sand 4 pillars of upcoming changes for the EU as a geopolitical entity and aspiring global power. However, even if the EU has been already operating deep change at some levels, just "noting a change of era does not yet make a programme" (Mennerat, 2022). Therefore, this two-part paper aims to explore the origine and the echoes of this concept and then, the legals implication of the most substantial proposals made by the German Chancellor for the EU’s defence and security future.
- [The Moscow Army Expo 2022 takes place amid the Russia-Ukraine war](https://finabel.org/the-moscow-army-expo-2022-takes-place-amid-the-russia-ukraine-war/) - The international military-technical forum "Army-2022" officially opened on August 15 and lasted until August 21 in the Moscow Region Exhibition Centre "Patriot". The event was organised by the Russian Ministry of Defence. The format of the forum included exhibitions, demonstrations, scientific and business programs as well as cultural and artistic events. The dominant agenda topics of business events were artificial intelligence technologies and the diversification of the Russian defence industry. (Aviation&Defence Universe, 2022). The annual expo comes nearly six months after the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and it included a variety of “family-friendly” exhibits designed to promote the Kremlin’s propaganda narrative. (Meduza, 2022).
- [Rethinking the EU Common Foreign and Defence Policy – New Proposals from the Ambrosetti Club](https://finabel.org/rethinking-the-eu-common-foreign-and-defence-policy-new-proposals-from-the-ambrosetti-club/) - The State of the Union address held on 14 September 2022 has em